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Tatjana Muravska  University of Latvia, Riga 
Political Economy of the Crisis in Latvia 2008-2010 – Key Contributing Factors 
Neo-liberal policy and economic transformation 
The severe economic downturn in Latvia, 2008-2010, was provoked by the world financial and economic crisis 2007-
2009. It had similarities with many other countries in the world: rapid growth of domestic demand facilitated by 
borrowing ease from banks, boom of real estate and positive growth expectations of foreign investments. Despite the 
similarities with other countries, the roots of the recent crisis go down in the annals of the modern history of Latvia. 
They also open a new scope of debate that contains potential for change in economic thought that eventually could 
positively influence changes in the political and economic structures of the country. 
Latvia and the other Baltic States were the fastest growing economies in Europe following the accession to the EU. 
GDP growth in Latvia was more than 10% per year during 2004-2007. In Estonia GDP growth in the same period was 
4.5% and in Lithuania- 8.1%.1 Between 2000 and 2008 (before the crisis), GDP per capita, measured in Purchasing 
Power Standards, increased from 37% of the EU average in 2000 to 57% in 2008.  According to the official statistics, 
this was the result of a convergence in indicators of standard of living that started with the prospects of EU enlargement 
and continued since after. This process could be perceived in two ways: as the outcome of EU integration, but also as a 
precondition to it. 
The apparent success of economic development in the country until 2008 and its economic transformation was based 
largely on the concept of a neo-liberal economic policy. Latvia since regaining its independence in 1991 along with the 
other Baltic states, Estonia and Lithuania, has applied the neo-liberal policies of the „Washington Consensus“. 
According to the neo-liberal concept and policy of the Bretton Wood institutions, transformation to a market economy 
from a centralised and regulated market required implementation of the first generation reforms and institutional 
changes aimed at building strong macroeconomic fundamentals.  Institutional reforms, privatization and restructuring of 
large enterprises  in all branches of national economy, radical fiscal reform, supported by the reform of tax policy and 
tax administration as well as the reform of budgetary processes, have been done according to  a “policy package” 
suggested by the “Washington consensus” and represented a “shock therapy” policy.2 The key fundamental suggestions 
received from the International Monetary Fund (IMF), relates to the establishment of a rigorous macroeconomic 
framework. Technical assistance, provided by the IMF and the World Bank, permitted for the first-generation reforms 
to be completed by the mid 1990s.  
During the transition period, and the implementation of the first generation reforms (1991-1999)3, the Latvian economy 
underwent three major downturns. The first was from 1991-1994 when the economy in 1992 shrunk by almost 35% 
with a dramatic decline in production and living standards. However in 1994, the rapid decline of GDP in Latvia 
stabilised. This year can be considered as a turning point and the beginning of the economic success story of Latvia that 
lasted until the crisis of 2008.  
The second downturn occurred in 1995when the internal banking and financial crisis damaged the economic system of 
the country.  In 1996, the economy started to recover.  Between 1996 and 1998, economic development began to 
flourish with an annual growth rates reached 6% of the GDP and represents an example of the conditional convergence 
theory4. By 1997, growth in Latvia was the most pronounced of the transition economies, and the annual economic 
growth of the country was higher than that of the EU during 1996-1998. However, in 1998, a third downturn took place. 
                                                        
1
  Eurostat. Flash Estimate 14 February 2008. 
2
  John Williamson (1990) What Washington Means by Policy Reform Peterson Institute for International Economics, 
http://www.iie.com/publications/papers/paper.cfm?ResearchID=486, (5/03/11); Grzegorz W. Kolodko (2002) Post Communist 
Transition and Post- Washington Consensus. The Lessons for Policy Reforms in Mario I. Blejer and Marko Skreb (eds.) 
Transition: The First Decade. The MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass. 
3
  In December 1999 the EU opened negotiations with Latvia about the accession to the EU and the Government of Latvia signed the 
Joint Assessment with the European Commission on economic policy priorities for the country. 
4
  Fischer S, Sahay R, A Vegh C (1998) How Far is Eastern Europe from Brussels IMF, WP/98/53,  http://mpra.ub.uni-
muenchen.de/20059/1/fischer-sahay-vegh-brussels.pdf,  5/03/11 
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This was the result of the Russian economic and financial crisis of 1998 that had a negative impact on Latvia The 1998 
rouble devaluation in Russia forced Latvia to re-orient its exports from Russia and the Common Independent States 
(CIS) towards the EU countries, and thus abandon what was once Latvia's main export market. However the Russian 
and CIS markets became problematic for Latvian producers not only as a result of the weakened demand but also due to 
the strong Latvian currency, subject of the philosophy and independent position of the Bank of Latvia. In the medium 
term this loss of exports to Russia and the CIS was compensated in part by exports to the EU. 
The impact of the Russian crisis on Latvia strongly influenced trade patterns and forced Latvia’s producers to reorient 
trade flows to the EU countries, which grew by 16-17% per year by the time of the EU accession in 2004, and 
accounted for approximately 50% of Latvian exports re-establishing the pre World War II trade pattern.5 Steadily a 
trend of inter-trade with the EU has changed to intra- trade. The second-generation reforms have been implemented 
with the prospect for Latvia to become a member of the European Union. Methodologically it is aknowledged that the 
second-generation reform process is focused on real convergence, which requires structural adjustment and overcoming 
the income gap between Latvia and the EU level. 
Related to the above described trends in trade, the Government identified comparative advantages of the country, 
particularly as far as the product composition of trade is concerned: wood and wood products dominated exports, and 
the production of these also made a decisive contribution to the growth of GDP. Another important industry was textile. 
Export of textile to the EU was stimulated by cheap labour cost, as the industry is relatively labour intensive. However, 
this advantage has eroded over the following years when Latvian wages increased to catch up with Western Europe.  
The economic progress of the country required understanding of the emerging composition of production that would 
have to be complementary or competitive to the structures prevailing in the European Union. Support of those sectors of 
the economy that should be developed in order to benefit the most from EU membership, was of crucial importance. 
The economic structure as a whole has been transformed since the transition began in 1991. Post World War II 
developed large industrial enterprises and industrially based agriculture that has been predominant until the transition 
started. These have been dismantled with the first generation reforms and, in particular, through the privatization 
process. Agriculture and manufacturing by 2001 accounted for 14% of the GDP, and the service sector accounted for 
70% of GDP.6 This pattern continued until the crisis of 2007-2010, thus resulting in a serious impediment for Latvia to 
catch up and become a serious competitor with the countries in Europe. It is important to stress that in Latvia as in some 
other countries in the EU, service and construction sectors grew rapidly during 2000-2008. At the same time 
manufacturing lagged behind. 7 
While employment in agriculture and industry has declined, it has risen steadily in construction and in all other service 
sectors, apart from business and financial services, but including public administration, education and health. Latvia’s 
National Development Plan8 for 2007-2013 at the time of its preparation in 2006, put emphasis on the development of 
knowledge-based industries to stress in the future comparative advantages in those sectors, which Latvia has. This 
complements the traditional timber and textile industries with such sectors as biotechnology, timber chemistry, 
pharmaceutics - all of which are knowledge based and require high technology.  
Latvia has been generally following a set of monetary and fiscal policies demanded by the international market. Free 
convertibility and the liberal foreign exchange policy have secured competitiveness on the foreign exchange market. 
The national currency (LVL) was pegged to the SDR in 1991 and since 2004 has fixed the peg rate of the lats to the 
euro. 9It has been quite stable since its introduction, and the domestic money supply has 100% foreign exchange 
                                                        
5
  Bank of Latvia, http://www.bank.lv/eng/main/all/sapinfo/presrunas/latviainfocus/, 5/03/11 
6
  Ministry of Economy of the Republic of Latvia, 2005 
7
  Muravska, Tatjana. Crisis inLatvia- Economic Transformation: The Regional Dimension and Development Constrains (2012) in 
Adaptability and Change- The regional Dimensions in Central and Eastern Europe, eds: Grezgors Gorzelak, Chor-Ching Goh and 
Karoly Fazekas, SHOLAR, Warsaw,pp240-263. 
8
  Latvian National Development Plan 2007-2013.Ministry of Regional Development and Local Government of the Republic of 
Latvia, Ltd."Jelgavas tipogrāfija” 2006. 
9
  Since the beginning of 1994 when the Latvian currency was pegged to the SDR, the unit of accounting of the Internationally 
Monetary Fund (1 XDR = 0.7997 LVL). The Bank of Latvia on December 30, 2004, has fixed the peg rate of the lats and the euro 
Tatjana Muravska 
 3 
coverage. Exchange rate pegs in Latvia have provided currency stability and significant progress with disinflation. 
However, when the exchange rate is fixed, the burden of adjustment in response to external shocks, or shifts in relative 
competitiveness, falls elsewhere on the economy. To the extent that prices or wages are not flexible enough, and the 
real economy has to adjust.  
As a result of comparatively stable and liberal economic policies, the Latvian economy was successful in attracting 
foreign direct investments (FDI) before the accession to the EU10. This had a positive influence on the rapid 
development of the foreign trade relations. There have been substantial changes in foreign direct investments over time 
including the modest investments in 1992-1996 that increased considerably in 1997. the greatest gains of FDI were 
experienced after accession to the EU as the result of a combination of political and economic factors. The major part of 
FDI influx has been in transport and communication, port facilities, industrial sector, food and wood processing, 
textiles, chemicals, base metals, metal products and machinery. It is important to mention that FDI has also been 
significant in real estate and construction  
Since accession to the EU and until the recent crisis, the FDI stock more than doubled in both goods and services. In 
terms of the production of goods, a particularly rapid increase of the FDI has been observed in the energy sector (by 
almost 5 times), and more than 5 times in the construction sector. The dynamics of FDI was not so rapid in the 
manufacturing sector and has increased only by 1.5 times.11 However, the majority of the FDI were financial 
transactions that are not included in direct and portfolio investment, but represented trade loans, other credits and 
borrowings, cash and deposits, etc. The biggest share of the financial influx belonged to commercial banks. This trend 
was stimulated by the open regime of the financial account and the fixed currency exchange rate. Nordic and German 
banks (Skandinaviska Enskilda Banken, Swedbank, Nordea, DnBNORD) mainly, have increased their stake in 
ownerships and new acquisitions in the financial sector.  
In 2000, Latvia became an integral part of the European banking system. The real time gross settlement system was 
introduced, which strengthened motivation of financial capital to “settle” in Latvia. Since 2005 the leading position in 
FDI belonged to financial services. Influx of FDI, as percent of GDP, was the highest (8%) in 2006 and then was 
reduced to 3% in 2009. The intensity of FDI flows in Latvia, like in almost all countries in the world, is considerably 
weaker than before the crisis.12 The high levels of investment were the result of the intensified influx of foreign 
financial resources into the national economy after accession to the EU, while domestic savings were too low, and 
cannot be considered as a sufficient source of investment. However, a number of potential risks for the future of real 
convergence existed and associated with the scale of the current account deficit and inflationary pressures. Stable 
financing of the current account deficit due to strong flows of FDI plus cross-border credit transfers from Nordic banks 
to their subsidiaries in Latvia, helped to sustain economic development in pre-crisis period.  
At the same time, inflation increased in 2004, rising to 7.3 percent, reached 10% in 2007 and was over 15% in 2008, 
due in part to the rise in administratively regulated prices13, the harmonization of indirect tax rates in the context of EU 
accession, and high world oil prices. A negative factor in stimulating inflation was the growth of private sector credit 
and real estate. Strong domestic demand and a disproportionate current account balance pushed inflation beyond the 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
at 1 EUR = 0.702804 LVL, which took effect on January 1, 2005 in line with the government approved plan for Latvia's 
preparation for full-fledged membership in the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). Bank of Latvia, 
http://www.bank.lv/eng/main/all/monpolicy/ls-euro/cmp1/, 2/04/11  
10
 Foreign investors get national treatment, and they are free to engage in any activity, convert and transfer their earnings. Companies 
established before 1995 received 4-8 years tax holidays. Since 2001, large investments – both domestic and foreign – are eligible 
for corporate income tax holiday of up to 40 percent of the invested amount, in line with the limit set by EU competition rules. 
Companies manufacturing high-tech products enjoy a tax holiday of 30 percent of the investment; in the case of small and 
medium-sized enterprises it amounts to 20 percent. The corporate income tax rate has fallen gradually, reaching 15 percent in 
2004. The withholding tax on dividends amounts to 10 percent. 
11
 Ministry of Economy of the Republic of Latvia, 2004-2008. 
12
 Ministry of Economy of the Republic of Latvia, 2011. 
13
 According to the data provided by the Central Statistical Bureau, in 2008, 11.46% of all goods and services listed in the Consumer 
Price Index were services with administratively regulated prices. These include services that are regulated by the Public Utilities 
Regulation Commission, services that are regulated by local government regulators, as well as other services that have regulated 
prices. 
Political Economy of the Crisis in Latvia 2008-2010 – Key Contributing Factors 
 4 
10% threshold. In 2010, the annual inflation reached 2.5%. The main contributors to the inflation was the prices for 
energy and food. For example, petrol prices rose by 14.2%, whereas diesel fuel went up by 19.9%; heating increased by 
19.4% and natural gas by 16.3%; food prices went up by 8%.14 
The economic downturn started in the first half of 2008 and originated in the reversal of the domestic real estate boom. 
This worsened rapidly and affected GDP growth rates, which dropped to 4.6% in 2008. The hardest downturn was in 
retail, real estate and construction. The budget deficit was 1.6% of GDP in before the accession in 2003 and below 1% 
of GDP every year after 2004, before rising to 4.1% in 2008 and 9% in 2009. The budget deficit was narrowed to 7.6% 
(targeted at 8.5%) of GDP in 2010, and for the 2011 it was projected at 6 % of GDP and 3% in 2012. 15  Latvia’s current 
major financial policy goal is to enter the euro zone by 2014.  
Large domestic consumption as a result of liberal credit policy by banks (majority of them are Scandinavian crediting 
institutions) in Latvia, was one of the reasons for the loan- giving boom in the country when foreign currency loans 
have dominated. Experts from the European Commission, IMF as well as the European Central Bank have already 
stressed the danger of this situation prior to the crisis, but the ruling parties ignored warnings from the international 
financial community that the economy was dangerously ‘overheated.’ Too little was done and too late to avoid an 
almost inevitable catastrophic outcome in terms of a ‘hard landing’.16 
Unfortunately, the government’s decision to limit housing loans through the requirement for buyers to provide co-
funding in the value of at least ten per cent of the value of the purchase and the proof of taxed income from the State 
Revenue Service, was introduced too late.  The Credit Register of the Bank of Latvia was also created only in 2007 and 
launched in 2008.17 In addition, the Latvian population is still lacking experience in adjusting to the new rules of a 
market economy imposed by the neo- liberal approach to economic development, which resulted in  an unjustifiably 
high increase of housing and other   types of loans. 
The catalysis of the rapid economic downturn was the announced insolvency in November 2008 of the second largest 
bank by total assets and the only Latvian commercial bank - Parex Bank. Despite the nationalisation of the bank, rapid 
capital outflows continued and the government introduced deposit withdrawal restrictions. Consequently, non-resident 
deposits had in general decreased by 19.2 % in one year by December of 2008 in Latvia18. In general, the global 
financial turmoil put a blockage on credit channels, and investment flows into Latvia drained off. The Parex Bank case 
very seriously affected this process. The FDI according to the Central Statistical Bureau amounted 23.5 million euro in 
Q1 of 2009, down almost 94 % from 371 million euro in Q1 2008. CSB data shows that the adjusted GDP figure for the 
first quarter of 2009 was -18.0%. International experience shows that economic growth has not always been a symptom 
of economic overheating. The so-called “overheating” of the Latvian economy was and continues to be discussed by 
experts. However, no forecasts have been made for such deep downturn as Latvia experienced.  
On 23 March, 2010, the Latvian Cabinet of Ministers approved the restructuring plan of Parex Bank and later submitted 
the plan to the European Commission. According to the plan, a part of the Bank‘s assets were used for the creation of a 
new bank, Citadele, with a stable financial base. The decision envisages that until 2014, no additional state budget 
funds, apart from the Treasury’s deposit for capitalisation in the amount of  146.55 million euro for financing equity 
                                                        
14
 Central Statistical Bureau of Latvia (CSB), 2011. 
15
 CSB April 18, 2011; Declaration of the Intended Activities of the Cabinet of Ministers of the Republic of Latvia, 
http://www.mk.gov.lv/en/mk/darbibu-reglamentejosie-dokumenti/valdibas-deklaracija-eng/ ,20/04/11 
16
 IMF (2008) World Economic Outlook: Housing and the Business Cycle, April  
08. Washington DC: International Monetary Fund, http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2008/01/index.htm, 9/01/11. 
17
 Bank of Latvia, http://www.bank.lv/eng/main/all/lvbank/register/register/, 9/01/11 
18
 The Parex Bank restructuring component required large funding as the Parex Bank (assets equivalent to more than 20% of GDP) 
was taken over by the government following a run on deposits and the consequent need to avoid default on the 775 million euros 
($1 billion) of syndicated credits due in 2009. The problems at Parex Bank were one of the main reasons for Latvia to apply to the 
IMF and EU for financial help, since the syndicated credit had the right to demand repayment of the debt immediately following a 
change in ownership at the bank, and the government needed the institutional support to be able to renegotiate and rollover the 
debt. As a result the Latvian authorities have been able to issue guarantee for the refinancing of syndicated loans of EUR 775 
million due in 2009 (euro 275 million in February and euro 500 million in June). The risk of further deposit withdrawals from 
Parex Bank, especially by non-residents, will continue despite the effective nationalisation of the bank. At present negotiations 
with the EBRD take place for EBRD to become a partner of the Bank. 
Tatjana Muravska 
 5 
capital during the division phase, will be needed. The decision does not provide for any other additional investment of 
state capital in the Parex Bank or the separated bank. Prime Minister Valdis Dombrovskis stated: “ Parex Banka has 
received state aid in amount of.565 billion euro, and the decision provides for no more than 1.85 billion euro of 
aggregate state investments, including guarantees. The amount is based on calculations by the Finance Ministry and the 
Latvian Privatisation Agency as adequate for ensuring sufficiency of both banks – the Parex Bank and another bank that 
was separated from the Parex Bank. Harmonisation of these decisions with the European Commission ensured that the 
restructuring model is viable and will not distort competition in the EU internal market. The previously widespread 
policy of lending without any in-depth research into a loan applicant’s credit history was suddenly replaced by a much 
more cautious approach. Together with an increase in value-added tax, this has profoundly influenced consumer 
behaviour. 
In just a year, the economic boom was replaced by a crisis that made foreign borrowing unavoidable. A government 
programme to restore confidence and macroeconomic stability has been initiated based on an agreement with the IMF. 
This programme involves a .5 billion euro injection of liquidity into Latvia, including contributions from the EU, the 
IMF the Nordic countries, and the World Bank.19 It is widely acknowledged by experts and the public in Latvia that 
fiscal management carried out by the government of Latvia prior to the crisis was pro-cyclical and immature. This could 
be explained by the behaviour of political coalitions aimed at the redistribution of the state budget funds as a result of 
the implementation of supplementary annual budgets at the end of the fiscal year, which always increases government 
spending. As a result, the economy suffered from imbalances. Having the EU’s highest GDP growth until 2007, largest 
credit expansion, house price increases, and high inflation, Latvia has currently the largest account deficit of all EU 
states as well as the highest private sector debt in the CEEC. 
Labour market and economic democracy 
Social protection and employment policies represent two conflicting trends in the context of socio-economic system 
development. this represents another feature in the building of a market economy in Latvia. The experience of the 
country can contribute to the modern conceptual debate in Europe of economic democracy and the transition from the 
capitalist welfare state to democratic socialism. The major themes under consideration are focused on the free market, 
market socialism and socialisation of the market.  
These debates are determined to great extend by the ‘Swedish Model’ of socialism and theories of Gösta Rehn, one of 
the fathers of the ‘Swedish Model’, and Rehn-Meidner Model’ Rudolf Meidner. The most influential economic model 
of the twentieth century is known as the ‘wage earner funds20. As a result of the economic crisis in the 1970s and 1980s 
and its consequences, these models became the most widely used in the Old Member States in the EU. The fundamental 
question remains whether market forces should play a central role in the economy or whether they should function 
under the pressure of democratic decision making. 
The socio-economic democracy concept21 is foreseen through the implementation of social policy and social protection.  
This concept is aimed to minimise a potential conflict in the decision making process on the subject of the wealth 
distribution in a society and is focused on such issues as the concentration of wealth and democratic principles.  A 
macro-level approach to this dilemma requires the involvement of a government to develop a mechanism for 
harmonisation of the interests of different social groups. Besides, this approach requires certain strategies for the 
transformation of power and property by the promotion of further democratisation of a welfare state and public sector, 
corporative management, cooperatives and self-management.  
                                                        
19
 The authorities reaffirmed their commitment to putting the budget deficit on a rapidly declining  path from 2010 onward in order to 
meet the Maastricht criteria for euro adoption as quickly as possible; 
IMF, http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pr/2010/pr1047.htm,  5/04/11 
20
  Brian Burkitt, Phillip Whyman (1994). “Employee Investment Funds in Sweden: Their Past, Present and Future”, Journal: 
European Business Review, vol. 94, no 4, pp. 22-29; Lennart Erixon (2008), “The Rehn-Meidner Model in Sweden: Its Rise, 
Challenges and Survival” , Department of Economics, Stockholm University, http://www.ne.su.se/paper/wp08_02.pdf, 9/01/11 
21
 Economic democracy is a concept that was developed in the 19th and 20th centuries with the main idea to apply democratic 
principles in an economic system. 
Political Economy of the Crisis in Latvia 2008-2010 – Key Contributing Factors 
 6 
Countries that have rather regulated economies and apply contra-cyclical measures experienced much less turbulence 
during the recent crisis. For example, Germany, Austria, the Scandinavian countries and Canada. These countries 
pursued the classical path of protection of domestic industry, public infrastructure spending, banking system 
regulations, and progressive taxation, public health and workplace safety regulations. 
In Latvia, neo- liberal policy and the path of the radical free market economic reconstruction did not provide provisions 
of an inclusive welfare state system. Development of social dimension in Latvia before the accession to the EU was 
significantly influenced by a conflicting trend of social protection and employment policies. Nevertheless, international 
organisations such as the World Bank, United Nations Development Programme, International Labour Organisation and 
the European Union suggested and implemented programmes and projects that help to establish a legal framework  
required to provide a social safety net system. Despite the fact that Latvia has signed several international agreements 
on human rights, welfare as well as social protection22, Latvian legislation does not provide an explicit definition of the 
term ‘social protection’23. It is important to stress that major legislative steps to develop the social protection system 
were taken in the pre-accession period. The accession period required the design and implementation of the National 
Employment Plan launched in 2004 and National Action Plan for Reduction of Poverty and Social Exclusion (2004) 
that was in line with the Single National Economy Strategy (2004-06) Joint Memorandum on Social Inclusion 
(2003)24. The Ministry of Welfare in Latvia has issued two important strategic documents: the “Conception of the 
Development of Labour Protection from 2007–2013” and “The Programme for Development of Labour Protection from 
2007-2010”. At the same time, while the economic development aspect and its various components are fully 
recognized, the social dimension is more diffused and not always fully integrated in the development process. This 
increases the risk of increasing the lack of public confidence regarding the stability and sustainability of the safety net 
system in general.  
A controversial issue in the development of the pension system was the complete transfer of administrative rights of the 
state’s funded pension funds to the private sector. It has lead to a high concentration of financial resources within the 
private pension plans and investments of these resources abroad, especially the US bonds. consequently, these resources 
are not facilitating development of Latvian national economy, but rather working against the Bank of Latvia 
intervention policy. The increase in economic activities since 1999 has witnessed a significant degree of convergence. 
Latvia appeared to have a clearly positive development of GDP per capita from 2005 to 2007 and rose above 50% of 
the EU average.25 
Over the period from 2003 and until the crisis in 2008, the employment rate increased by 6.5 percent and the 
unemployment rate decreased by 4.5 percent. The number of average yearly benefits recipients decreased slightly every 
year after EU accession, following the general trend since 1999. On the contrary, the average unemployment benefit 
and the associated social insurance expenditures gradually increased. The rise in the unemployment benefit is linked to 
increase of wages in the economy, but also to more legalization of employment (or rather paying social insurance 
contributions from full salary, reduction of prevalence of “ envelope wages”). 
                                                        
22
 The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, United Nations General Assembly resolution 217 A (III) from10 December 
1948.European Social Charter, Council of Europe Treaty, adopted in 1961, revised in 1996. 
(http://www.hrcr.org/docs/Social_Charter/soccharter.wpd). Constitution of the Republic of Latvia (1992), as amended, 
www.likumi.lv  9/01/11 assures that everyone has rights to social security when old or in the case of work inability or 
unemployment. 
23
  EC Regulation Nr. 322/97 art.2. 
24
  National Employment Plan (European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions. 
www.eurofound.europa.eu/areas/qualityoflife/eurlife/index.php?template=3&radioindic=dDomain=3 3/03/11 and National Action 
Plan for Reduction of Poverty and Social Exclusion (2004-06 (accepted on July 23, 2004), that was in line with the Single 
National Economy Strategy (2004- 06), /Tautsaimniecības vienotā stratēģija, 2004/.www.likumi.lv/doc.php?id=72377  3/03/11; 
Joint 
 Memorandum on Social Inclusion (2003), prepared by Latvia together with European Commission (JIM), signed on December18, 
2003. The Ministry of Welfare in Latvia has issued two important strategy documents: the “Conception of the Development of 
Labour Protection from 2007–2013” and ‘The Programme for Development of Labour Protection from 2007–2010”. 
25
 Eurostat. 2008, http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/cache/ITY_OFFPUB/KS-SF-08-112/EN/KS-SF-08-112-EN.PDF, 3/03/11 
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The expenditures on social protection have been steadily increasing since 2000 reaching almost 2 million euro  in 2007. 
However, this expenditure was around 30% in 2007 in Belgium (30.1%), Denmark (29.1%), Germany (28.7%), France 
(31.1%), the Netherlands (29.3%), Austria (28.5%) and Sweden (30.7%), and below 15% in Latvia (12.2%), Estonia 
(12.4%) and Lithuania (13.2%). These disparities reflect differences in living standards and also indicatives of the 
diversity of national social protection systems and of the demographic, economic, social and institutional structures 
specific to each Member State26. Accession to the EU has promoted discussion on health and safety issues at the 
workplace as the accession has re-opened inherent tensions in the EU policy making in health and safety as a result of 
incompatible  two  objectives: the need to ensure broad member state compliance with regulation around agreed 
minimum standards through active regulatory enforcement and the promotion of voluntary initiatives in the 
management of work place risks and hazards in order to create “a culture of prevention”. 
According to the European Agency for Safety and Health at work and estimating EU labour forces is approximately 
about 220 million. The fatalities rate per million are at 25 in the EU compared to over 50 in Latvia. The estimated cost 
of work place accidents in the EU is 20 million euro per year. For Latvia alone it is approximately 100 million euro per 
million workers. However, in view in the more than double workplace accident rates in Latvia using fatalities as an 
indicator, the cost of workplace accidents in Latvia may exceed 200 million euro. Thus, workplace accidents represent 
not only human tragedy, but also a major economic burden that must be addressed urgently. As a result of the crisis, at 
the end of 2009, the ration of jobseekers exceeded 20% of the economically active population and wages decreased 
significantly, especially in the public sector. Due to the labour market and crediting conditions, disposable income of 
the population decreased. Government expenditure was substantially limited in order to reduce the budget deficit, which 
rose due to declining tax revenues. Unemployment has continued to increase. In June 2010, the average seasonally-
adjusted unemployment rate in Latvia was 20%.27  
Social exclusion and poverty are not sufficiently recognised in the country and regional disparities in economic 
development remain very significant with the factor of almost 2 to 1 (comparing Riga with the rural areas). Since the 
income in the country has increased the number of people receiving social support from he municipalities has been 
reduced by 2/3 between 2004 and 2007 –from 74700 to 26800 people.28 the current economic crisis conditions have 
undoubtedly worsened further and in turn will negatively influence the demographic situation and labour-market in the 
country.  
The social assistance available to reduce poverty compared to the EU has always been considerably lower and trends 
indicate the deterioration of the situation. In the EU -27 through social assistance, the at-risk-of-poverty rate is reduced 
from 26% to 16 % while in Latvia in 2004 the reduction was from 26 % to 19% and in 2007 from 27 to 21%. 29 The 
State Employment Agency is the main institution involved with unemployment issues and implementing active labour 
market policies, including the European Social Fund projects. special support has been granted to the unemployed from 
socially vulnerable groups – persons with disabilities, long-term unemployed, persons with less than general secondary 
or professional education, elderly (over 50 years), people with one or more dependents and ethnic minorities. These 
activities are co-financed by the European Social Fund.  
                                                        
26
 Evidence suggests that in Europe there is a general tendency for countries with relatively high levels of GDP per head to have a 
more equal distribution of income (as measured by Gini index), whereas with rapid economic development also the Gini index 
increases, i.e., the gap between the rich and the poor increases. In Latvia the Gini index s increasing by about 1% every year since 
2004 widening social gap in Latvian society. Income is more equally distributed in most EU Member States than in Latvia. The 
Gini index in 2004 in EU was 32.7, while in Latvia – 35.5, which compares to US at 35.7.  
 Regional analysis of Latvia’s per capita GDP reveals another cause for concern: increasing regional disparities in personal 
disposable income. The Gini index measuring inequality in the distribution of per capita disposable income in 2006 was 0.36 
compared to a level of 0.30 in 1996. 
27
 CSB, 2010. 
28
 Ministry of Welfare of the Republic of Latvia, 2008. 
29
 Eurostat Database. In the “Laeken Poverty Indicators” to monitor progress in the fight against poverty and social exclusion, the 
income threshold used to measure poverty was fixed at 60 percent of the national median income in each member state. This is 
similar to the concept of the EU Regional and Cohesion policies. The absolute poverty line defined by the World Bank is not 
relevant to this context. See for more information World Bank Report No.38437 LV “Latvia: Sharing the High Growth Dividend 
A Living Standards Assessment”, Poverty Reduction and Economic Management Unit Europe and Central Asia Region, March 
28, 2007. 
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Economic out-migration of the working population from 15 to 65 years old, including people of reproductive age from 
15 to 49 years old, has intensified during the crisis.30. Major reasons for migration are the following: income level, 
unemployment and poor social security system, quality of life and lack of career opportunities. Eurostat estimates31 by 
2030, the population of Latvia is expected to fall to 2 million, and to 1.8 million by 2050. The proportion of the 
population over 65 years was 17% in 2008 (12.7% in the EU), but is expected to rise to 22% in 2030, and 34% in 2060.  
The old age dependency ratio32 is expected to reach as high as 65% in 2060. In addition, life expectancy is also growing 
which means that people over 80 years old is increasing. The proportion of the population that has survived to live over 
80 will increase from 3.6% in 2008 to 12% in 2060. The economically active population will fall, and the inactive 
population will grow.  This means people will have to become more productive to provide for the living conditions of 
the elderly based on the current level.33 It may also turn out to be the case that it will not be the young people who will 
care for the old, but rather the old who will care for the even older.  
Lack of labour is an important constraint to consider for economic recovery and the further development of the country. 
In itself, the demography implies increasing social budget requirements including a need for more healthcare, social 
houses, care work.  Social policy decisions such as potentially increasing the retirement ages also required but heavily 
debated in Latvia and amongst World Bank experts. It is obvious that in order to prevent further population outflows 
,attention must be focused on making Latvia a more hospitable place for its own people to live and work which requires 
effective policy choices for sustainable development, and Cohesion policy implementation; given that the country’s 
human resources for successful economic restructuring are limited.  
However, the administrative implementation of the social and employment policies is a complex process and 
requires the active involvement of a number of government departments and agencies such as the Ministry of 
Welfare, Ministry of Health, State Employment Agency and etc. It also requires ensuring a social dialog with 
the stakeholders. Currently, the EU policy makers are confronted by conflicting social and economic goals, 
i.e., high levels of productivity and growth and the maximization of social protection, inclusion and 
cohesion. However, the EU Social policy and the Lisbon Strategy can be a tools for EU Member States in 
the process of adapting to the more competitive environment brought by the new economic environment that 
resulted from the crises and expectance neo-liberal policies for development of this is critically important for 
the further reform of the European social and employment policies. Given the diversity that exists, reform 
can only be addressed at the national level.  
Conclusions 
The crisis clearly shows, that the model of a service-based economy and excessive dependence on foreign finance and 
cost advantage, did not create an immunity to the crisis. National economic policy should be ready to react proactively 
and take contra-cyclical measures. The Government and Parliament should work together and respond to the current 
crisis in improving legislation that will foresee legitimate actions to respond to economic disasters, by having financial 
reserves to keep macroeconomic fundamentals strong. 
                                                        
30
 The average estimated number of people, leaving country in 2009, might be average 30 000 persons. Between 2004 and 2008, 76 
000 social security numbers were granted in the UK and Ireland to persons from Latvia; another 4 000 were registered in other 
countries of the EEA.  After a peak in 2005, workforce emigration slowed down in 2006-2007 and regained momentum in mid-
2008 and especially 2009. According to CSB, the number of people leaving a country for a purpose of living or working in 2008 
had 43,6% increase comparing to 2007. The number of Latvian citizens and non-citizens registered in the UK in the 1st quarter of 
2009, namely 4 400, was much higher than in any other quarter. Even in Ireland, which has been particularly hard hit by the crisis, 
the number of registered persons from Latvia in the first 8 months of 2009 was the same as in the corresponding period in 2008, 
namely 2 500. Countries of destination: Great Britain, Ireland, Northern Europe and Germany. Mostly viewed workplaces by 
sectors and groups of professions are: occupations in agriculture, forestry and fishing, construction accommodation and food 
services, transportation sector and human health. 
31
 EUROPOP, 2008, convergence scenario.  
32
 Old-age dependency ratio - number of persons aged 65 and over expressed as a percentage of the projected number of persons 
aged between 15 and 64. 
33
 Cunska Z., Muravska T. Cunska Z. Muravska T. (2009) “Social Policy Implementation in Latvia: Post EU Accession” in 
Promotion of Social Policies- an Investment in the Future, Riga: EC Representation in Latvia and the University of Latvia. 
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The current economic situation requires fulfilling a dual task: to maintain the long-term goals of the social policies and 
to respond to economic and social challenges. The EU Social policy and the Lisbon Strategy can be tools for EU 
Member States in the process of adapting to the more competitive environment brought by globalisation and current 
crisis. The fundamental question remains whether a pure neo-liberal approach to economic development, or a more 
ridged set of state regulations related to economic behaviour of private companies and financial institutions, taking into 
account the democratic decision making process, should be implemented in Latvia?  
Economic democracy as a concept that was developed and strengthened at times of economic crises in many EU 
countries should be also implemented in the New Member States, according to the same principles as in the other 
European countries. The challenge to balanced economic and social policies agendas is also a major challenge in 
countries struggling for economic and social convergence with the rest of the EU, as is the case for Latvia. 
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Kalev Kukk  Tallinn, Estonia 
Estonia's Roller Coaster Ride 
Introduction 
The restoration of independent statehood and the collapse of the Soviet central planning system in 1991 allowed for a 
renaissance of Estonia’s national economy. According to estimates of the European Comparison Program, Estonia’s 
GDP per capita at current prices was only 5 per cent of that of Austria in 1993.1 Austria’s purchasing power parity (ppp) 
was five times greater than Estonia’s. Such a significant backlog was typical of all European post-socialist countries 
(Table 1). 
Table 1:  GDP per capita in some European Post-Socialist countries compared to Austria in 1993 (Austria = 100) 
  On ppp basis At current prices 
Slovenia 48 28 
Czech Republic 44 13 
Hungary 31 16 
Slovak Republic 30 9 
Belarus 26 6 
Russia 26 2 
Poland 24 10 
Bulgaria 22 6 
Croatia 20 11 
Estonia 20 5 
Lithuania 19 3 
Romania 19 5 
Ukraine 17 3 
Latvia 16 4 
Moldova 12 1 
Source: Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft (1996) 
It was difficult to believe that the Baltic countries’ economies could return to Western European levels after 50 years of 
Soviet annexation. The open scepticism dominated the thinking of politicians, economists, and Sovietologists. Jürgen 
Nötzold represented such a point of view:  
“The destruction of a unitary monetary system and an economic area with an integral economic system leads to the 
decline in production and income and to increasing socioeconomic destabilization caused by the collapse of the planned 
economy. It may be assumed that at least half of the decline in outputs has been caused by the interruption of trade 
between the descendant countries of the Soviet Union. … The marketing of their [Baltic countries] products remains 
dependent of the CIS markets. The exports of animal products can be reoriented to Western Europe but only if open 
markets can be found there. In industrial good exports, nothing can replace the CIS markets. The continuing economic 
decline in the CIS countries and the insufficient qualification of industry for export in the West leads the Baltic 
countries to continuous economic stagnation. The maintenance of economic relations with the successors of the Soviet 
Union, primarily with Russia, need not mean membership in some economic or monetary alliance, but association 
agreements with Russia are still indispensable.” (Nötzold 1993: 55). The bottom year of the transition crisis in Estonia 
was 1994. According to estimates of the EBRD, the GDP (on the basis of ppp) in that year was 62 per cent of the level 
of 1989 (EBRD database). The fall in Estonia, moreover, was even one of the smallest of the former Soviet Union’s 
territory, and Estonia’s economy was one of the first to grow. Since 1995, it is possible to follow an unbroken path of 
                                                 
1
 According to Statistics Estonia, the GDP per capita of Estonia was 976 euros or 1,155 US dollars in 1993. 
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GDP growth, with a short exception in 1999, when the Russian crisis caused the GDP to decline 0.3 per cent. Exports to 
Russia fell 43 per cent (total exports 0.6 per cent) that year. The Estonian economy exited quickly from the Russian 
crisis, however, and the growth rate for the year 2000 was already 10.0 per cent – the highest among post-socialist 
Central and Eastern European countries. This cyclical growth lasted until 2008. 
From acceleration to overheating 
Since the mid-1990s, Estonia has successfully integrated into the global economy. Together with political integration 
into the European Union (and to NATO as well), Estonia’s credibility as an attractive place for investors – both foreign 
and local – has increased rapidly. A huge inflow of foreign direct investment and an excessively expansive credit policy 
of commercial banks, financed by their parent banks abroad, followed Estonia’s accession to the European Union and 
NATO in 2004. All of the biggest Estonian commercial banks were subsidiaries (Swedbank, SEB, Sampo Bank) or 
affiliated branches (2005 entered Nordea Bank) of Scandinavian banks. The share of the three subsidiary banks in the 
total assets of the Estonian residential banks was 96.9…97.8 per cent in 2003–2007.2 Within three and half years (from 
the end of June 2005 to the end of 2008), the net liabilities of commercial banks to foreign credit institutions increased 
11-fold, from 526 million Euros to 5.9 billion Euros. The amount of the banks´ liabilities to their parent banks reached 9 
billion Euros before the global financial crisis (see e.g. Eesti Pank. Financial Stability Review. 2011: 28). The ratio of 
their net liabilities to foreign credit institutions to GDP increased from 3.7 per cent in 2003 to 36.8 per cent in 2008. 
This reveals a huge difference between the Baltic countries and Central European post-socialist countries. 
Domestic credit to the private sector in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania increased 2.5, 3.4, and 4.9-fold during the three 
years after joining the European Union (2005–2007; in the five Central European countries, the increases were “only” 
1.5…1.8 times – Table 2).  
Table 2: Monetary expansion in Baltic and some Central European countries 
  2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Domestic credit to private sector (y-on-y, in per cent) 
     Estonia 30.0 32.5 40.7 32.6 7.9 -4.9 
     Latvia 40.0 67.6 53.4 32.9 17.9 -10.5 
     Lithuania 32.0 56.1 34.9 40.6 17.4 -7.1 
     Poland 4.2 13.8 23.0 27.0 32.5 8.6 
     Czech Republic 0.1 1.7 22.0 19.5 … … 
     Slovak Republic 14.1 14.9 23.3 20.3 25.5 -10.9 
     Hungary 14.1 16.3 18.5 12.8 18.5 -3.5 
     Slovenia 24.1 20.2 21.6 24.9 14.9 7.6 
Domestic credit to private sector (as a percentage of GDP)  
     Estonia 39.6 56.6 76.5 86.1 91.7 … 
     Latvia 50.3 67.8 87.0 88.3 90.1 103.3 
     Lithuania 28.8 40.9 50.1 60.4 63.0 69.8 
     Poland 31.0 33.4 38.5 44.6 55.0 55.2 
     Czech Republic 31.6 35.7 39.9 … … … 
     Slovak Republic 30.4 35.1 38.7 42.4 44.7 51.1 
     Hungary 44.5 49.9 54.4 59.5 67.3 66.5 
     Slovenia 48.1 56.3 65.8 78.8 85.2 92.7 
Broad money (M2; y-on-y, in per cent) 
                                                 
2
 The market share of the two biggest resident banks (Swedbank and SEB) and the two biggest affiliated branches (Nordea Bank and 
Danske Bank as successors of Sampo Bank) was 90.1 per cent at the end of 2010 (as a percentage of total assets). 
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     Estonia 16.6 42.4 27.6 14.1 6.2 0.8 
     Latvia 26.9 38.7 39.7 14.4 -4.4 -2.8 
     Lithuania 21.4 31.9 21.5 21.4 -0.4 0.7 
     Poland 7.5 12.6 15.9 14.2 20.2 8.2 
     Czech Republic 4.5 10.6 13.7 16.3 8.3 … 
     Slovak Republic 5.7 5.8 8.2 11.8 5.5 6.4 
     Hungary 9.9 13.0 11.8 8.6 10.8 -0.8 
     Slovenia 6.6 7.8 8.2 10.6 5.2 0.4 
Source: EBRD (2011) 
The supply of broad money (M2) increased in Estonia 107 per cent, in Latvia 122 per cent, and in Lithuania 95 per cent 
over the same period. By comparison, in Central European countries, the increase was 28…49 per cent. Table 2 also 
answers the question: “Why Slovenia got the Euro in 2007 (and Slovakia in 2009) but Estonia and Lithuania failed?” 
The growth rates of GDP neared double digits (9.4 per cent) in 2006 and reached them (10.6 per cent) in 2007. These 
figures were among the highest in post-socialist Europe (Table 3). The positive impact of the accession to EU on 
economic and social development is characteristic of all post-socialist member states of EU (see e.g. Alber et al., 2010). 
Table 3:  Real GDP growth rate in some post-socialist European countries (in per cent) 
  2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2007/2003 
Estonia 7.2 9.4 10.6 6.9 -5.1 39 
Latvia 8.7 10.6 12.2 10.0 -4.2 48 
Lithuania 7.4 7.8 7.8 9.8 2.9 37 
Poland 5.3 3.6 6.2 6.8 5.1 24 
Czech Republic 4.5 6.3 6.8 6.1 2.5 26 
Slovakia 5.1 6.7 8.5 10.5 5.8 34 
Hungary 4.5 3.2 3.6 0.8 0.8 13 
Slovenia 4.3 4.5 5.9 6.9 3.7 23 
Bulgaria 6.7 6.4 6.5 6.4 6.2 29 
Romania 8.5 4.2 7.9 6.3 7.3 30 
Croatia 4.1 4.3 4.9 5.1 2.2 20 
Source: Eurostat 
The growth, however, was unbalanced and largely statistical. “The Economist” characterised this “development” 
ironically: “Your money, my growth” (The Economist 2007: 30). Foreign money inflow created new jobs, but first and 
foremost in closed sectors like construction and retail trade. From the total increase of employment of 49,700, 
construction and trade accounted for 44,700 persons. Estonia reached full employment. The labour market turned into 
the employee-market. Wages skyrocketed and generated additional inflation. This was similar to Germany in the 1950s, 
which Ludwig Erhard characterised as the time of Kopfjäger [head hunters] (Erhard 1990: 81–82). In 2007, the 
quarterly growth rates of average wages were more than 20 per cent (y-on-y). On the other hand, domestic demand was 
driven by active lending stimulated by the overall optimism in the economy and society as a whole and by the 
expansive “cheap” credit pressure from banks ‘fighting’ for the clients. 
The rapid growth of wages and increased confidence led to a typical backlog of demand and generated an acceleration 
of demand-pull inflation: between January and October 2008, the HCPI on y-on-y basis was more than 10 per cent. In a 
currency board system, the ability to manage the complications of extremely rapid inflows of foreign currency (see 
Table 4) was limited. A single increase of mandatory reserve obligations by the central bank from 13 to 15 per cent 
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from 1 September 2006 did not play a role anymore. So the surplus of the state budget – to replace every Estonian 
kroon that was withdrawn by the surplus of the budget the banks threw to the market additionally four kroons. 
Table 4: Key indicators reflecting the overheating of Estonia’s economy 
  2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
2008/ 
2003 
GDP real growth (%) 7.6 7.2 9.4 10.6 6.9 -5.1 32% 
HCPI (%) 1.4 3.0 4.1 4.4 6.7 10.6 32% 
Producer price index of industrial output (%) 0.2 2.9 2.1 4.5 8.3 7.1 27% 
Construction price index (%) 3.7 6.5 7.3 10.3 12.7 3.4 47% 
Average monthly gross wages growth (%) 9.4 8.4 10.8 16.5 20.5 13.9 92% 
Current account deficit (bn EUR) 1.0 1.1 1.1 2.1 2.6 1.6   
Current account deficit (% of GDP) 11.3 11.3 10.0 15.3 16.2 9.8   
Gross external dept (bn EUR) 5.6 7.5 9.7 12.9 17.4 19.0 240% 
Net liabilities of credit institutions on foreign credit 
institutions (bn EUR) 0.3 0.5 1.0 2.7 4.8 5.9 1732% 
Loan portfolio of individuals with credit institutions (bn 
EUR) 1.2 1.9 3.2 5.2 7.0 7.7 527% 
… for comparison: deposits of individuals with credit 
institutions (bn EUR) 1.5 1.7 2.3 3.0 3.4 3.8 154% 
Increase of loan portfolio of individuals with credit 
institutions (%) 48.0 52.3 70.0 62.9 33.9 11.1 527% 
Growth of money supply (M2; %) 9.9 16.6 42.4 27.6 14.1 6.2 157% 
Growth of revenues of general government (%) 13.3 8.5 14.1 22.6 21.1 2.0 87% 
Growth of expenditures of general government (%) 9.2 8.4 14.2 19.8 21.0 18.0 112% 
Source: Statistics Estonia, Eesti Pank [Bank of Estonia] 
This money concentrated more and more into the real estate business and through this sector into construction. Such a 
process had similar futures to crowding out phenomena on the financial market. The number of persons employed in 
construction doubled within a couple of years and reached the maximum of 87,400 in the third quarter of 2007. The 
share of construction workers in the total number of employed persons reached 13.2 per cent (Table 5). New 
construction workers were mostly unskilled, unemployed workers or former policemen, rescue workers, teachers, etc. 
who were looking for higher wages. The value added in construction increased 192 per cent over 2003–2007 (e.g. in 
manufacturing 65 per cent and in the Estonian economy on average 78 per cent; Table 6). 
Table 5: The number of employed persons in construction and their share in total number of employed persons 
  Number of employed persons (thousands) Percentage of employed persons (per cent) 
  I Q II Q III Q IV Q I Q II Q III Q IV Q 
2003 40 41 48 48 6.9 6.9 7.8 8.0 
2004 48 43 51 49 8.2 7.3 8.6 8.1 
2005 44 46 53 52 7.4 7.6 8.6 8.5 
2006 53 62 66 75 8.3 9.5 10.1 11.5 
2007 74 83 87 84 11.4 12.6 13.2 12.9 
2008 82 85 83 75 12.4 13.0 12.5 11.4 
Source: Statistics Estonia 
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Table 6: Growth of value added by economic activity (current prises; 2003=100) 
  2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Agriculture, forestry, fishing and hunting 107 112 119 142 128 100 142 
Mining and quarrying 104 114 133 169 177 182 203 
Manufacturing 106 121 142 165 167 122 151 
Construction 114 157 228 292 277 186 161 
Wholesale and retail trade; repair of motor 
vehicles etc. 111 130 155 179 171 140 143 
Hotels and restaurants 115 142 164 185 189 144 143 
Transport, storage and communications 109 114 131 144 150 133 146 
Financial intermediation 111 120 156 195 203 138 158 
Real estate, renting and business activities 113 138 162 191 202 175 175 
Value added total 110 127 151 178 184 154 163 
Source: Statistics Estonia 
Estonia’s economy overheated, which weakened its competitiveness in foreign markets. A decrease in the growth rate 
to developed markets can measure these tendencies: the Estonian exports to EU-15 and EFTA countries increased 9.5 
per cent over two years (2006 and 2007). At the same time, exports to the third countries increased 64.6 per cent. We 
have to agree with the conclusions made by EBRD:  
„A key explanation for the rise in core inflation lies in capacity constraints in the region´s labour markets. Employment 
has expanded rapidly in recent years and unemployment rates have fallen to historically low levels. In all but six 
transition countries, the unemployment rate in 2007 had fallen below 10 per cent, while in eight countries it was below 
5 per cent. Strong demand for labour accounts for most of these developments, although demographic factors and 
migration have also played an important role; substantial labour emigration has been recorded in recent years in 
Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Poland, Romania and the Caucasus region [this was not so typical for Estonia]. 
Tightening labour market conditions have led to greater wage pressures throughout the transition region. In most 
countries annual real weight growth has risen well above 10 per cent without corresponding labour productivity gains. 
In fact, a significant gap has opened up since 2005 between real wage and labour productivity growth in most countries. 
In sectors experiencing rapid growth but an insufficient supply of labour, such as construction and financial services, 
wage growth has been very marked. This in turn has resulted in rising unit labour costs which, combined with the 
effects of other rising costs of production, have put significant pressure on firms´ profit margins and ultimately on 
prices, particularly in sectors with low competition.“ (Transition Report 2008: 9). 
From overheating to crisis 
Such extensive growth was not sustainable. Imbalances in the economy deepened. The high deficit in the current 
account – 15.3 per cent of GDP in 2006 and 16.2 per cent in 2007 – revealed the external imbalance, and the 
acceleration of inflation reflected the internal imbalance (HCPI reached in 2008 10.6 per cent – see table 4). The 
imbalance in the labour market was expressed in its transformation into an employee-market. 
The expected slowdown in economic growth started. Moreover, the external environment has been considerably less 
favourable for the Estonian economy since mid-2007. The turmoil in global financial markets (in particular the 
“examples” of small countries like Iceland and later Hungary and New Zealand) increased the risks of investing in 
Estonia. The rise of prices on the world market also reached the Estonian economy directly at the end of 2007: in the 
third quarter of 2008, average import prices were 8.6 per cent higher than in the respective quarter of the previous year. 
Meanwhile, the press published several articles discussing the devaluation of the Estonian kroon, including one written 
by the former Governor (1982–93) of the Swedish Riksbank, Bengt Dennis. These articles increased the uncertainty in 
the economy. In the last quarter of 2007 and in the first quarter of 2008, the GDP fell against the previous quarters on a 
year-on-year basis. The volume of industrial output began to fall in the second quarter of 2008. Unemployment started 
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to increase in the fourth quarter, and employment started to decrease in the first quarter of 2009. The development of 
main cyclical indicators in 2008–2010 is characterised in Table 7. 
Table 7: Key indicators of business cycle in 2008–2010 
  2008 2009 2010 
  
I  
Q 
II 
Q 
III  
Q 
IV  
Q 
I  
Q 
II  
Q 
III  
Q 
IV  
Q 
I  
Q 
II  
Q 
III  
Q 
IV  
Q 
GDP real growth (%)1 
-2.2 -2.6 -4.5 
-
10.7 
-
14.6 
-
16.6 
-
15.4 -8.8 -2.6 3.1 5.0 6.6 
Volume growth of industrial   
production (%)1 1.2 -2.4 -2.3 
-
16.4 
-
23.5 
-
31.3 
-
27.3 
-
12.4 5.7 18.9 24.1 34.6 
Number of employed persons 
(thousands) 657 657 661 653 612 593 598 581 554 559 578 593 
Number of unemployed                
persons (thousands) 29 27 44 54 79 92 102 107 137 128 106 93 
Unemployment rate (%) 4.2 4.0 6.2 7.6 11.4 13.5 14.6 15.5 19.8 18.6 15.5 13.6 
Number of persons employed              
in construction (thousands) 82 85 83 75 64 55 59 56 41 41 55 54 
Percentage of employed persons            
in construction (%) 12.4 13.0 12.5 11.4 10.4 9.3 9.9 9.6 7.3 7.4 9.6 9.2 
Average monthly gross wages        
(EUR) 788 850 800 838 776 813 752 783 758 822 759 814 
Average monthly gross wages               
in construction (EUR) 832 889 918 899 747 756 792 770 723 787 816 853 
Exports (bn EUR) 2.0 2.2 2.2 2.0 1.5 1.6 1.7 1.7 1.8 2.1 2.3 2.6 
Loan portfolio of commercial 
undertakings with credit          
institutions (bn EUR) 7.3 7.5 7.6 7.5 7.4 7.3 7.3 7.1 7.1 6.9 6.8 6.6 
Loan portfolio of individuals             
with credit institutions (bn EUR) 7.2 7.5 7.7 7.7 7.6 7.6 7.5 7.5 7.4 7.3 7.3 7.2 
Growth of money                           
supply (M2; %)1 11.3 9.6 11.5 6.2 3.4 0.2 -0.8 0.8 2.7 5.0 3.0 3.0 
HCPI (%; last month of quarter)1 11.2 11.5 10.8 7.5 2.5 -0.5 -1.7 -1.9 1.4 3.4 3.8 5.4 
1 On annual basis 
Source: Statistics Estonia, Eesti Pank 
There were features similar to the so-called debt crisis in South America at the beginning of 1980s, especially in Chile, 
and also to the Asian crisis of the mid-1990s. Afterwards it was possible to determine that Estonia was one of the first 
countries in the transition world affected by the crisis (Transition Report 2009: 6). At that time, the question of soft 
versus hard landing was discussed in Estonia. 
In the autumn 2008, a global financial crisis broke out. The flow of foreign capital into Estonia stopped (at the end of 
2010, the net foreign liabilities of commercial banks were 1/3 smaller than at the end of 2008). The first “victims” of the 
crisis were real estate business and construction. But the main setback hit exports. The precipitous decline of demand 
for Estonia’s main export markets led to a rapid fall of industrial production, 16.4 per cent in the fourth quarter 
compared to the previous year. The hope of a soft landing disappeared. Moreover, the main export markets of Estonia – 
Finland, Sweden, Russia, Latvia, Lithuania and Germany – proved to be the biggest losers in Europe. Their share in 
Estonian exports was 63.4 per cent in 2008 (Table 8). 
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Table 8: Changes in import demand of Estonia’s main trading partners in 2009 and 2010 (per cent; on EUR basis) 
  
  
Decrease of 
import 
demand of the 
country in 
2009 
Decrease of 
Estonian 
exports to this 
country in 
2009 
Increase in 
import 
demand of 
the country 
in 2010 
Increase in 
Estonian 
exports to 
this country 
in 2010 
As a percentage of total exports of 
Estonia 
2008 2009 2010 
Finland -30.0 -22.8 18.0 23.9 18.4 18.5 17.0 
Sweden -24.7 -30.2 29.9 67.7 13.8 12.8 15.6 
Russia -33.9 -31.7 44.0 40.9 10.4 9.3 9.7 
Latvia -37.4 -27.3 25.2 28.5 10.0 9.5 9.0 
Germany -17,5 -7.8 21.2 15.4 5.1 6.1 5.2 
Lithuania -37.9 -35.6 34.5 38.9 5.7 4.8 4.9 
Source: National statistics boards 
Estonian exports shrunk 23.4 per cent in 2009 and were comparable to the turnover of exports in 2005. The total 
percentage of the six main export partners decreased by 2.4 percentage points − to 61.0 per cent. The local and global 
crises fed into each other. The fall of domestic and external demand also led to a rapid decline in employment. In the 
first quarter of 2010, the number of employed persons (553,600 or 15.7 per cent fewer than in 2008) bottomed out and 
unemployment peaked (136,900; see table 7). The number of persons employed in manufacturing decreased 21.3 per 
cent and 50.2 per cent in construction . 
The average monthly gross wages and salaries in 2009 was 15.5 per cent lower than in the previous year. Decreasing 
demand started to press down inflation. Deflationary tendencies in Western Europe also reached Estonia. From May 
2009 to February 2010, the inflation rates (HCPI; y-on-y) were negative. On the other hand, the falling import prices 
and weak internal demand for consumption and investment goods turned the huge current account deficit into a surplus 
in 2009 and 2010: 4.5 and 3.6 as a percentage of GDP, respectively. 
From fall to new growth 
At the end of 2009 or beginning of 2010, several European economies began to improve. For Estonia, this signified a 
recovery of external demand. Estonia’s GDP increased again at the end of 2009. After having decreased for nine 
quarters, GDP turned to growth in annual figures in the second quarter of 2010. The recovery of demand in foreign 
markets, above all in Nordic markets, was followed by rapid growth of industrial output and exports (Table 7). The 
number of employed persons started to increase and unemployment decreased. The GDP growth of 6.7 per cent (y-on-
y) in the fourth quarter of 2010 was the second-fastest among EU countries after Sweden. 
External demand has been the main driver of economic stabilization and new growth. This growth was largely based on 
the increased utilisation of production capacities. Capacity utilisation in industry in Estonia was only 58.1 per cent in 
2009, the second lowest in the Euro zone after Slovak Republic. In the other Euro-countries this figure ranged from 
65.4 to 77.4 per cent (excluding Ireland). According to preliminary estimates, the capacity utilisation in industry 
increased to 73.5 per cent in the first quarter of 2011; nevertheless, this level is one of the lowest in the EU (Deutsche 
Bundesbank. Monatsbericht 2011, Statistischer Teil: 6–7). 
In January 2010, exports started to increase. The total of exports in 2010 was 34.9 per cent higher than in the previous 
year and also bigger than in 2008. The obvious increase was distinctive for all main directions, especially for exports to 
Sweden3 and Russia (Table 8). 
Nevertheless, the deep recession had several long-lasting consequences on the labour market. Due to increasing 
productivity and structural changes, unemployment will obviously stay high for a long time, despite the fact that in the 
first quarter of 2011 the number of unemployed persons was 27.5 per cent lower than in the same period in 2010. The 
                                                 
3
 The rapid increase of exports to Sweden was largely related to extended production of 3G and 4G network equipment and 
broadband network installations (Ericsson Group). 
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number of employed persons increased first of all in manufacturing: 22.4 per cent in the first quarter of 2011 (y-on-y). 
The increase in employment was supported by a possibility of cross-border work, mainly in Finland. In the fourth 
quarter of 2010, 4 per cent of employed persons worked abroad, including 27 per cent of constructors. 
Statistically, the crisis of 2009 was deep. Among the EU countries in the period of 2008–2010, Estonia’s amplitude of 
quarterly growth and fall rates of GDP on year-on-year basis was the highest (Table 9). 
Table 9:  The amplitude of quarterly growth and fall rates in some European countries in 2008–2010 (y-on-y) 
  
Highest 
growth 
(%) 
Deepest 
fall (%) 
Amplitude 
(percentage 
points) 
Turning to new 
growth (quarter) 
Growth in 
the fourth 
quarter of 
2010 (%) 
Estonia 6.7 -16.6 23.3 II/2010 6.7 
Latvia 3.6 -19.1 22.7 III/2010 3.6 
Lithuania 7.3 -15.9 23.2 II/2010 4.8 
Poland 6.5 (0.6) 5.9 continuous growth  4.1 
Czech Republic 3.7 -5.1 8.8 I//2010 3.0 
Slovakia 9.5 -5.4 14.9 I/2010 3.5 
Hungary 2.3 -8.0 10.3 I/2010 1.9 
Slovenia 6.3 -9.6 15.9 II/2010 2.1 
Bulgaria 7.2 -7.6 14.8 II/2010 3.1 
Romania 9.6 -8.7 18.3 Continuous fall -0.6 
Finland 5.5 -9.9 15.4 II/2010 5.5 
Sweden 8.2 -7.1 15.3 I/2010 8.2 
Denmark 3.5 -7.4 10.9 II/2010 3.0 
Germany 4.3 -6.8 11.1 I/2010 3.8 
Ireland (-0.3) -9.3 9.0 Continuous fall -0.7 
Source: Eurostat 
The recovery is extremely sensitive and vulnerable to global developments, particularly in small and open economies 
like Estonia, which is heavily dependent on the developments in Finland and Sweden. On the other hand, the 
introduction of the Euro at the beginning of 2011 and accession to the OECD in 2010 have given Estonia additional 
advantages. According to preliminary calculations, the annual growth rate of Estonian GDP in the first quarter of 2011 
was the highest in EU (8.5 per cent). 
Public finance 
The cyclical development of the Estonian economy is reflected in public finance changes. The expansive growth of the 
economy, which was based on an inflow of foreign capital, escalated tax revenue in the budget (Table 10). The creation 
of new jobs and the rapid growth of wages increased income tax revenue; increases in consumption and investment led 
to a revenue growth from VAT and excise duties. The tax revenue increased continuously until 2008, including in 2006 
and 2007, when the increases were 20.4 and 22.9 per cent respectively. Nevertheless, the income tax rate was reduced 
from 26 per cent to 21 per cent in 2003–2007. Similarly, public expenditures also increased rapidly. The general 
government budget in 2001–2007 had a surplus, peaking with 2.4 and 2.5 per cent of GDP in 2006 and 2007. The share 
of general government consolidated debt from GDP decreased in the same period from 5.7 per cent to 3.7 per cent, 
which was the lowest among EU countries (Table 11). On the other hand, the accumulation of central government 
reserves amounted to 1.4 billion Euros, which accounted for 8.6 per cent of the GDP at the end of 2007. In 2008, the 
general government balance became a deficit: in 2008 and 2009 the deficit was -2.9 and -1.8 per cent, respectively. The 
deficit was first covered by the reserves. In the middle of 2009, the value of the central government reserves decreased 
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to 0.8 billion Euros (at the end of 2010, 1.0 billion or 6.9 per cent of GDP). The share of general government 
consolidated debt in GDP increased to 7.2 per cent in 2009, the main reason being the shrinking of nominal value of 
GDP. 
Table 10: Increase or decrease of revenue and expenditure of general government (per cent) 
  2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Revenue 8.5 14.1 22.6 21.1 2.0 0.9 -3.4 
      of which                                                                                                                    
   Taxes 9.8 16.6 20.4 22.9 5.7 -9.9 -1.5 
         of which                                                                                                                    
      Personal income tax 7.9 2.3 20.0 25.4 8.0 -22.0 -1.5 
      Corporate income 
      Tax 17.0 -1.0 25.1 30.8 2.0 -3.8 -24.4 
      Social security 
      contributions 10.4 15.2 19.9 25.4 14.8 -11.3 -5.4 
      VAT 1.1 29.8 27.0 19.6 -7.9 -8.5 3.8 
      Excise duty 26.1 24.4 7.7 16.6 9.5 9.4 6.2 
Expenditure 8.4 14.1 19.8 21.0 18.0 -2.5 -7.4 
Source: Statistics Estonia 
 
Table 11: Public finance in some European countries in 2007–2010 (as a percentage of GDP) 
 
Deficit (-) or surplus                                        General government gross dept                           
2007 2008 2009 2010 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Estonia 2.5 -2.8 -1.7 0.1a 3.7 4.6 7.2 6.6 
Latvia -0.3 -4.2 -9.7 -7.7 9.0 19.7 36.7 44.7 
Lithuania  -1.0 -3.3 -9.5 -7.1 16.9 15.6 29.5 38.2 
Poland  -1.9 -3.7 -7.3 -7.9 45.0 47.1 50.9 55.0 
Czech Republic  -0.7 -2.7 -5.9 -4.7 29.0 30.0 35.3 38.5 
Slovak Republic  -1.8 -2.1 -8.0 -7.9 29.6 27.8 35.4 41.0 
Hungary -5.0 -3.7 -4.5 -4.2 66.1 72.3 78.4 80.2 
Slovenia -0.1 -1.8 -6.0 -5.6 23.1 21.9 35.2 38.0 
Bulgaria 1.1 1.7 -4.7 -3.2 17.2 13.7 14.6 16.2 
Romania -2.6 -5.7 -8.5 -6.4 12.6 13.4 23.6 30.8 
Finland 5.2 4.2 -2.6 -2.5 35.2 34.1 43.8 48.4 
Sweden 3.6 2.2 -0.7 0.0 40.2 38.8 42.8 39.8 
Denmark 4.8 3.2 -2.7 -2.7 27.5 34.5 41.8 43.6 
Germany 0.3 0.1 -3.0 -3.3 64.9 66.3 73.5 83.2 
Ireland 0.1 -7.3 -14.3 -32.4 25.0 44.4 65.6 96.2 
a
 To the surplus led single receipts from the selling of assigned amount units to Kyoto Protocol. 
Source: Eurostat 
Conclusions 
The “OCED Economic Surveys: Estonia” comments on the last business cycle in the Estonian economy with the 
following words: “The Estonian economy went through an extreme cycle of record-breaking growth up to 2007 and a 
precipitous decline in 2008 and 2009” (OECD 2011: 9). This is correct. The amplitude of quarterly fall and growth rates 
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of GDP (y-on-y) in Estonia during the period 2008–2010 was the highest among EU countries. However, the very sharp 
decline did not mean a collapse. The peak in 2006 and 2007 did not reflect the real situation in the economy. The peak 
of the cycle was, in essence, the unique time of private consumption and investments based singularly on the excessive 
inflow of foreign money. 
On the other hand, this verified the thesis that the peaks and bottoms of the cycles may be sharper and that entering and 
exiting from the crises may be faster under the currency board arrangement compared to classical monetary policy. 
The contraction of public expenditure helped prevent the fall into the debt trap. The ad hoc rise of the VAT rate from 18 
to 20 per cent in the peak of the crisis (1 July 2009) was non-traditional, but at this moment it appears to have been the 
right decision. Estonia fulfilled the Maastricht deficit criteria in the peak year of crisis also. Inflation was pressed down 
by import of deflation tendencies and by giving up traditional Keynesian deficit spending policy. Since 1 January 2011, 
Estonia is the 17th member of the European Monetary Union. 
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Matti Raudjärv University of Tartu, Estonia 
Estonia’s recent Developments in the European Union 
Introduction 
There is often regularity in economic life: the economy rises and falls, economic recessions are followed by upswings. 
In order to avoid or limit unexpected negative developments, it is necessary to constantly and comprehensively monitor, 
analyse, and evaluate the situation in individual countries, regions, and throughout the world. This is particularly true 
during periods of economic upswing, lest setbacks occur. It is, moreover, particularly important for small national 
economies that depend on global trends. Euphoria and emotion have no place in any area of the economy. Both were 
present in Estonia, where the excessive profit orientation of commercial banks led to loan-related problems because of 
their uncontrolled favouring of both real estate and consumer credit.  
The objective of this paper is to give a brief overview of recent economic developments in Estonia, the Estonian 
government’s economic policies regarding the economic crisis, and of the further orientation and problems in the 
development of the national economy as a European Union member state. 
Both the causes and consequences of the economic crisis, which can be delimited with the period 2008–2010 (with the 
main emphasis on 2009), will need to be analysed more thoroughly and in more detail once the duration of the crisis can 
be more specifically determined. Regardless, it is necessary to take immediate measures to ensure rational steps with 
respect to the choice of economic policy and orientations in exiting the economic crisis and in achieving the 
development.  This is topical today for the sake of the future.   
This paper is based on different evaluations, the experiences of other countries as they concern Estonia, several research 
studies in analysing the economic crisis, and the author’s own positions. These personal positions are based on official 
statistics and materials, long-term personal assessments of the economic situation, as well as on years of working with 
students in seminars of different subjects related to economic policy. 
1. General situation of the Estonian economy in 2009-2010 
Evaluations of the economic crisis cannot yet be based on specific economic analyses. Although the economy is 
recovering, the economic crisis is not completely over, and the current situation of Estonia is not yet clear. Has the 
economy stabilized? Is the recession continuing or has an upswing occurred? These questions remind one of the 
economic crisis of the 1930s, when the first effective analysis and evaluations were performed years after the end of the 
crisis (Amin et al. 1982; Berton 1990; Klein 1987; Varga 1974 and many others).   
Moreover, the Estonian economy depends on the economic situation of other – larger – countries. Factors of the 
economic growth, possible crises and the reforms which contribute to exiting from them are necessary for the success. 
Many economists (such as Krugman, Obstfeld 2006: 780-824) have pointed that out. In Estonia, exiting the crisis does 
not just mean a return to economic growth, but also an extensive series of administrative, social, educational, and health 
care reforms, among others. 
State and local governments, organizations, companies, and households made many changes during 2009, the first full 
year of the current economic crisis. They cut costs, restricted activities, and cancelled plans. These were often „efforts 
to survive.” Many companies terminated their activities or went bankrupt. Some individuals declared themselves 
bankrupt.  
The Bank of Estonia has also not taken definite positions and not all necessary possibilities were used to set conditions 
for the operation of commercial banks. Also, Estonia’s liberal economic policy contributed towards the economic crisis.  
The most important processes in 2009 were the following: 
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- state budget expenditures had to be cut1 considerably as revenues remained lower than expected; 
- unemployment increased considerably as many companies reduced or terminated their activities; 
- economic growth slowed, i.e. the economic recession caused by decreased demand was considerable; 
- investments and exports of businesses dramatically decreased (there were no possibilities for exporting their products 
because other countries also suffered from the economic crisis); 
- business development was severely inhibited (while the estimated proportion of profitable entrepreneurs in Estonia is 
approximately 2% of the labour force, the same estimated proportion in more developed countries is ten or more times 
higher);    
- the products manufactured and the services offered often proved too expensive due to high labour costs (another 
important reason was low labour productivity);  
- local governments got into financial difficulties, often because their obligations were not in conformity with the 
financing, i.e. they had not been secured with their budget; also numerous cases of corruption were suspected in local 
governments; 
- activities related to real estate were in a significant decline (real estate issues can also largely be regarded as an 
important trigger of the economic crisis).   
The Estonian state budget was cut twice in the course of 2009 through negative supplementary budgets. In the state 
budget of 2009, revenues was initially established to be 97.8 billion kroons by the Riigikogu, while expenditures (taking 
into account also the additional cost cutting planned) were 96.7 billion kroons (Riigieelarve 2009). After the first 
negative supplementary budget of 2009, revenues were planned to be 88.2 billion kroons (reduction of -9.6 billion 
kroons) while expenditures were expected at 91.9 billion kroons (a reduction of -4.8 billion kroons) (budget of 2009 + 
supplementary budget of 2010).  
The second negative supplementary budget of 2009 reduced revenues by -3.9 billion kroons and expenditures by -2.6 
billion kroons. Thus, revenues of the 2009 state budget were 84.3 billion kroons and expenditures 89.3 billion kroons 
(State 2009 Second Supplementary Budget Act). Planned revenues for the 2010 state budget were 84.5 billion kroons 
and expenditures were 89.7 billion kroons (2010 State Budget Act). Based on statistics presented by Statistics Estonia 
and the Bank of Estonia, many economic indicators declined considerably in 2009. For instance, GDP declined by 
14.1% in 2009 compared to 2008, industrial production decreased by 26.1%, and the volume of construction works 
decreased by 34.2%. The number of new cars decreased by 55.6% compared to 2008 (and by 70.9% compared to 2007). 
The unemployment rate was 13.8% in 2009. The role of tourism decreased: the number of foreign tourists decreased by 
6.5% in 2009 compared to 2008 (and by 51.6% compared to 2007). Moreover, the number of Estonians who took 
foreign trips in 2009 decreased by 28.8% compared to 2008. Capital investments of businesses located in Estonia 
decreased by 27.6% in 2009 compared to earlier years. (Eesti majandusnäitajad … 2010; Enim … 2010 a,b)  
Based on these statistics, as well as factors such as unemployment, decline of salaries, decrease in demand, and budget 
cuts, we can state the following about Estonia: 
- the added value created in manufacturing and in other sectors of the national economy decreased as businesses got 
fewer orders; 
- construction projects decreased as the demand for new living (and office) space had decreased; 
- as incomes decreased, the pressure on repayments of bank loans increased; also, the possibilities for and interest in 
buying new cars and durable goods and in travelling decreased; 
- the sales of consumer goods and food products decreased as people bought less, chose more carefully, and bought 
cheaper goods;  
- competition led to the reduction of prices of certain goods and services; sales and discounts were used in trade and 
services (incl. in food products, consumer goods and construction materials, hotels, restaurants, etc.); 
- businesses were not able to make the required investments, therefore product development and innovation suffered;  
                                                 
1
 If we compare, for instance, the Estonian state budget that was initially passed for 2009 and the state budget after passing the 
negative supplementary budgets, we can see that revenues decreased by 13.8% and expenditures by 7.7% (calculations by the 
author). Thus, the state budget of 2009 was negative as the higher amount of expenditures was largely covered from reserves.    
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- as a consequence of reduced resources of businesses, both their import and export volumes declined. 
Considering comparisons with 2007, it appears that a considerable economic downturn was already evident in 2008. 
The Estonian government, however, did not take it seriously.  
No information has been presented on the increase in labour productivity or its comparison with the increase in the 
average salary level. Thus we were in a situation, which unfortunately continues, in which the increase in incomes is the 
primary objective rather than achieving higher quality, more productive and more competitive work, products and 
services. 
Registered unemployment went above 90 thousand people in the first months of 2010 and there were an additional 20–
25% of people who had not been registered. Based on that situation, more than 1/5 of the Estonian population capable 
of work was unemployed.2 Persisting high unemployment levels constitute a risk for the society as social tensions 
increase, leading to higher crime rates, migration, etc. At the end of March 2011, the number of registered unemployed 
people in Estonia was 65,831, i.e. 10.2% of the labour force. (Registreeritud … 2011)  
The activities of Estonian economic policy institutions (above all the decision-making institutions) before and during 
the economic crisis were often characterised by untimely decisions and constant delays. 
Sometimes, however, delays were followed by rash decisions. For example, the decision to immediately raise the VAT 
rate in mid-June 2009 on most goods and services from 18% to 20%. Probably both the government and politicians 
lacked the proper will in economic policy, an adequate evaluation of the situation, and clear objectives. At the 
beginning of the economic crisis, they were not able to evaluate the situation adequately or respond to it in due time. 
2. Attempts to stabilize the Estonian economy and expected trends  
In 2009–2010, different measures were taken in an attempt to stabilize the Estonian economy. Some of the most 
important of these were: 
- The Employment Contracts Act came into force on 1 July 2009, intended to proceed from the principle of flexicurity 
for both employees and employers3 ;  
- The VAT rate for most goods and services was raised from 18% to 20% on 1 July 2009; the reduced VAT rate was 
raised to 9% and is now applicable to books, workbooks, newspapers and journals, medicinal products, and 
accommodation services; 
- Income tax rates for both individuals and legal entities remained at the 2009 level of 21% during 2010 despite the fact 
that an annual reduction of the income tax rate by 1% had been planned before the crisis;  
- Excise tax rates for motor fuel, alcohol, tobacco products were raised on 1 January 2010,  and for electricity on 1 
March 2010; 
- The payment of the land tax became more tense: there were now two deadlines for 2010 – 31 March and 31 October – 
while there had previously been three deadlines – 15 April, 15 July, and 15 October; 
- A patient contribution of 15% for rehabilitation treatment came into force on 1 January 2010, while this had 
previously been financed by the Sick Fund.  
The Estonian Strategy for Competitiveness for 2009–2014 was adopted to achieve greater national economic growth 
and higher employment levels. The following objectives were set as priorities for the next few years according to the 
strategy (Uuendatud ... , 2010: 29):  
- implementation of a conservative macroeconomic policy, which will make it possible to: 
 - keep the government budget deficit below 3% of the GDP; 
 - join the euro zone in 2011; 
 - keep the increase in public debt under control; 
 - preserve Estonia’s ability to make investments in the next few years 
                                                 
2 In 2010 the employment rate of 15–74-year-olds was 57.4% in Estonia. The highest employment rate in the period 1995–2009 had 
been in 2008, namely 63.0% (Eesti majandusnäitajad ... 2010). 
3
 Until then, the opportunities and positions of employers seemed to be better than those of the employees. 
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- improvement of the exporting capacity of businesses, which: 
 - supports the creation of the favourable environment for the improvement of productivity; 
 - retains export volumes at the 2008 level; 
 - increases the attractiveness of Estonia for foreign investments; 
- development of employee skills by 
 - increasing the financing of life-long studies; 
 - focusing on further training and retraining; 
 - making use of the low level of employment by improving the skills level of 50,000 people by one stage    
- maintaining the employment level by 
 - developing the business environment; 
 - increasing the volume of public investments; 
 - supporting the retention of jobs in order to restore the earlier general 63.5% level of employment by 2011.  
Joining the euro zone is thus no life jacket for the development of the Estonian economy, but rather a tool among many 
for the implementation of a rational economic policy.  
3. Activities for alleviating and exiting the economic crisis 
Emergence from the economic crisis requires purposeful and effective actions and the adoption of economic policy 
decisions.. The structure of the national economy will certainly not be the same after the economic crisis. There will be 
important shifts, both in the proportions and content of different economic sectors and in the branches of the economy. 
This will assume a comprehensive and intensive retraining of labour all over the country, which the state should 
coordinate and encourage through its institutions. Until now the state has been quite half-hearted in its activities. It is 
appropriate to emphasise here that the public sector has not sufficiently cut its expenditures or raised the efficiency of 
its activities. The current cuts of expenditures have not led to rational activities of the state. Although there have been 
some salary cuts and several government agencies and institutions have been merged, it is now necessary for officials to 
take comprehensive measures that would be more effective in all respects; moreover, until now the activities of several 
agencies have often been overlapping.     
Foreign experts from well-known economic newspapers and journals, international central banks, and foundations have 
made different forecasts concerning the Estonian economy. These forecasts have been both positive and negative. At 
the same time, we can generally state: such positions are interesting, sometimes even necessary, but one should not take 
them very seriously as such evaluations usually contain subjective and sometimes misleading conclusions. Such experts 
do not have sufficient information about Estonia and do not know the actual situation and conditions in Estonia. It is not 
possible to make adequate evaluations based on single statistics. It is also necessary to know the background and the 
factors influencing it. In order to exit the economic crisis, Estonia has had to focus attention on the following: 
- Favouring the development of production activities, including manufacturing. This area has not received sufficient 
attention in Estonia until now. It has often been thought that intermediation, transit, tourism, real estate activities, IT 
development, etc. would be sufficient. These are important areas of development, but real economic growth can only be 
achieved by creating manufacturing jobs, including making efforts to develop national industries; 
- Improving labour productivity on all levels (this assumes also the use of modern engineering and technology, access 
to information, etc.). It is important to monitor constantly the ratio between the growth of productivity and the increase 
in salaries.4 Also, the creation of a favourable investment climate is important;  
- Improvement of the economic and business environment and favouring their functioning in all respects; 
- Favouring long-term investments in municipalities (including lending support for significant projects); 
                                                 
4
 The ratio between the growth of productivity and the increase in salaries is not taken into account in Estonian economic policy 
making. At the same time, it is important to bear in mind that the growth of productivity is faster than the increase in salaries. 
Statistics Estonia has not paid sufficient attention to the labour productivity indicator either. Also, the General Director of 
Statistics Estonia supports the need for constant calculation and publishing/monitoring of the above-mentioned indicators 
(Potisepp 2010). 
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- More specific definition of the functions of the state and municipal levels in order to better divide the financing 
between the two entities; 
- Improved use of the EU funds. 
These orientations can be better implemented if the need for balanced regional development and also for the conduction 
of the administrative-territorial reform are taken into account. Regional development in Estonia is extremely unstable, 
confirmed by regional comparisons of almost all Estonian economic indicators).  
4. Economic crisis, general economic situation, unemployment, and increase in prices 
The economic crisis had a deep impact on the Estonian economy and brought along a recession (see Table 1). The 
unemployment rate in 2010 was at an unprecedented high level of 16.9% (Enim … 2011). The official maximum 
unemployment rate reached 19.8% in the first quarter of 2010 (Kiire … 2011). This unemployed rate is unacceptably 
high in Estonia; according to different evaluations, there were approximately 120–130 thousand unemployed people in 
Estonia in 2009–20105, or approximately 20% of the Estonian labour force. In addition, a large proportion of the 
population has not been recorded as unemployed (i.e. if a person has not started work within one year, then he or she is 
taken off the register of unemployed people; also, a large number of people have never registered themselves as 
unemployed, although have been without a job for years). Such a situation is not a positive characterisation of the 
economic policy of the country. When László Andor, the EU Commissioner for Employment, Social Affairs, and 
Inclusion met with journalists in Brussels on 11 March 2011, he directed attention to Estonia and Spain as countries 
with a high unemployment level. Among other things, he said: „high unemployment level refers to the failure of the 
economic policy of the government“ (Kõrge … 2011). We probably have to agree with that.  
The extremely high unemployment level referred to the poor labour market policy of the state. It  also referred to the 
fact that   
- first, not all unemployed people are interested in returning to work or able to acquire retraining   
- second, the business communities are not certain about their need for employees (with which specialities and which 
qualification and how many employees are required anywhere; also separately for highly qualified employees and 
engineers)  
- third, employers have no clear interest in paying the costs of retraining and raising the qualification of their 
employees  
- fourth, local businesses have relatively little, if any, interest in making investments (which would provide an increase 
in labour productivity in the long term); at the same time, businesses are often very profit-oriented. 
In September 2010, the Bank of Estonia mentioned in its economic policy statement (Toormehindade ... 2010): 
- The Estonian economy has overcome the recession and started to grow above all with the support of exports  
- The Estonian businesses and the state have raised the efficiency of their activities 
- During the second half of 2010, unemployment will decrease in Estonia but long-term unemployment will increase in 
2011 
- The decrease in salary levels and prices due to the economic crisis has proven to be short-term and lower than could 
have been assumed from the extent of decrease in GDP. 
This were relatively optimistic evaluations. In-depth analysis of the situation, however, may not always provide such 
hopeful results. 
Table 1: Main indicators (2007–2009) and forecasts of their changes (2010–2012) in Estonia compared to the previous 
year  
Indicators 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
GDP (bill. euros) 15.8 16.1 13.9 0.5 0.8 1.1 
GDP change in constant prices (%) 6.9 -5.1 -13.9 1.5 0.1 0.5 
Inflation of harmonised consumer prices (%) 6.7 10.6 0.2 1.2 1.6 0.4 
Change in private consumption in constant prices (%) 8.6 -5.6 -18.8 4.7 5.1 0.5 
                                                 
5
 The number of people capable for work at the age of 15–74 years was 686.9 thousand in Estonia in 2010 according to Statistics 
Estonia. 
Estonia’s recent Developments in the European Union                                   
 26
Change in investments in constant prices (%) 6.0 -15.0 -33.0 -9.0 6.3 -0.5 
Change in exports in constant prices (%) 1.5 0.4 -18.7 6.5 -1.7 0.1 
Change in imports in constant prices (%) 7.8 -7.0 -32.6 11.7 1.4 -2.9 
Unemployment (%) 4.7 5.5 13.8 1.8 0.3 0.2 
Change in employment (%) 1.4 0.2 -9.2 -2.3 1.8 -0.4 
GDP change per employee in constant prices (%) 5.4 -5.2 -5.1 4.1 -1.7 0.9 
Change in average gross salary (%) 20.4 13.8 -4.6 4.4 1.8 0.1 
Change in loans volume at the end of the period (%) 30.2 7.3 -6.4 -1.3 -1.4 -2.4 
Gross foreign debt (% of GDP) 109.8 118.2 125.5 -4.2 -8.5 -13.3 
Budget balance (% of GDP) 2.6 -2.8 -1.7 1.1 1.1 0.5 
Source: Statistics Estonia, Eurostat, Bank of Estonia 
The respective Maastricht criteria had to be fulfilled by 2010 in order for Estonia to adopt the euro on 1 January 2011. 
Meanwhile, the authorities consistently told the general public throughout 2010 that the euro would not raise the prices. 
Indeed, it was not the euro that led to the rise of prices in Estonia. Rather, entrepreneurs and traders opportunistically 
increased prices. This began as early as May 2010, and the higher prices were already in place on 1 January 2011 so 
that they could remain on the same level. Prices, however, continued to rise in January–February 2011 (see also Table 2 
below), and will continue to do so in the future (referring above all to global price increases in the market, etc). 
The change in the consumer price index in March 2011 in Estonia compared to March 2010 was 5.2% and 0.8% 
compared to February 2011. The price of goods increased by 7.0% and the services 2.1% compared to March 2010. 
Regulated prices of goods and services increased by 6.3% and unregulated prices by 4.8% compared to March 2010. 
The index was most influenced by the 11% price increase of food products, which accounted for approximately one half 
of the total increase. Approximately one half of this consisted in the 18% price increase of dairy products and 12% price 
increase of milled products compared to the period of the previous year. Also, the 14.2% price increase of motor fuel 
had an important effect. Compared to the same time in 2010, largest price increases were for potatoes (84%), coffee 
(48%), and apples (40%). Also, the prices of fuel oil (32%), cereals (31.6%) and milk (31%) have increased more than 
30%. (Tarbijahinna-indeks … 2011) The impact of the world market prices on the price increase of food products, 
which is much discussed in Estonia, is not certain because:  
- No respective economic analyses have been performed in Estonia nor any facts presented. 
- Observations and price comparisons of the author of this paper when staying in the Federal Republic of Germany in 
November and December demonstrated that while food prices increased in Estonia, they did not increase in Germany 
(there were massive and extensive price reductions in Germany instead during the period before Christmas); the 
shopping basket of the author was 20–25% cheaper in Germany than when living in Estonia. 
- This raises the issue – did not the prices of the world market have any effect on food prices in Germany?  
- There are also doubts about the seriousness of the campaign agreements started in the middle of 2010 in Estonia, 
which were extensively advertised as the agreement between traders and other businesses not to increase prices during 
the period before the adoption of euro; this was loudly announced to the general public (according to the observations 
of the author of this paper in the Estonian supermarkets in September–October, the prices were increased after all 
despite promises, sometimes even by 20–30%!). 
It is appropriate to present the information of the Bank of Estonia here: „Inflation rates of the main trade partners for 
Estonia has also recently increased. Prices of Estonian food products depend on developments in the markets of our 
foreign trade partners and have therefore considerably increased within the last year. The Estonian food processing 
industry has reaped high profits from the price increases, which were the highest ever in the fourth quarter of 2010. 
These are even 1/6 higher than in the previous highest level achieved in 2008. … High variations of mark-ups (M.R. – 
greediness of traders) is also felt in consumer prices of food products and therefore the inflation in Estonia has been 
much more hectic than in other countries. … At the same time, the foreign factors cannot be blamed for the increase in 
retail mark-ups which rose to record-breaking levels again in 2010.“ (Lindpere 2011) 
Public figures, including representatives of several trade associations, have probably often been demagogic in Estonia in 
their statements about producers and traders not raising prices, and businesses, including traders, have been 
opportunistic.  
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5. Adoption of euro and price dynamics in Estonia 
The transition to the euro has often been regarded as an important objective for enlivening the economy and achieving 
economic growth. In fact, it is rather a tool of monetary policy, which will not show its actual impact until a few years 
from now. Regardless, transition to the euro was related to many activities in Estonia: budget cuts, fulfilment of the 
criteria for the adoption of euro; alleviation of the economic crisis, and exiting from the crisis.  
The current evaluation is based on the following question: was the adoption of euro at such a price for the Estonian 
national economy – high unemployment rate, extremely low quality of life of many people, and many other social 
problems – a timely step (or maybe too hasty) to ensure the development of the small country? Perhaps party politics 
played a greater role than stable welfare growth of the population, improvement of the quality of life of people, and 
achievement of economic development. 
It is interesting to look at the results of the households budget survey in Estonia, conducted by statistics organisations of 
all EU countries according to a harmonised methodology.6 A household member spent less in Estonia in 2010 than in 
2007, but the proportion of compulsory expenses, i.e. inevitable housing and food expenses, increased in the household 
budget. According to the households budget survey, each household member spent on an average of 265 euros (4,139 
kroons) per month in 2010, including 45% (119 euros) on compulsory food and housing expenses. The proportion of 
compulsory spending has increased in the household budgets in the recent years. According to the last comparable 
survey of 2007, a household member spent 278 euros (4,358 kroons) per month, including 40% (108 euros) on 
compulsory expenses. The increase in the proportion of compulsory expenses in the budget shows a lower quality of life 
as less money and opportunities are left for other expenses. (Sundkulutuste … 2011) 
In 2010, a household member’s greatest expense was for food (69 euros per month), which accounted for 26% of total 
expenses. Fifty euros per month were spent on housing, 29 euros on transport, 25 euros on spare time, 16 euros on 
household expenses, 12 euros on clothes and footwear, and 10 euros on health care per household member. Compared 
to 2007, housing expenses have increased by approximately a quarter. Moreover, expenses related to spare time have 
somewhat increased. Expenses related to clothes and footwear have decreased most of all, by more than a third. Also, 
expenses for transport and eating out have decreased. (Ibid.) 
Price increases in Estonia during the transition to the euro are characterised by some examples highlighted in Table 2. 
The increase in the price of raw materials in the world market partly drove the price increases, but the opportunism of 
businesses and traders also played a role.   
The purchase price of milk was 23% higher in Estonia in January 2011 than it had been the previous year (and the price 
has increased 29% compared to January 2009). The purchase price of wheat has increased 112% in 2011 compared to 
2010, with a price increase of 84% compared to the price in 2009. The purchase price of pork increased 1.4% during 
one year. Compared to February 2010, dairy products, bread, potatoes and vegetables have become considerably more 
expensive for consumers. For instance, the price of milk was up 46.9%, sour cream 32.7%, coffee cream 29.9%, cheese 
20.4%, kefir 18.2% and butter 12.9%. The prices of pork and pork products decreased in the course of 2010, but the 
prices of beef, chicken and minced meat, and frankfurters increased. The prices of white bread products in shops 
increased 15.8% and black bread prices increased 7.5%. The prices of fresh vegetables increased in shops, including 
head cabbage 226.3%, imported tomatoes 17.8%, carrots 17.5% and fresh cucumbers 1.4%. The price of unpacked 
                                                 
6
 The evaluations are based on the results of Statistics Estonia’s households budget survey of 2010. The last comparable information 
is from 2007, as no surveys were conducted during the years in between. In 2010, more than 3,600 households participated in the 
survey. A household is a group of persons living at the same address and using money in common, whose members regard 
themselves as belonging to the same household. A household is different from a family that is based on blood relationship or 
relationship by marriage. In 2010, there were approximately 600,000 households in Estonia, the average size of a household was 
2.3 persons. (Sundkulutuste … 2011) 
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potatoes increased 112.7% during the year. The price of eggs decreased 5.6% during the year. The average retail price 
of motor fuel (95E) in automatic gas stations was 1.20 euros/litre in February, which was 12% higher than a year ago. 
Diesel fuel prices increased 18% during the year. (Toidukaupade … 2011) This is another example of the actual price 
increases. 
Table 2: Dynamics of certain prices in Estonia in 2010–2011, before and during the adoption of euro  
Order 
No. Goods / services 
Price in December 
2010 (EUR) 
Price in February 
2011 (EUR) 
Price increase 
(%) 
1. Rakvere frankfurters, 1 kg 2.70 3.61 34 
2. Main course of pork chop 5.00 8.95 79 
3. Solyanka soup 1.92 2.50 30 
4. Fresh tomato, 1 kg 1.50 2.00 33 
5. Fresh cucumber, 1 kg 2.27 2.99 32 
6. Carrots, 1 kg 0.26 0.38 46 
7. White head cabbage, 1 kg 0.46 0.65 41 
8. Bananas, 1 kg 1.25 1.69 35 
9. Pasta 0.95 1.25 32 
10. Potato (unwashed), 1 kg 0.33 0.60 82 
11. Vegetable oil (from rapeseed), 1 litre 1.91 2.59 36 
12. Sugar, 1 kg 1.02 1.19 17 
13. Light beer, 4.5% 2.24 2.50 12 
14. Palmolive soap 0.30 0.44 47 
15. Haircut (ladies) 8.50 12.20 44 
Source: Pealinn 2011: 4-6 
The Consumer Protection Board also notes that businesses have continued to adjust their prices after the transition to 
the euro by making the prices more attractive for marketing. For instance, in January 2011, a little more than 10% of 
prices ended with the number 9, but in March 2011 there were already more than 20% of such prices (Eesti 
toiduainetööstus … 2011). These adjustments have also led to a certain increase in prices.    
The prices of food, services, and several other products will combine with the price dynamics to gradually shape the 
attitude of the population towards the euro in Estonia. Concerning the attitude towards the euro, it is, for instance, 
generally known that Germans were not as enthusiastic about the euro as they were about the German mark. The 
strength and stability of the mark had been ensured by (Kaupmees 2010): 
- the general knowledge that hard work and diligence led to success 
- discipline and order in everything, including in one’s work 
- extensive saving and economizing 
- a high level of engineering 
- high economic productivity (achieved through all the above-mentioned factors).  
Probably many countries, including Estonia, need to follow the example of Germany in many issues. The economic 
growth forecasts for Germany have been optimistic. For instance, in November 2010 the economic growth forecast for 
2010 in the European Union was 1.8% and in Germany 3.7%. For 2011, the respective forecasts were 1.7% and 2.2% 
(Tageschau 2010). Germany has also been regarded as the so-called engine of the European Union for exiting the 
economic crisis (Ibid). For instance, in November 2010 the consumer price index increased by 1.5% in Germany, above 
all due to the price increases of food products and motor fuel (Regional 2010). At the same time, the price comparisons 
show that the price increases of goods and services in Estonia are almost double the average increases in the EU (Pao 
2011: 8). When we compare the prices of February 2011 with those in February 2010, however, the change in the 
consumer price index in Estonia was 5.7% (Enim … 2011). Considering the economic situation in Germany and the 
situation of the euro zone, it is evident that the leadership and economy of Germany is necessary to stabilize the euro. 
Unlike in Estonia, the prevalent basic economic position in Germany has been that the increase in labour productivity 
has to exceed the increase in average salaries. According to Statistics Estonia, the Estonian economy and the 
Government of the Republic of Estonia are not particularly interested in these indicators. In other words, there is no 
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demand. Thus, the increase in average salary has outpaced the increase in labour productivity in Estonia since regaining 
independence twenty years ago. Economists have ignored the non-observance of that ratio (particularly in the years of 
high economic growth). The Estonian media has mentioned it, but only in the context of the economic crisis. The 
actions of the government in Estonia quite often reminds us of the Soviet days, when suitable economic indicators were 
carefully selected to characterise the positive developments of the country. 
Conclusion 
The creation of many new private companies (above all micro businesses and small businesses) supported the rapid 
economic growth of Estonia in earlier years. Other factors included active investment activities (including involvement 
of foreign investors), the expansion of economic contacts, and reforms in the areas of education, agriculture, health 
care, among others. Joining the European Union and NATO have also contributed to the development of Estonia. 
However, several wrong or half-hearted decisions limited productivity in Estonia. 
The economic crisis had an extensive impact on Estonia. It led to decreases in exports, demand, production, the 
redundancy of labour, and a reduction of salaries. Bankruptcies of companies also profligated, leading to a dramatic 
increase in unemployment, an increase in regional imbalance, and many other phenomena. The problems were most 
evident outside larger cities, particularly in the Estonian rural areas. Exiting the economic crisis largely depends on the 
success of other EU countries and countries throughout the world in overcoming difficulties. 
The adoption of the euro in Estonia on 1 January 2011 (which is often officially regarded as an important objective for 
the achievement of recovery and growth of the economy) was an instrument of monetary policy, but the actual impact 
of the currency will not become evident for at least a few years. Fulfilling the criteria for the adoption of the euro, the 
related budget cuts, and operating in the situation of the economic crisis have taken the Estonian economy to a difficult 
situation. The economic crisis and the objective of adoption of the euro have been a double burden on the Estonian 
society and economy, especially in 2009-2010. 
The extremely high unemployment rate will surely remain for a long time. Although unemployment decreased in the 
second half of 2010 and economic growth increased,  many unemployed people are either not interested in getting a job 
again or are able to learn and acquire retraining. Moreover, employers have no clear idea about the labour they need, 
nor do they have a clear interest in incurring the expenses of retraining and further training themselves. Neither 
employers nor owners have particular interest in making investments to update outdated equipment. 
The central question is whether the adoption of the euro at such a price – high unemployment rates, extremely low 
quality of life of many families, additional social problems – was a timely step to ensure long-term stable development 
of the small country. Were the interests of party politics in the foreground rather than the well-being of the population 
and the achievement of balanced economic development? 
There are numerous additional activities, many of which are interrelated. These include: the reduction of the number of 
the unemployed through job creation and the founding of new businesses, despite the lack of qualified labour; economic 
restructuring towards science-intensive activities; and the achievement of a higher rate of productivity. Development of 
national production activities and industry, rather than relying on subcontracts and foreign investments, is necessary, 
.The quick completion of administrative and territorial reform soon (it has continued for more than ten years already) is 
also important, as is achieving balanced regional development. It is also necessary to complete the land reform to enable 
private owners (rather than merely agricultural producers) to cultivate and manage the land. Other necessary reforms 
include tax reform, which is necessary to achieve social justice, and educational reform, which would lead to higher 
quality. Finally, the further and closer cooperation of the three Baltic states – Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania – should be 
regarded as important. In short, Estonia needs to develop from a society of officials into a society of citizens. 
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Boguslavas Gruževskis / Laima Okunevičiūtė Neverauskienė / Julija Moskvina 
Lithuanian Social Research Centre, Vilnius 
Changes in Lithuanian labour market during period of economic recession 
1. SOCIO-ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF THE ECONOMIC RECESSION 
Recessions have far-reaching impacts on a range of economic and social outcomes. Rapid falls in exchange rates are 
often viewed as the key indicators of a recession and subsequent GDP contractions (Baldacci et al, 2002). Economic 
crises that usually occur as the result of sudden, unanticipated shocks (e.g. the shock that arises from large capital 
outflows) lead to a sharp decline in output, and often to substantial price increases (Prennushi et al., 1999; Sumner et al., 
2009).  
Economic downturn affects labour markets and the behaviour of individuals in employment. The most important 
consequences of the recession towards labour markets are reduced demand for labour, and thus lower employment, 
reduced wages, and lower labour income (Prennushi et al., 1999; Sumner et al., 2009; Knowles et al, 1999). 
Studies also show that economic recession causes a reduction in the labour force employed by both the private and 
public sectors. The falling labour demand has a depressing effect on formal sector wage rates. Crises are generally 
accompanied by increased health risks and decreased affordability of health care (Gruževskis, Zabarauskaitė, 2010 by 
Knowles et al, 1999). Furthermore, evidence suggests that recessionary periods have detrimental effects on social 
indicators that are greater than the gains during equivalent periods of growth (Gruževskis, Zabarauskaitė, 2010 by 
Edstrom, 1999). Despite of the first signs of economic recovery, Lithuania is still experiencing its deepest recession 
since regaining independence. When the economy slowed down, sales and production in most economic sectors 
declined, and unemployment increased simultaneously. Financial crisis triggered inflation, unemployment, drop in 
purchasing power, and the growth of public debt (the government may have to devalue the national currency or borrow 
from the International Monetary Fund) and others (Račickas, Vasiliauskaitė, 2010). 
The Lithuanian economy from 2004 to 2007 was one of the fastest growing in the EU. In 2007, the national economy 
grew at a rate of 9.8 percent. Since 2004, GDP growth has been impressive: average annual growth reached 7.6 percent. 
The main factors of this economic development were rapid household consumption and investment growth. Increase in 
employment and labour shortages led to wage growth. In 2008, Lithuanian economic growth began to slow rapidly, 
falling to 2.8 percent. A decrease in domestic demand was one of the main causes of this decline. The deepening global 
financial crisis and weakening external demand furthered the Lithuanian economic downturn. In 2009, GDP growth was 
negative and amounted to -15 percent. 
Figure 1. Lithuanian GDP growth dynamics in 2004-2010 
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Source: Lithuanian Economic Survey 2009/2010.  
A significant increase in the unemployment rate was observed in the country since the end of 2008. According to the 
data of Department of Statistics, the average unemployment rate in Lithuania in 2009 was 13.7 per cent. In comparison 
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with 2008, unemployment more than doubled.. National Labour Force Survey data showed that the unemployment rate 
was 18.1 per cent in the first quarter of 2010. 
 Figure 2. Average unemployment rate in Lithuania, 2004-2010 (per cent) 
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Statistics Lithuania shows that in 2009 the average gross earnings (including individual enterprises) in the country 
amounted to 2,056 litas (or about 596 Euro) per month, 5 percent less than in 2008. In 2010, the average gross earnings 
amounted to 1,990 litas (almost 577 Euro), or 3 per cent less than in 2009.  
Figure 3. Average gross wage (in litas) in Lithuania (with the exception of individual enterprises)                            
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The consumption expenditure that had steadily increased during 2004-2008 decreased in 2009. According to the 
Statistics Lithuania, household consumption expenditure at current prices during the first quarter of 2010 was 12 
percent lower than in 2009 Q I-III.  
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Figure 4. Average consumption expenditure per capita per month, 2004-2010 (Lt and annual change) 
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The significant economic recession in Lithuanian that was caused by the real estate crisis, precarious bank lending 
policies, and ineffective political decisions rapidly destroyed the achievements of previous economic development. 
Moreover, the global financial crisis had a stronger effect on the Baltic states than elsewhere in the EU. According to 
estimations of experts, the current economic recession in Lithuania is more severe and will last longer than in 1999 
(Nausėda, Tauraitė, 2009). 
The economic downturn created a big budget deficit in 2008-2010. In 2008, Lithuania's budget deficit reached 3.2 
percent of GDP, and in 2009 - 9.5 percent. Compared with 2008, Lithuanian state budget revenues in 2009 declined 
10.8 percent while expenditures remained the same. 
Table 1. Lithuanian state budget revenue, expenditure, and deficit in 2004-2009 (bln. Litas) 
State budget items 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 Change in % 2009 compared with 2008 
State budget revenue 11.8 14.1 16.8 20.7 23.2 20.7 -10.8 
State budget spending 12.7 14.8 18 21 24.6 24.6 0.0 
Budget deficit -0.9 -0.7 -1.2 -0.3 -1.4 -3.9 178.6 
The results of the empirical research of the shadow economy in Lithuania carried out by Krumplytė (2010) show that in 
2006-2009 officially unaccounted revenue, due to the shadow economy, was between 15 percent and 38.5 percent of all 
received revenue. Social consequences of economic recession.  Economic recession had devastating effects on a range 
of social conditions. As indicated in the literature, many of the declines have persistent or irreversible effects – costs 
that last for years after the financial consequences of a crisis have been mitigated (e.g. workers who lose their jobs for a 
year or more during a recession may find it hard to return to formal employment) (Edstrom, 1999; Cecchetti, 2009). 
Earlier research shows that the incidence and severity of income poverty usually rise during a crisis, frequently in 
combination with pressures on other dimensions of well-being. These include nutritional status, education, health, and 
security. While these changes may affect people in all strata of life, they can have a particularly devastating impact on 
those living below or close to the poverty line (Edstrom, 1999; Baldacci et al., 2002).  
Baldacci et al. (2002) argue that financial crises impact poverty through several transmission mechanisms. 
Approximately 60-70 percent of the poverty impacts of a recession are due to four factors: unemployment, inflation, 
reduced public expenditure, and GDP contraction. According to him, the extent of the poverty rise during the crisis 
period depends on an aggregate level of changes in GDP and income inequality. At the household level, it depends on 
household characteristics, education, and location. Some of the poor will be protected by their geographical isolation 
and poor connectivity with national and global markets (Ravallion, 2008). 
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Historical evidence presented by Schmitt and Baker (2008) shows that „labour-market recessions last far longer than the 
technical recessions. Long after financial markets and employers have begun to recover from an economic downturn, 
workers continue to suffer from high levels of unemployment, depressed levels of employment, falling incomes, loss of 
health insurance, and outright poverty.“ Income poverty and social exclusion. With Lithuania’s rather ineffective 
unemployment insurance system, an increase in the number of the unemployed is closely linked with increasing poverty 
in the country (especially as a result of increasing long-term unemployment when no income is earned for more than a 
year). This fact is clearly revealed by a sharply increasing number of persons receiving social benefits in Lithuania.  
The statistical data analysis shows that since the third quarter of 2008, the number of recipients of social benefits has 
dramatically increased in the country. In the last quarter of 2010, social benefits were drawn by about 215.2 thousand 
people in Lithuania, i.e. four times more than in the first quarter of 2008. Compared to the first quarter of 2008, the total 
number of families receiving social benefits in 2010 jumped by more than 430 percent (from 19.7 thousand to 85.2 
thousand). Such a sharp growth in the number of recipients of social benefits was conditioned by falling income of the 
population and particularly by the increased number of job cuts in the recent period1. 
Figure 5. Dynamics of the number of recipients of social benefits in Lithuania in 2008 – 2010 (by quarter) 
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Source: Social map of Lithuania. Available via internet: <http://www.socialiniszemelapis.lt/index.php?22274078> 
The data of the Survey on Income and Living Conditions, collected by Statistics Lithuania, indicates that the 
unemployed are particularly vulnerable in the Lithuanian population. In 2007, the unemployed’s at-risk-of-poverty rate 
was 57 percent, among the highest in the EU. The unemployed were at risk of poverty roughly seven times more often 
than the employed.  
Households where the main source of income is the income derived from work are also at risk of poverty. The income 
derived from work does not ensure a family member’s income level is higher than the poverty line, which is defined as 
60 percent of median equalised disposable income. The EU-SILC survey conducted in 2009 shows that the number of 
such households in Lithuania amounted to 10.4 percent (EU – 8.4 percent). The at-risk-of-poverty rate among the 
unemployed was 5 times higher than those of the employed and made 54.3 percent.  
A comparison of minimum monthly wages (MMW) and the relative poverty line during the subject years helps analyse 
the problem of in-work poverty. In 2008-2010, the MMW in net terms amounted to LTL 660.8 (about € 191). The at-
                                                          
1
  Social benefits in Lithuania are paid to a family (single resident) if its average income during the period of three 
months preceding the month when the family (single resident) applied for a benefit was below the state supported 
income (SSI) per family (single resident) (i.e. 350 LTL), as well as if the value of the property owned by the family 
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risk-of-poverty threshold for a single person was LTL 831 (about  € 243) (SILC (2009) 2008 income data). The income 
derived from work of a person living alone and receiving MMW was 21 percent lower than the at-risk-of-poverty 
threshold. Thus, people living alone who were below the poverty threshold despite having been employed during the 
working period and received MMW had no opportunity to escape from the risk of poverty. Persons receiving MMW 
and experiencing risk of poverty may be related when they work full time or have dependants with no income or whose 
income (from work or social benefits) were lower than the poverty threshold. In addition, a family of four members 
(with two persons employed and receiving MMW and two dependants) also had no opportunity to avoid the risk of 
poverty, as their income per one family member was LTL 330,4 (about € 96) and at-risk-of-poverty threshold - LTL 
436.5 (about  € 127).  
The percentage of people working full time and receiving MMW has a tendency to rise among the total number of the 
employed in Lithuania. The share of those receiving MMW in 2007 constituted 7 percent; in 2008 - 7.2 percent; and in 
2009 - 9.7 percent. The European Union Statistics on Income and Living Conditions (EU-SILC) also showed negative 
changes in the indicator of the households whose main income source was the income derived from work. In 2007, the 
at-risk-of-poverty rate in these households constituted 9.4 percent, rising to 10.4 percent in 2008. The majority of low-
income workers live in rural areas in Lithuania. Around 32.7 percent of the rural population experienced the risk of 
poverty compared to 14.7 percent of those living in urban areas. Comparing the qualification of the rural and urban 
labour force, certainly, the qualification of rural population is lower than urban population. On the other hand, the in-
work poverty rate in Lithuania does not reveal the real poverty situation because the relative poverty threshold in 
Lithuania is extremely low2 compared to many EU Member States. Therefore, any household receiving slightly higher 
income than the poverty threshold is not classified (according to the methodology of calculation of the indicator) as a 
household living in poverty (Blažienė, 2011). 
Table 2. At-risk-of-poverty rate and in-work poverty rate in Lihuania and EU-27, percent 
 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Lithuania 
At-risk-of-poverty rate 20.5 20.0 19.1 20.0 20.6 
In-work poverty rate3 10.0 10.0 8.0 9.4 10.4 
EU-27 
At-risk-of-poverty rate 16.4 16.5 16.7 16.4 16.3 
In-work -poverty rate 8.2 8.2 8.5 8.6 8.4 
Other indicators for 2009 that show the relevance of in-work poverty in Lithuania are:  
- The at-risk-of poverty rate among single employed individuals in Lithuania was 16.1 percent (EU-27: 10.4    
   percent). 
- The in-work poverty indicator of individuals with lower than secondary educational attainment was 21.1  
   percent (EU-27: 16.4 percent). 
There were 191,000 part-time workers, which accounts for 19.8 percent of the population employed in the national 
economy. By comparison, in 2008 the number of part-time workers was 156,800, or 13.7 percent of the total employed 
population (Blažienė, 2011). The figures above suggest that having a job often does not provide adequate standards of 
living. This fact together with the high unemployment rate are seen as a push effect, encouraging people to look for 
more attractive working and living conditions abroad. 
                                                                                                                                                                                                
does not exceed the fixed ratio of property value. Cash social assistance is equal to 90 percent of the difference 
between the SSI per family or single resident and the average monthly income of the family or single resident. 
2
 E.g., in 2005 (latest data published by the EUROSTAT) the poverty threshold in Lithuania was EUR 1,235 per person, 
whereas in France it was EUR 9,567. 
3
 The share of persons who are at work and have an equivalised disposable income below at-risk-of-poverty threshold, 
which is set at 60  percent of the national median equivalised disposable income (after social transfers). 
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Emigration of population. Despite the fact that emigration decreased (from 15.5 thousand to 12.6 thousand) in 2006 for 
the first time since Lithuania’s accession to the EU, the pace of emigration has accelerated again during the period of 
the economic crisis. In addition, 7.7 thousand persons (or 14 percent more than in 2005) immigrated to Lithuania. This 
situation was mainly induced by falling or lost income, rising interest rates on consumer credits, or housing loans (taken 
in the national currency). Moreover, the social and economic policy implemented in the country had little focus on 
social problems . In 2008, the number of emigrants from Lithuania grew by 22.8 percent, as compared with 2007 (from 
13.8 thousand to 17.0 thousand); meanwhile, the increase in the number of immigrants to Lithuania stood at merely 8 
percent (increasing from 8.6 thousand to 9.3 thousand). 
Figure 6. Extent of international migration in Lithuania in 2004-2010 
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Sources: Statistics Lithuania. Data of the International Migration Survey. 
The extent of emigration did not decrease in 2009 either. According to statistical data, around 22.0 thousand persons 
emigrated from Lithuania in 2009. Bearing in mind that the Lithuanian economy is foreseen to recover only in 2011-
2012, Lithuania is likely to see even higher rate of emigration in 2010, along with the recovery of economies of foreign 
countries.  
In April-August of 2010, the magnitude of emigration from Lithuania was high (average of 10.7 thousand emigrants per 
month). This can be explained by the obligations that are stated in Lithuania’s Health Insurance Law, which demands 
country residents pay health insurance premiums. In this context, the change of residence from Lithuania to a foreign 
country could be declared by those migrants who have lived abroad before. During the first ten months of 2010, 74.1 
thousand people declared their departure from Lithuania, which is four times more than during the same period last 
year. According to the Department of Statistics, every second or third person who was absent from Lithuania in 2010 
did not declare his or her departure.4  
As a result of increasing migration, Lithuania may lose additional 100-150 thousand residents in the long run. This is 
particularly alarming because Lithuanian citizens find it increasingly easy to adapt to the socio-cultural environment of 
foreign countries (particularly English-speaking countries) and they tend to stay there permanently. Increased 
emigration entails a wide range of long-term social consequences, having a negative impact not only on individual 
households but also on the country as a whole and its economic potential. Emigration entails a decline in population, 
"brain drain", demographic ageing, and other problems. 
Increase in the crime rate. The statistical data analysis provided by Gruževskis and Zabarauskaitė (2008) has showed 
that economic decline, accompanied by rising unemployment and decreased household income lead to an increased 
crime rate. Although the total crime rate in Lithuania went up about 4 percent in the first quarter of 2009, the number of 
                                                          
4
 General population and housing census 2011 will allow a clarification of the extent of emigration and population for 
2001-2010. 
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economic crimes increased considerably: the number of cases involving the counterfeiting of currency and securities 
increased 158.6 percent (from 237 to 613 cases). Fraud cases increased 59.1 percent (from 915 to 1456). Furthermore, 
the unlawful production of alcohol and the number of crimes committed by persons under the influence of alcohol 
nearly doubled during the same period (as compared with the previous year). If such trends persist, the total number of 
criminal acts in Lithuania may increase by 27 percent in 2012 (against 2008) and constitute about 3 thousand criminal 
acts per 100 thousand residents. The increased crime rate is expected to continue until 2012-2013 due to the fact that 
restraints on economic crimes take longer to develop and are related to a rise in the standard of living in the country 
(Gruževskis, Zabarauskaitė, 2008). It also should be mentioned that in 2008 Lithuania led Europe in the number of 
homicides, suicides, and car accidents caused by drunk drivers (Eurostat). These facts indicate a severe destruction of 
the social structure. 
2. KEY INDICATORS OF CHANGES IN LABOUR MARKET TRENDS 
Employment indicators were uneven during the different periods of labour market development. The average annual 
rate of employment until the decline (2001-2005) began to grow quite rapidly (from 57.2 to 62.6 percent). Employment 
growth continued, and the average rate in 2007 reached its maximum level during the reference period (64.9 percent). 
However, in 2008-2009 it decreased significantly, by 60.1 percent. The lowest employment rate during the period was 
in 2001, when the employment rate was only 57.2 percent. The key factors influencing employment growth were the 
improvement of the economic situation by 2008 and incentives from the European Union. However, there was a drastic 
change during the entrenched economic crisis: employment and unemployment rates significantly deteriorated. (Some 
reached 2002 levels, which was before Lithuania's accession to the EU). In other words, during the last two years major 
adverse employment and unemployment figures actually cancelled the positive trends in the labour market changes that 
took place over the previous five boom years (until 2008). 
Table 3. Core labour market indicators 
 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
The total number of employed, thous. 1436.3 1473.9 1499.0 1534.2 1 520.0 1415.9 1343.7 
Employment rate, total (population aged 15-64), in % 61.1 62.6 63.6 64.9 64.3 60.1 57.8 
The total number of unemployed, thous. 184.4 132.9 89.3 69.0 94.3 225.1 291.1 
Unemployment rate, total, percent.  11.4 8.3 5.6 4.3 5.8 13.7 17.8 
Source: Department of Statistics 
Employment dynamics. While analysing the dynamics in national labour market it is worth highlighting the positive 
changes in employment of elderly people. The employment level of the people aged 55-64 since 1998 rose from 39.8 
percent to 53.1 percent in 2007. Despite the fact that the situation got worse in 2008.  
It must be stressed that the relatively high employment of women is a distinct feature of the Lithuanian labour market. 
During the period of economic downturn, the women's employment rate dropped by 3.2 percent, but it was still higher 
than that of men.  
The youth employment rate was lower than the employment rate of other social groups. At the beginning of the 
economic recession, the employment of young people in the country shrank from 26.7 percent in 2008 to 21.5 percent 
in 2009. Such a drop was the sharpest among other labour force groups. On the basis of the lessons from the „Russian 
crisis” in 1999, it is obvious that the outcomes of the economic recession on young people are very severe. It is probable 
that the employment rate of young people will raise much more slowly than average once the economy improves. 
Table 4. The employment rate and its dynamic by the main target groups 
 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Employment rate (15-64) 62.6 63.6 64.9 64.3 60.1 57.8 
Women employment rate  59.4 61.0 62.2 61.8 60.7 58.7 
Youth employment rate (15-24) 21.1 23.7 25.2 26.7 21.5 19.2 
Elderly employment rate (55-64) 49.2 49.6 53.4 53.1 51.6 48.6 
Source: Department of Statistics  
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Unemployment changes. The lowest number of unemployed people in Lithuania was recorded in 2007, when the 
unemployment rate reached 4.3 percent. Nevertheless, by the end of 2008, when the economic recession began, the 
unemployment rate rose quickly. In 2009, it was almost 14 percent, and in 2010 it had climbed to 17 percent. The 
changes in the unemployment level of different social groups in fact are similar to the dynamics of average index but 
the changes in youth unemployment rate were especially prominent. In the period 2000-2007, it decreased from 30.1 to 
8.2 percent, but in 2008-2010 rose to 35 percent. 
The variations of the unemployment rate of men and women were lighter than for the young target goup. In 2004-2005, 
the unemployment level of women was higher than men. Nevertheless, the situation has changed since 2006: the 
women's unemployment rate became lower than men's (except in 2007, when the indices were equal). During the 
economic recession, the unemployment level of men increased faster than women. In 2010, it reached 20 percent (QIII). 
Table 5. The average annual number of unemployed and the dynamics of the unemployment rate (thous. and  percent) 
 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Number of unemployed, (thous.)  184.4 132.9 89.3 69.0 94.3 225.1 291.1 
Total unemployment rate (15-64), in %, of which            11.4 8.3 5.6 4.3 5.8 13.7 17.9 
Women  118 8.3 5.4 4.3 5.6 10.5 14.6 
Men 11.0 8.2 5.8 4.3 6.1 17.3 21.5 
Youth (15-24) 22.5 15.7 9.8 8.2 13.4 29.2 35.1 
Source: Department of Statistics 
It is clear that the dynamics of different indices vary substantially. According to the data of Statistics Lithuania, the 
situation of the national labour market started to deteriorate in 2008, but the number of unemployed people who belong 
to certain target groups who registered in public employment offices were noticed as early as 2006 and 2007. It can thus 
be assumed that those indices were more sensitive to the approaching economic recession. Even during a strong 
economy, people without vocational education have faced unemployment problems more often. The number of 
individuals who belong to this target group started to increase as early as 2006.  
In 2009, the number of registered unemployed accelerated enormously. Compared to 2008, the number of unemployed 
men increased dramatically (from 11 to 217.2 thousand) and the number of unskilled individuals increased from 84 to 
145.2 thousand. 
Table 6. Job seekers and the unemployed (annual number of registered individuals, thous.) 
 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Registered job seekers, of which: 221.6 178.3 176.7 186.4 241.0 383.2 312.1 
Unemployed 204.3 163.9 160.8 166.7 214.2 369.4 311.2 
Women  101.1 85 87.5 90.5 103.2 152.2 139.1 
Men 103.2 78.9 73.3 76.2 111.0 217.2 172.2 
Youth 40.6 29.1 26.1 29.6 38.6 79.6 44.7 
Without vocational education 66.5 56.7 59.9 66.3 84.0 145.2 … 
Without job experience … … 19.3 22.3 24.5 47.3 … 
 
The analysis of statistical data shows the changes of the situation in the labour market of different population groups, 
especially the situation of vulnerable groups.  The most significant manifestations of the crisis were observed in the 
field of employment. Examining the structure of the labour force reveals that the effects of economic slowdown has 
primarily impacted the most unprotected population in the labour market. The changes in labour supply during the 
economic recession. The number of clients in public employment offices, the increased number of people receiving 
social benefits, and the changing structure of the unemployed since 2008 created new conditions for implementation of 
active labour market policies (ALMP).  
During the economic downturn, the unemployed changed in both quantitative and qualitative terms. At the beginning of 
the recession (end of 2008 - beginning of 2009), the share of people who recieved additional support guarantees among 
all unemployed people had decreased. In 2010, the situation changed again. When the health insurance situation became 
clear, the share of unemployed without work experience and long term unemployed stabilised. In 2010, the share of 
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unemployed people without a work record consisted 23.4 percent (in 2009 – 12.8 percent). Those who had a gap in 
employment for 2 or more years consisted 22 percent (in 2009 – 14.3 percent). 
Forty-one percent of clients of the employment office have no vocational education. Although the share of unskilled 
people in total number of unemployed remained stable (about 40 percent), the absolute number of them has increased. 
Comparing the years 2008 and 2009, the share of unemployed men increased up to 60 percent. It than decreased to 57.7 
percent in 2010. Almost every fifth registered unemployed person is older than 50 (18.6 percent). Every fourth is under 
25 years old (24.4 percent). The number of individuals who are entitled to the additional employment support has 
increased again since the middle of 2010 because of an amendment of the Law on Employment. 
Among other problems related to the structure of labour supply, it is necessary to mention rather sizeable territorial 
disparities in unemployment. According to the data of the Lithuanian employment office from the end of 2010, the 
highest rate of working-age population registered as unemployed was in the municipalities of Ignalina (21.3 percent), 
Mazeikiai (19.8 percent). and Zarasai (19.4 per cent.). The lowest number of unemployed was in Neringa (5.7 per 
cent.), Birstonas (10.7 percent), and Siauliai (11.3 percent). In Lithuania’s big cities, the rate of registered 
unemployment was lower than the average in the country. (Lithuanian labour exchange, 2011). Role of active labour 
market policy measures during the economic recession. From 2003 to 2008, the number of participants of active labour 
market policies (ALMPs) in Lithuania decreased. The share of ALMP participants among total number of unemployed 
also decreased. 
Figure 7. Number of unemployed, persons in active labour market policies,                                                                   
and recipients of unemployment insurance benefit (per year) 
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Source: Lithuanian labour market in figures 2005-2009. 
More significant changes in the application of ALMP measures were observed in 2008. Compared to 2007, the number 
of participants of the measures decreased dramatically. The analysis of the data from the beginning of 2008 and in 2009, 
when the number of unemployed increased dramatically, shows that during the same period the total number of 
participants in ALMP was very low. The share of women and long-term unemployed among the participants of the 
measures were also lower, but the young and disabled people have been actively involved in ALMP measures. 
According to the 2010 data, 57.8 thousand individuals were involved with active labour market policy measures. 
Individuals involved in different ALMPs currently constitute 3.5 percent of the all registered unemployed. An analysis 
of the targeting data of the different ALMP measures during the recession period (2008 – 2010) reveals an increased 
volume of almost all the programs. 
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Table 7. Number of people directed to the active labour market policies (by measures, during the period) 
 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Number of unemployed persons directed to ALMPs (total) 129.9 99.8 72.1 36.3 47.5 57.8 
Vocational training 19.8 19.6 24.4 9.8 13.9 6.5 
Non-formal education … … 5.5 1.4 … … 
Vocational rehabilitation 0.01 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.5 
Supported employment. Of which:       
Subsidised job placement  … 2.7 11.7 4.9 9 12.3 
Support for acquisition of professional skills  … 1.3 4.9 1.7 3.8 6.5 
Public works  39.3 34.4 22.4 16.4 18.8 31.9 
Support for establishing of job places  4.3 3.8 2.4 1.4 0.1 0.1 
Job rotation … 0.1 0.6 0.4 0.6 0.6 
Business license  … 4.2 7.1 7.0 7.7 14.5 
Source: Lithuanian labour exchange.  
During the period of economic downturn, ALMP could be an important tool to reduce social tension and maintain 
employment of vulnerable groups. ALMP measures implement the following key tasks in order to mitigate the 
economic consequences and to speed up the recovery of the country's labour market: promotion of labour demand, 
improvement of the quality of the work force, reducing the consequences of financial crisis for unemployed persons, 
and promotion of small business. 
The changing structure of the unemployed and declining labour demand creates a need for active labour market 
policies. During the period of recession, it would be appropriate to extend the list of the groups who are entitled to 
participate in ALMPs. More attention and more preventive measures should also be implemented in the areas with mass 
unemployment in order to forestall the breakdown of social structures. Unfortunately, the financial allocations for 
ALMPs from the state budget after the beginning of the crisis dropped three times (from 69,524 thous. litas in 2008 to 
22,471 thous. litas in 2009) and the current level of implementation of those measures was maintained mostly by 
European Social Fund. 
It can be argued that ALMP measures in Lithuania were not actively used to reduce unemployment and to preserve 
existing jobs during the economic downturn. Given the extent of long-term unemployment in the country, it is a low 
figure. Since March 2011, the number of long-term unemployed has increased by 140 thousand, a 120 percent increase 
compared to the same period of 2010. At the same time, the number of unemployed people receiving unemployment 
benefits declined from 70.5 thousand up to 45 thousand during the same period. 
Conclusions 
As historical evidence shows, a general lesson is that one must respond quickly to economic crisis before it gets worse. 
The measures selected should have a quick impact on the economy and population with the main focus on employment 
issues. Unfortunately, analysing the macroeconomic indicators of the Lithuanian economy in the period of 2004-2009 
suggests that the public management system had no sufficient potential to meet challenges of economic recession. 
Significant variations in the employment rate and earnings indicated that there are no mechanisms for stabilizing the 
economic fluctuation in the country.  
A reduction in national production, an increase of unemployment (especially youth unemployment), a drop in average 
wages, a rise of prices for utilities, and a reduction of social guarantees all limit citizen participation in the Lithuanian 
labour market. The migration flows – rising number of emigrants and shrinking number of immigrants - illustrates this 
point.  
Another social problem is the worsening standard of living of the unemployed. The number of unemployed who lost 
their right to unemployment benefits is increasing. A significant reduction in personal income often causes the 
unemployed person (or family) to fall into the ranks of socially disadvantaged people. It should be noted that the 
reduction of unemployment benefits (from 1 January 2010 and December) has triggered protests and social anxiety. 
However, a significant decrease in social security and standard of living of unemployed persons has led to the 
development of informal employment.  
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While assessing the main drivers and obstacles for economic and employment growth in Lithuania, the unfavourable 
political situation and imperfections in public administration should be mentioned. Those factors adversely affect the 
opportunities for economic development. The deficiency of institutional trust, which at the end of 2010 reached its 
lowest levels, is concerning. Only 9 percent of the respondents relied on Parliament (Seimas) and 17 percent on 
government and its subordinate institutions (Baltijos tyrimai, 2010). 
Despite the economic downturn, which led to the fastest growth of unemployment in the EU (over 300 percent in the 
period of 2008-2010), and the European Commission's recommendations, Lithuania has failed to increase the role of its 
employment policy. During the recession, the number of employees at the Lithuanian Labour Exchange has dropped, 
and the Lithuanian Labour Market Training Authority has been abolished. Unemployment benefits have reduced while 
the number of unemployed has increased. Although the average unemployment benefit was up to 35 percent of the 
average wage, less than 20 percent of registered unemployed have received it by the end of 2010. A rapid growth of 
long-term unemployment and the decreased availability of business loans should also be mentioned to illustrate the 
importance of cohesive employment policy at public level. 
Lithuania's future is threatened by high structural unemployment, which should be prevented by current government 
policies. The Government has taken various measures to carry out structural reforms. However, in our opinion, the 
efforts were not sufficiently effective due to the following factors:  
- the actions implemented were not compatible and were not sufficiently complex; 
- the actions taken are not supported by the public (including by different interest groups or trade unions);  
- the actions do not directly focus on job creation.  
Growing numbers of the formerly unemployed who were working under a business license showed that such ALMP 
measures could accelerate the development of self-employment during economic recession. More attention should be 
given to the development of small and medium businesses. Such measures are aimed at both the labour supply and 
labour demand, and could contribute to the acceleration of private sector recovery. However, it is clear that long-term 
effects of such measures depend on an overall favourable economic climate for the development of small business. 
The first modest observable signs of economic recovery in 2010 suggest that the country managed to curb the economic 
recession. Nevertheless, the situation remains difficult in the national labour market and social security system.  
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Romans Putans University of Latvia 
Youth Intentions to Public Administration Development: Baltic States and 
Germany Case Studies 
Introduction and topicality 
As in any other organization there is uninterrupted development process in public administration going on for decades 
and in some countries for centuries. Public administrations in the Baltic States and Germany have gone through many 
changes – the foundation of the countries, the lose  of independence, wars, regaining of independence, baby booms, 
changes in political regimes and economies, involvement in international relations, population migration waves. Not 
only have the governments been changing every 2-4 years, but also the generations, the people and this process of 
change will go on as long as the human civilization will exist. In the next 10 to 30 years, the work carried out by public 
administration will be taken over by the next generation, namely young people currently attending schools and 
universities and receiving state services provided by existing policy-makers who are currently planning and ensuring the 
development of public administration. They are implementing various kinds of national and supranational policies, 
including youth policy which in its turn is mainly targeted at those young people who will replace the aging generation. 
Will they? On the background of demographic statistics (low birth rates, high emigration) and economic statistics (high 
unemployment, debts, lower income), which  also affect demographic statistics, as well as taking into account the 
overall attitude to public administration, the answer to the abovementioned question might seem debatable. 
Youth have always been an important part of society.  “Youth is our future” is a saying we can hear quite often in 
speeches given by both experienced and new speakers in various discussions on economic, social, political, cultural and 
public administration topics. Although, for objective reasons, youth – being the future – is not in the very centre of 
focus of public administration, nevertheless it is given a significantly important part of public administration resources, 
including, personnel, money, attention, time, place, legal acts and many other. There are countless youth policy 
documents and programmes in European Union1 as well as in every country2;3;4;5 working toward different directions of 
youth development and trying to cover all stages of youth needs in Maslow pyramid. The care of youth, of course, 
comes back to public administration development in indirect ways through nation’s sustainability, welfare, socio-
economic development, cultural and intellectual growth, competitiveness and other ways. 
Youth represents a specific, large and strategically important group of state clients – receivers of state services. 
According to the author – client of public administration is everybody, every person of society, who receives at least 
one service given by any of public administration institutions, like, social security, state border control and protection 
and many others. There are different names and titles used for describing public administration actions which objective 
is give benefits to individuals. Most commonly used terms are public service, social service, government service, and 
public administration service. Public services are material or nonmaterial benefits defined in legal acts that are offered 
to individuals by government institution in order to ensure society’s need for receiving these services6. Customer 
relationship and effective strategic planning is remarkably topical and still improvable process that is being recognized 
as good practice of management and at the same time it also makes healthy competition in public administration and 
private business sector. For instance, in United States customer satisfaction is being regularly evaluated in all business 
and public fields using a common methodology – American Customer Satisfaction Index (ACSI), which is defined as 
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the weighted average value of the three survey indicators: perceived quality (Perceived quality), perceived value 
(Perceived value) and customer expectations (customer expectations). Normally the assessment results are higher for 
products, services and the lowest, lower - the Government and public authorities7. A lot of public and private sector 
institutions and companies are very interested in exploration of new ideas and research methods and results in this field. 
Researching, developing and discovering questions of customer relationship and effective strategic planning, and rapid 
implementation of solutions have become a true necessity for progress of social, political, and economical processes. 
Private business sector in contradiction to public administration for longer time already admits that the most important 
is the client but not the profit, quality or other business matters. Both quality and profit depend on the client. The client 
defines these matters and the customer relations management has been rapidly developing in private sector. Companies 
are trying hard and take lot of effort to know their clients better, to individualize service, to keep and attract clients, to 
systematize the relationship using information management equipment including web based technologies8, which now 
allows to determine which client has the greatest impact on profits and apply the appropriate segmentation method of 
customer behavior analysis. In addition to improving customer satisfaction, it is possible to direct them to appropriate 
services, based on information and knowledge about customer.9 In private sector`s customer relationship management 
youth is specifically distinct group both in terms of clients as well as in terms of overall business environment shapers – 
their skills, abilities, attitudes, perception of achieving results help enterprises across all disciplines adapt and enable 
best performance.10  
In recent decades similar ideas have come also in public administration. A new public administration culture is 
developing, at the center of which attention is paid to the client’s needs and desires. Public institutions are 
implementing the principles of private business, focusing more on cooperation, cost reduction and the achievement of 
results. Cooperation between the client and public administration has to become as simple as possible in order to 
diminish the administrative burden on individuals and businesses so as to save customers’ time and money and support 
the further development of businesses. The significance of the client in public administration has recently become more 
apparent in the objectives of national and EU strategic documents that underline expanding the availability of public 
services. Many public administrations in Europe are increasingly focusing on a particular strategic objective, namely to 
become a service organization so that clients` consider them to be client-orientated. 
Human resources, personnel development or talent management, the latter being the newest trend in conventional 
human resources management process, are crucial part of organizations’ sustainable development. The same level of 
importance and attention in planning an organization`s sustainable development is devoted to both the personnel or 
internal clients and external clients – consumers of organization`s products and services. The higher the level of 
customer satisfaction and the better the image of the organization, the better it is perceived by both types of clients. 
Besides, people interact closely and are even switching within these groups, thus one affect the other – higher level of 
satisfaction of organization personnel (internal clients) will lead to a higher level of customer satisfaction and other way 
around. The interaction between these two groups is very sensitive and important, especially if we look at it through the 
perspective of future personnel and the development of an organization, both, private or state. Public administration’s 
strategic planning in terms of human resources and customer relations management are as important as in the private 
sector. Public administration has to cover everyone’s needs for public services while the private sector is willing to do 
so and may cover the specific part of society and their needs according to company`s specialization. Although the 
impact of customer relationship management and personnel management are very interconnected, in specific terms of 
development, as every organization, also public administration must ensure its own sustainability. So the organization 
must plan ahead both, the customer service and its own development in order to stay flexible in nowadays rapidly 
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changing environment and keep covering the needs of its clients and ensure their satisfaction and trust which is very 
important precondition of organization`s existence. “Client satisfaction is a key to keeping clients”11. It is important that 
a government policy-makers and performers have a clear position on the involvement of younger generations. This will 
make it possible to develop an appropriate youth policy planning documents. It is also important to be aware weather 
the expectations contained in stand of the current government leaders and youth policy planning documents are in line 
with young people's desires, ideas and their stands. This, in its turn, will enable appropriate and clear mutual contact, 
mutual understanding, thereby promoting the participation of civil society and more efficient public administration, 
increasing its membership and customer satisfaction. Consequently, author defines the main research problem as a 
challenge to create a clear relationship between the current government leaders, youth policy-makers and youth 
generation. 
To sum up, a list of direct and indirect arguments can be made supporting the topicality, necessity and influence of this 
research: 
1) Government and its institutions need to know their clients; 
2) Improved youth policy; 
3) Enabled appropriate and clear mutual understanding of policy-makers and youth; 
4) Increased participation of civil society; 
5) More efficient public administration that can lead to a higher value added in private sector; 
6) Improved customer satisfaction that improves the efficiency and welfare; 
Finally, it is necessary to point out that the every kind of development itself should not be considered only on the 
problem-based background. It can be planned and performed also taking into account its possible future value and 
significance. Wide range of customer relationship researches has proven themselves to work in private sector, which 
has been a great teacher of public administration for centuries. Taking that into account public administration should 
strive for excellency facing possible future value it can obtain. See Figure 1 for visualization of research`s scheme. 
Figure 1. Research scheme 
 
Source: Author 
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The research methodology and sample description 
The main research tool was a questionnaire. The electronic version of the questionnaire in English is available online12. 
The questionnaire included 48 different statements formed into 6 major groups: 
- questions about youth intentions towards participation in public administration development; 
- questions about motivating factors; 
- questions about dissuading factors; 
- questions about comparative factors; 
- questions about all the previous factors’ significance; 
- demographic questions (age, sex, education, geography etc.) 
Each statement in the questionnaire was provided with an evaluation scale from 1-10, 1 being “strongly disagree with 
the statement” or “very unimportant factor” and 10 being accordingly strong agreement with the given statement or 
evaluation of a given factor at the highest level of importance. Overall, the research questionnaire was designed to reach 
the objective of the first part of research – is the youth future of state development and how they see the possible 
participation in public administration development. The questionnaire was distributed both electronically and in a paper 
form. Electronically it was prepared by Google product Google Docs which also provided very convenient data 
collection for further analyses. The electronic version of questionnaire was distributed via emails and through social 
networks among many youth organizations and individuals in Baltic States and Germany that met the only target group 
criteria – age 18-30. In a paper format it was handed and collected from young people at schools and universities in 
Latvia. 
To rebut the argument that major part of research participants are internet users thus seemingly not representing the 
general population, author would like to emphasize that sample selection of research are young people among which the 
regular internet using level in 2010 varies from 93% Lithuania to 97% in Estonia and has been steadily growing ever 
since the beginning of internet appeared13. Besides, the essence of the research relates to active social development 
where internet using level is nearly 100%. So, the participants included in sample size represents the general population 
of research target audience and is completely related to essence of the research. The research data were collected and 
analysed using Google Docs, MS Excel and SPSS softwares. For data analyses following main methods were used: 
statistical data analyses, cross-tabulations, multivariate analysis: factor analysis, correlation analysis and indicators of 
variability, 5 „whys” technique. There are in total 2307 participants in sample size from four respective countries. See 
Table 1 for detailed view on sample description. 
Table 1. The sample description (compilation of main characteristics) 
Questionnaire`s demographic questions  Estonia Latvia Lithuania Germany 
 N 403 1001 411 492 
37. Sex Female 59% 76% 61% 52% 
Male 41% 24% 39% 48% 
38. Age 
below 20 17% 19% 24% 3% 
21-30 79% 78% 73% 95% 
above 30 4% 3% 3% 2% 
39. 
Education 
Secondary school 9% 7% 9% 8% 
Bachelor or professional studies or degree 64% 65% 59% 65% 
Master studies or degree 25% 26% 18% 25% 
Doctoral studies 3% 1% 3% 5% 
43. Field of 
work 
Not working or looking for a job 38% 42% 47% 51% 
Various kinds of employment (public sector, 
service field, NGO, trade, banking, education, a.o.) 62% 58% 53% 49% 
Source: author`s research results 
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Youth intentions 
The first part of the questionnaire included nine statements about different options of how to participate in public 
administration development. These questions were important to evaluate one of the main research hypothesis – the 
conceptual approval from young people that (whether) they are the future of state development and also to identify 
more detailed outh`s plans and ways how they see the possible participation in public administration development. First 
two statements are about youth general and individual perception of them being the future of the state (see Table 2) and 
then 7 more statements about specific fields to involve (see Table 3). 
The average agreement with the statement "Youth is the future of the country" is quite similar among countries. Vast 
majority in all countries (91% - 95%) agrees with the statement that youth is the future of the country. The average 
evaluation in all countries is around 8,8 and the variance of average evaluations among countries is around 0,33 in scale 
1-10. Also the fractional distribution is very similar – the variance among countries lies within three percentage points. 
The balance is the best in Germany where actually no one disagrees that youth is the future of the country. In 
consideration of individual belonging to the future of one’s country (“2. I consider myself as the future of my country”) 
wider variance in balance among countries can be noticed – up to 12% between Lithuania (61%) and Germany (73%). 
Latvia ranks the second with balance of 72% and Estonia is the third with 63%. Interesting, that Estonia, which later 
proves itself to be the most appealing public administration for youth in many factors, has the lowest level of agreement 
and one of the highest levels of disagreement with the statement “2. I consider myself as the future of my country”. It 
results from comparatively high amount of young Estonians who does not have clear opinion about this question (see 
Table 2). 
Table 2. Young people conceptual agreement on youth being the future of their country 
Questions Average values in scale 1-10 Estonia Latvia Lithuania Germany 
1. I agree with the statement "Youth is the future 
of the country" 8,617 8,830 8,806 8,949 
Share of responses by scale fractions, % 
1 - 4 1% 2% 1% 0% 
5 - 6 7% 6% 4% 5% 
7 - 10 93% 93% 94% 95% 
 Balance* 92% 91% 93% 95% 
2. I consider myself as the future of my country 7,533 7,853 7,582 7,915 
Share of responses by scale fractions, % 
1-4 10% 7% 13% 5% 
5-6 17% 13% 12% 17% 
7-10 73% 79% 75% 78% 
 Balance* 63% 72% 61% 73% 
The difference between questions, case results (share (%) of all answers by countries) 
„I consider myself as the future of my country” LESS 
THAN „I agree with the statement "Youth is the 
future of the country” 
49% 51% 46% 59% 
*Balance is calculated as difference between evaluations in scale fractions “7-10” and “1-4”, where the first one 
represents the approval of a statement and the latter represents the denial. The difference shows more objective 
overall evaluation. For example, in the second question Latvian youth shows the highest approval of the statement 
(79%) and Germany follows with 78%, however Germany`s balance is better (73%) than Latvia`s (72%), because 
there are more young people in Latvia (7%) who disagrees with the statement than in Germany (5%). 
Source: author`s research results 
The results of interconnection of these first two questions about young people conceptual agreement on youth being the 
future of their country are more vigorous and were a little of a surprise. The difference between average evaluation of a 
general statement that "Youth is the future of the country" and the average evaluation of the statement „I consider 
myself as the future of my country” is quite significant, but the individual case results are even more substantial. The 
difference is calculated as a share of those cases where the evaluation for the second statement is lower than the 
evaluation for the first statement. The widest gap is in Germany – 59% of young people consider themselves as the 
future of their country less than they consider general youth as the future of the country. In Lithuania this indicator is 
50%, Latvia – 49%, and in Estonia this indicator is still very high – 46% (See Table 2). 
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This difference may be interpreted in many different ways, but among others it partly proves the perception of 
collectively shared and individual responsibility, where on the background of possibility of general involvement the 
individual responsibility decreases. These results also relate to observation that can be widely seen in many dimensions 
of social and professional lives, i.e., people often know better what others should do and how others should perform in 
their field and speciality, however not that often it can be seen in ownership and responsibility of their own actions and 
their own field of work. Of course, it has deeper roots than just personal reasons such as trying to look better by making 
look others worse; fear of guilt, fear of losing a job, fear of criticisms, disapproval, and condemnation. The reasons of 
these fears in their turn have been deeply rooting in psyche of whole society during last century during wars, especially 
in Eastern part of Europe that was under dominance of Soviet Union where different mistakes, lower performance and 
initiatives could turn fatal. On the other hand, it can, of course, be justified by strong interconnectivity and 
interdependence of different fields of work both in public administration and private sector nowadays. For instance, 
courts partly depend of investigation made by police which in its turn depends on policy made by ministry of internal 
affairs, which in its turn depends on government policies and resources, which in its turn can depend on supranational 
policies and global market, and after all they all depend on ability of tax and customs administration bring income in the 
country that in its turn depend on private sector consumption and ability to generate added value, which again in its turn 
inversely depends on different government policies and ability to ensure fair and competitive business environment. 
When talking about youth intentions towards participation in public administration development there are basically two 
major ways of how to participate: 
1) Directly – through being employed by public administration institution; 
2) Indirectly – through civil society, academia, NGO, private business and many other different ways that cannot 
all me named because of its wide variety and range. 
Although on the one side A.Smith`s “invisible hand” in interaction between the supply and the demand (including 
public administration labour market) most probably is still working at full force, on the other hand it is considered not to 
be that simple. It is not just plain technical supply, the amount of working places in public administration that affect the 
youth intentions of participating in public administration development. In addition to more technical analyses in this 
very direct way of youth participation in public administration development (amount of vacancies, employment period, 
retention rates a.o.) there is also the indirect way of participation – through private sector, non-governmental 
organizations, social sphere, academia and others. 
According to the author`s research, the situation with youth willingness and intentions towards participating in public 
administration development varies among countries. Further analyses will explore youth attitude towards 7 ways or 
platforms for participation in public administration development. The popularity of given seven choices of how to 
participate in public administration development – 1) work in a state sector, 2) work in a private sector, 3) work in a 
social sphere, 4) work in academia, 5) work in NGOs, 6) commenting (expressing an opinion in virtual environment and 
printed periodicals (internet blogs, articles, journals etc.)) and 7) becoming elected statesman – in a cross view by 
countries varies quite significantly, although three of the most popular and three of the least popular platforms for 
intentions of participation in public administration development remain practically the same in all countries covered, 
and they are – State, NGO, Private as most popular and commenting, running for elections, and academia as least 
popular areas. 
The statements about possible ways of involvement in public administration development started with a question about 
direct involvement – “3. I would like to work in a national or local government institution”. The results showed that in 
Estonia they find working for public administration much more appealing than in Latvia, Lithuania and Germany (see 
Figure 2).  
Estonian youth show the highest level of willingness to work in government institutions – 58% of participants evaluated 
their agreement with the statement by marks 7-10 thus showing their interest and willingness to work in government 
institutions in Estonia. Although the level of unwillingness to work in government institutions (amount of evaluations 1-
4) in Estonia looks quite high (25%) still it is significantly lower in comparison to other countries, as a result the 
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balance (difference between share of marks 7-10 and 1-4) is quite scattered among countries. Overall, Estonia is ranking 
the first with highest average evaluation of 6,579 and 33% balance. Lithuania is following with average evaluation of 
5,881 and twice as low balance – 16%, because less participants agrees with the statement (51%) and more participants 
disagrees with the statement (34%). Latvia and Germany has around four times as low balance (accordingly 8% and 
7%) and average evaluations of 5,663 and 5,831. Although Germany has higher average evaluation than Latvia which 
results from higher level of agreement with the given statement and lower level of “I don`t know” answers, Latvia has 
insignificantly, but still a little better balance, because the level of youth unwillingness to work in government 
institution is higher in Germany. Figure 2 shows the distribution of evaluations by scale fractions. 
Figure 2. Share (%) of evaluations by scale fractions 
 
Source: author`s research results 
Although working in government institutions seems quite popular way among youth intentions for future, it is not, of 
course, the only way and there are more popular sectors. Now, let`s focus more on that part of youth who doesn`t want 
to work in government institutions or have no clear vision about this statement – the share of such young people varies 
from 42% in Estonia and 49% in Lithuania to 56% in Germany and 58% in Latvia. Table 3 below shows the average 
evaluations and fractional distributions by scale on other given sectors. 
Table 3. Youth`s plans for participating in public administration development  
Questions Average values in scale 1-10 Estonia Latvia Lithuania Germany 
4. I would like to participate in State development by running a 
private business 6,364 6,420 6,537 6,017 
Share of responses by scale fractions, % 
1 - 4 28% 23% 24% 34% 
5 - 6 20% 23% 18% 17% 
7 - 10 52% 54% 58% 49% 
 Balance 24% 32% 34% 15% 
5. I would like to work in the social sphere (doctor, teacher, 
police force etc.) 5,355 3,883 5,119 4,542 
Share of responses by scale fractions, % 
1 - 4 42% 63% 46% 63% 
5 - 6 21% 18% 16% 10% 
7 - 10 36% 19% 37% 27% 
 Balance -6% -44% -9% -36% 
6. I would like to work in academia and do research  on public 
administration 5,121 4,366 5,254 4,288 
Share of responses by scale fractions, % 
1 - 4 42% 55% 43% 56% 
5 - 6 26% 20% 18% 19% 
7 - 10 32% 24% 39% 25% 
 Balance -10% -31% -4% -31% 
7. I would like to participate in state processes through the third 
sector (non-governmental organizations) 6,617 5,881 6,776 6,898 
(Scale 1-10: 1 - fully disagree with the statement; 10 - fully agree with the statement). 
58% 
25% 33% 
42% 
34% 
51% 
37% 
44% 
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Share of responses by scale fractions, % 
1 - 4 20% 32% 22% 22% 
5 - 6 26% 23% 16% 12% 
7 - 10 54% 45% 61% 66% 
 Balance 35% 14% 39% 44% 
8. I would express my opinion in a virtual environment and 
printed periodicals (internet blogs, articles, journals etc.) 3,916 5,652 4,284 3,390 
Share of responses by scale fractions, % 
1 - 4 61% 34% 58% 69% 
5 - 6 18% 23% 13% 17% 
7 - 10 21% 42% 28% 14% 
 Balance -39% 8% -30% -56% 
9. I would consider running for government, parliament, and 
local government elections to become a statesman or politician 4,785 3,559 4,657 4,407 
Share of responses by scale fractions, % 
1 - 4 47% 66% 45% 58% 
5 - 6 19% 17% 24% 10% 
7 - 10 35% 17% 31% 32% 
 Balance -12% -49% -13% -25% 
Source: author`s research results 
Analyses of the results in the first section of research questionnaire about youth intentions towards public 
administration development show that overall the most popular platform where to act giving support to public 
administration development in youth perception is non-governmental organizations (NGO). This sector has the highest 
average evaluation and the most positive balance among other sectors thus ranked 1st in Germany, Lithuania, and 
Estonia, and the 2nd in Latvia. 
The second most popular sector varies among countries. In Lithuania and Germany it is private business sector, in 
Estonia – state sector, and in Latvia – NGO. 
And the third most popular sector for youth to participate in public administration development overall is state sector, 
however in Estonia state sector was ranked the 2nd, so the third most popular in Estonia is private sector (see Table 4). 
Table 4. Sectors ranking by countries based on different calculations  
(based on average evaluations) (based on share of 7-10 evaluations) (based on balance) 
Rank EE LV LT DE Rank EE LV LT DE Rank EE LV LT DE 
1 NGO Private NGO NGO 1 State Private NGO NGO 1 NGO Private NGO NGO 
2 State NGO Private Private 2 NGO NGO Private Private 2 State NGO Private Private 
3 Private State State State 3 Private Comm State State 3 Private State State State 
4 Social Comm Acad Social 4 Social State Acad Elect 4 - - - - 
5 Acad Acad Social Elect 5 Elect Acad Social Social 5 - - - - 
6 Elect Social Elect Acad 6 Acad Social Elect Acad 6 - - - - 
7 Comm Elect Comm Comm 7 Comm Elect Comm Comm 7 - - - - 
Source: author`s research results 
Deeper analyses of youth intentions showed quite a many significant (medium and large) correlations (Pearson, r 
coefficient values). That part of youth who shows willingness to work in public administration institutions keep being 
persistent in positive attitude to public administration which is proved by higher correlation coefficients respective 
factors such as sense of being helpful in public administration (r=0,596), no interest in public administration (r=-0,460), 
lack of belief in public administration (r=-0,512), the public sector is a more interesting and challenging place to work 
than the private sector (r=0,423) and others.  
Motivating and dissuading factors 
In the second and the third part of the questionnaire participants were asked to evaluate 3 motivating factors and  5 
dissuading factors (see statements No.11-13 and No.15-19 in Table 5) that accordingly inspires or decreases youth`s 
motivation to participate in public administration development. All of the motivating factors (sense of responsibility, 
sense of being helpful and having own opinion to implement) were approved by more than 50% of youth population in 
every respective country and the average evaluations of motivating factors varies around from 6,95 – 7,15 in Estonia, 
Lithuania and Germany and around 6,3 in Latvia. 
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Having ones opinion especially among young people now has become quite important for society and public 
administration. Very vividly it now can be seen in Latvia, where after the dissolution of parliament and coming fresh 
elections. According to the social research agency TNS Latvia study 16% of all the economically active citizens of 
Latvia aged 18-55 want to see new faces joining the political party of Latvia ex-president – Zatlers Reform Party, as 
well as they want smart and active people in the party with their own opinion14. This factor has overall lower agreement 
and higher disagreement level than the rest of other two, and the highest approval is among youth in Estonia (61,3%) 
which is very closely followed by Lithuania (60,0%) and then Latvia and Germany (50%). 
Vast majority of given dissuading factors  (4 out of 5) turned out not to be approved by youth, i.e., there are more young 
poeple who disagreed with the given statements than those who agreed. The exception is a statement about having bad 
opinion of public administration in Latvia and Lithuania where more young people agreed with this statement than 
those who disagreed. Over 60% of Latvian youth and 40% of Lithuanian youth agree with the statement „I have a bad 
opinion of public administration” and less than 20% in Latvia and 28% of youth in Lithuania think the opposite. In 
Estonia the situation is symmetrically contrary in comparison to Latvia – 61% of Estonian youth disagree with the 
statement „I have a bad opinion of public administration” and 19,6% agree with it (see Figure 3).  
Figure 3. Dissuading factors 
 
Source: author`s research results 
Comparative factors and their significance 
Further in the research participants were asked to evaluate 8 comparative factors that might be both motivating and 
dissuading as well as to evaluate each of the previously evaluated factors` significance depending on the participant’s 
personal and professional values, needs and individual assessment, for example, if a participant among other statements 
generally agrees with the statement that „less limited career opportunities are in public administration than in the 
private sector” or disagrees with the statement that „initiative is appreciated more in the public sector than in the 
private sector” then in the fifth part of the questionnaire it is evaluated how important participant rates the career 
                                                 
14
 Baltic News Network. „16% of citizens want to see new faces in Zatlers party”. http://bnn-news.com/16-citizens-faces-zatlers-
party-32464. Last viewed on July 18, 2011. 
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opportunity itself and recognition at work itself. It allows obtaining deeper and more objective analyses about each 
factor and technically calculating the factors` significance. 
The comparative factors were given in a form “public administration versus private sector” (see factors No.21.-27 in 
table 5). Youth in all countries highly agrees that a job in public administration, including salary, is more guaranteed 
(safe and stable) than in the private sector and partly agrees that it is also easier. Other comparative factors have lower 
level of agreement thus also lower average evaluations (see Figure 4). 
Figure 4. Evaluations of comparative factors 
(Is the given factor better in public administration than in private sector?) 
 
Source: author`s research results 
Regarding factors` significance, in all countries most the given factors are of a high significance except of “Easy job” – 
over 60% of youth in Estonia and Germany, over 50% in Lithuania and 41% of Latvian youth consider the factor “Easy 
job” not significant. However, taking into account that over 20% of youth in Baltic countries evaluates this factor as 
important and its average evaluation varies up from 4-5, it is being considered and used in further analyses of the 
research (see Figure 5). 
Figure 5. Average evaluations of factors` significance. 
 
Source: author`s research results. 
Overall public administration`s attractiveness indicator from youth perspective 
Analyses of the research results by all sections gives us a detailed view of the country`s ranking by factors and the 
different factor’s ranking by countries. These are important for detailed analyses of each factor and each country and 
form general views about countries, however it does not give an overall concrete representation of youth attitude 
regarding participation in public administration development and public administration`s attractiveness. Therefore, the 
overall public administration`s attractiveness indicator from youth perspective is calculated in a following way: 
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, where 
j – country; 
i – statement or factor used in calculation (see the list above) with an evaluation scale 1-10; 
 – overall public administration`s attractiveness indicator in country “j”; 
Fij – sub- indicator of statement “i” in country “j” expressed in percentage – describes the share of the 
evaluation of statement “i” in its maximum; 
xij – evaluation of statement “i” given by respondent in country “j”; 
 – average evaluation of the statement “i” in country “j”; 
wij – evaluation of factor`s “i” significance given by respondent in country “j”; 
– average evaluation of factor`s “i” significance in country “j”; 
maxi – maximum possible evaluation of factor “i”; 
nj – total amount of respondents in country “j”; 
ni – total amount of statements used in calculation. 
 
Step by step methodology description of how to get to : 
1) Choosing the statement and factors (i) from the questionnaire that characterize youth`s attitude to public 
administration. There are 25 factors in total used for calculation of overall public administration`s attractiveness 
indicator out of which there are 18 statements` evaluations and 7 factors` significance evaluations. 
1. Overall statements: 
- 2. I consider myself as the future of my country 
2. Plans, intentions: 
- 3. I would like to work in a national or local government institution 
- 9. I would consider running for government or parliament elections 
3. Motivating factors: 
- 11. I have a sense of responsibility towards my country 
- 12. I feel that I could be helpful in public administration 
- 13. I have my own opinion, which I would like to implement 
4. Dissuading factors: 
- 15. I  have no interest in public administration 
- 16. I do not believe that I can change anything in public administration 
- 17. I have a bad opinion of public administration 
- 18. I have a bad experience in dealing with public administration 
- 19. Working in public administration is not prestigious 
 
5.  Comparative factors (used to weigh previous factors): 
- 21. A job in public administration, including salary, is more guaranteed 
- 22. Career opportunities in public administration are less limited 
- 23. A job in public administration is easier and takes less effort 
- 24. Taking initiative is more appreciated in the public sector 
- 25. Salaries in public administration are higher 
Youth Intentions to Public Administration Development: Baltic States and Germany Case Studies 
 54
- 26. The public sector is a more interesting and challenging place to work 
- 27. The public sector’s working environment is more professional 
2) Calculation of the average value of each statement and factor in each respective country ( ); 
3) The average values of statements are weighted using significance factors as coefficients that show how 
important these factors are for youth ( ). This result is divided by 10 in order to stay in the same estimation 
scale that is used throughout the questionnaire. 
Example: the statement „Career opportunities in public administration are less limited than in the private sector” 
(questionnaire`s question No.22) is evaluated with an average value of 4,57 in Estonia, 4,621 in Latvia, 4,358 in 
Lithuania and 3,850 in Germany. Then it is necessary to evaluate how important participant rates the career opportunity 
itself (questionnaire`s question No.31) – it is evaluated with an average value of 8,411 in Estonia, 8,738 in Latvia, 8,642 
in Lithuania and 8,150 in Germany. Then the average value of the statement is multiplied by the average value of its 
respective significance coefficient and divided by the maximum of estimation scale (10) as a result more unbiased 
weighted estimation is calculated. For some factors there are no weighing coefficients since their importance or 
significance is unquestionable, e.g., it is assumed that bad experience or opinion, or sense of responsibility needs no 
significance coefficient. In this case the maximum of evaluation scale (10) is used in order to have the same average 
value of statement after it is divided by 10. 
N.B. It is important at this stage not to calculate the overall average value of all previous average evaluations since 
among 18 factors there are five dissuading factors to which inverse interpretation of the evaluation scale applies (1 
being better and 10 being worse). And because of inequality of amount of “positive” and “negative” factors the overall 
evaluation is influenced just by the number of factors, but not by factors` factual essence. Besides, because of influence 
of inverse scale of dissuading factors, the maximum possible overall evaluation using this method of calculation in a 
perfect scenario would be seemingly random number 7,500. 
4) Weighted evaluations of motivating and comparative factors are divided by their maximum possible value 
(maxi = 10). Since the evaluation scale inverses for dissuading factors and the best possible value for these factors is 
“1”, then 1 is divided by the weighted evaluations of for dissuading factors to calculate their share in maximum possible 
value. All shares are expressed per cents. Now we have evaluations based on maximum possible values for each 
statement (Fij).  
5) And for the last calculation step the overall public administration`s attractiveness indicator for respective 
country is calculated as an average value of all sub-indicators ( . 
Since the opinion of the most and the least attractive public administrations might have already formed from previous 
analyses, the results of overall public administration`s attractiveness indicator calculations showed no huge surprise in 
these terms. With an overall indicator of 45,1%, the most attractive public administration in perception of respective 
country`s youth is Estonia – 11 out of 18 given statements are evaluated the most positively for Estonian public 
administration in comparison to other countries. From previous analyses it might seem that the second most attractive 
public administration overall would be Germany where youth evaluations on state related factors in 4 cases ranked 1st 
and in 3 cases ranked 2nd, while Lithuania`s youth evaluations were never ranked neither 1st nor last, but always 2nd (10 
statements) and 3rd (8 statements), as a result second most attractive public administration overall is Lithuania with 
indicator of 43,2%. It is to be admitted though that Germany ranks 3rd with only 0,4%-point difference – 42,8%. And 
the lowest overall indicator (40,6%) is in Latvia where 12 out of 18 given statements are evaluated the least positively 
for public administration in comparison to other countries and in 3 factors Latvia was ranked the 1st – the highest 
agreement that there are better career opportunities and higher salary in public administration institutions as well as 
considering that a job in public administration is easier, simpler and takes less effort than in the private sector (See 
Table 5). 
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Table 5. Overall public administration`s attractiveness indicator from youth perspective 
Statements Weighing significance factors 
The share of weighted evaluation 
of statement  in its maximum (Fi) 
EE LV LT DE 
2. I consider myself as the future of my country 75,3% 78,5% 75,8% 79,5% 
3. I would like to work in a national or local government institution 65,8% 56,7% 58,8% 58,8% 
9. I would consider running for government or parliament elections 47,9% 35,7% 46,6% 44,8% 
11. I have a sense of responsibility towards my country 76,1% 64,0% 76,0% 75,3% 
12. I feel that I could be helpful in public administration 70,5% 62,2% 69,9% 68,7% 
13. I have my own opinion, which I would like to implement 67,9% 61,8% 65,5% 64,7% 
15. I  have no interest in public 
administration 
32. It is important that job is 
interesting and challenging for me 32,8% 27,1% 33,7% 34,3% 
16. I do not believe that I can change anything in public administration 24,6% 19,0% 24,2% 24,4% 
17. I have a bad opinion of public administration 23,3% 14,5% 17,2% 21,7% 
18. I have a bad experience in dealing with public administration 25,4% 18,4% 19,0% 21,7% 
19. Working in public administration is 
not prestigious 30. Prestige 37,4% 30,7% 35,6% 32,9% 
21. A job in public administration, including salary, is more guaranteed 65,6% 64,4% 64,8% 75,2% 
22. Career opportunities in public 
administration are less limited 31. Career opportunities 38,4% 40,4% 37,7% 31,4% 
23. A job in public administration is easier 
and takes less effort 
34. Job can be easily 
accomplished 19,6% 28,3% 24,3% 15,9% 
24. Taking initiative is more appreciated in 
the public sector than in the private sector 
35. Leaders encourage initiative 
and appreciate work 36,0% 31,1% 30,3% 36,3% 
25. Salaries in public administration are 
higher than in the private sector 29. Salary 28,3% 36,7% 33,5% 26,7% 
26. The public sector is a more interesting 
and challenging place to work 
32. It is important that job is 
interesting and challenging for me 40,4% 33,7% 36,8% 35,5% 
27. The public sector’s working 
environment is more professional 
33. Professional leaders, rational 
decision making 36,8% 28,5% 28,0% 23,4% 
Average public administration`s attractiveness indicator 45,1% 40,6% 43,2% 42,8% 
Source: author`s research results 
Methodology of the calculation of indicators allows for the comparison of results not only among countries thus 
identifying the practises to learn from other countries, but also to show the share of a specific country`s indicators in its 
own maximum, thus a particular country can look up not only to those higher levels of performance of other countries, 
but also can strive for its own excellence. 
Conclusion  
In conclusion, firstly, gratitude is paid to all participants of the research as well as the academic supervisor, experts and 
consultants that believed in, encouraged, supported and helped with the research. Due to the article’s length restrictions, 
the essay contains only main results, charts and trends. More detailed and comprehensive anatomy of the research is 
available upon request at author`s e-mail. 
Main content-based conclusions 
• Most popular areas for participation in public administration development are private sector, NGOs and state 
 institutions. 
• The situation of youth’s willingness and intentions to participating in public administration development are 
 quite different among countries, for instance, in Estonia they find working for public administration much 
 more appealing than in Latvia and Germany. Lithuanian public administration is also quite appealing for 
 young people. Almost 70% of young people in Estonia and a little over 50% of young Lithuanians showed 
 interest in working in national or local government institution, but only 33% of young Latvians and 44% of 
 German youth showed similar interest. 
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• In all Baltic countries there are more people having bad opinions of public administration than those having 
 bad experience. In Latvia the difference is significantly higher than in other countries. This might lead to a 
 thought of public communication issues (PR campaigns, news) that is obviously a better practice in Germany 
 where the difference is even in favour of good opinion despite the fact the experience is worse. 
• Lower salaries, less professional working environment, worse recognition from managers are factors that keep 
 public administrations less attractive to youth. 
• Estonia once again proved itself with overall better results of youth attitude towards public administration, 
 which, taking into account Estonia’s socio-economic development, is a good signal for other countries to 
 search for best practises and perform deeper and more substantial researches of their clients as well as to take 
 actions in order to increase client satisfaction importance of which has been presented in the article 
• The results of the research may be used for national strategic planning, namely for planning activities to 
 increase the attractiveness of the public administration and generally society`s level of satisfaction with public 
 administration performance. The results also serve as the background for further and deeper researches. 
Organizational conclusions 
• Before launching the research, the questionnaire was tested on 50 experts, who gave suggestions and 
 improvements on both design and content of the questionnaire and research, which in its turn gave the author a 
 „test-drive” of the research and an opportunity to plan the research results` analyses more detailed and more 
 successful. „Failing to prepare is preparing to fail.” /John Robert Wooden. American basketball player and 
 coach./ Good preparation had lot of benefits. 
• One of the substantial research restrictions was finances. The average price for data collection at a sufficient 
 amount, if it was outsourced to professional research company, would vary around 1`500 euros per country 
 (data collection for 4 countries covered in this research would cost around 6`000 euros); the average price for 
 whole research with the primary overall analyses would cost nearly 20`000 euros. It took unexpectedly long 
 time and effort for author to collect and analyse data on his own. 
 Although academia often might not have the direct impact on initiating changes in public administration, it can 
 certainly reveal the impact on general public opinion. Keeping that in mind and also taking into account that 
 society, its opinion and demand is actually the main basis of development of public policies, author believes 
 that academic activities and achievements will indirectly (through changing public opinion) will give a hand in 
 diminishing the gap between what science knows and what business does. 
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The Role of Trade Unions in Social Dialog and Social Agreements in New 
Member States: the Case of Latvia 
1. Introduction   
Most of the European Union Member States were seriously affected by the economic, financial and social crises of 
2008-2009, consequences of which continue to be felt particularly in the social area. The socio- economic situation 
experienced serious negative changes that threaten social cohesion in Europe.  The European Commission Joint 
Employment Report 2009/2010 to the Council1 calls for measures to be taken to ensure social stability in the EU. The 
report describes the employment situation in 2008-2009 and provides an outlook to 2011. Despite signs of economic 
recovery in the EU, employment prospects remain unfavourable.  
Some of the EU Member States have been hit more seriously then the others. One of these countiries is Latvia, 
belonging to the group of the New Member States (NMS). Latvia entred the EU in 2004 and during 2004-2007, had the 
fastest GDP growth in the EU (2004- 10.4%; 2006- 11.9%; 2007- 10, 2%). However, the  severe economic downturn 
severely affected the growth tendency in 20082.   
The reasons for the earlier unusual economic growth were largely due to a substantial inflow of foreign capital, which 
stimulated domestic demand based on easy credit conditions and an expansionary fiscal stance.  The economic crisis 
originated in the reversal of the domestic real estate boom and worsened rapidly when risk aversion became extreme on 
global financial markets.  In the first half of 2008, real GDP contracted by 4.6%3. In 2009, GDP had fallen by 18.7%. 
According to the the Ministry of Economy towards the end of the 2010 Latvia managed to overcome the recession, and 
in 2011 started a slow recovery. Analysts expressly predict a 3,3% GDP growth in 2011.4 
The economic downturn in Latvia was accompanied by raising unemployment, with the labour market significantly 
deterioreting since the end of 2008. The lowest point was reached in the first quarter of 2010 when the employment rate 
shrank to 57.7% (population aged 15-64 years), and the unemployment rate of the population aged 15-74, increased to 
20.4%.5 The decrease of the employment rate as well as the decrease in the level of wages due to the economic 
recession are the main push factors for out-migration of the labour force creating dangerous structural problems in the 
Latvian economy. The outflows of  labour and especially of high skilled professionals negatively influenced the 
potential for economic recovery and sustainability of the welfare system. 
Significant budget consolidation measures have been taken to implement the cumulative fiscal adjustment in 2009-2010 
in the amount of 10.5% of GDP.  The government reduced public spending and budget deficit by 500 M LVL  (EUR 
711.4 M),” in 2009 and by LVL 250 M (EUR 355.7 M), in 2010. Currently the budget deficit is at 8.5%.6 Additional 
cuts to public spending are foreseen in 2011. This trend will increase the number of unemployed people and the 
subsequent reduction in demand will result in further staff cuts in the private sector.7 According to the EU Lisbon 
Strategy “Europe 2020”, the aim should be to reach an employment level of 75% for the 20 to 64 age group; currently 
in Latvia this percentage is only around 58%8. A gradual decrease of unemployment is expected only in 2011.  
At a time when Latvia is slowly recovering from the economic resession, and in particular, from a fall in production and 
                                                 
1
 European Commission (2009) Draft Report from the Commission to the Council “Draft Joint Employment Report (JER)” 
2009/2010. COM(2009)674/3. Brussels  
2Eurostat. Flash Estimate 14 February 2008. 
3EC European Economy no 32009 May 4, 2009. 
 (http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/pdf/2009/springforecasts/lv.html) 12/03/111 
4
 The National Economy of Latvia. LR Ministry of Economy Report December 2010. 
(http://www.em.gov.lv/images/modules/items/tsdep/zin_2010_2/2010_dec_eng.pdf) 12/03/11 
5LR Ministry of Economy. Report June 2010. 
6LR CSB.  
7Unemployment situation complicates an additional phenomenon. With the requirement of the EC and IMF to cut the budget 
expenditure, the government, ministries and other public institutions are reducing a number of employees in public sector that is 
resulted in high unemployment of public servants and other groups of employees in different areas of the public sector located in 
Riga and major cities in the country. 
8Latvian National Employment Agency. 
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increase in unemployment, a swift and desicive response by the government is essential. The Latvian government has 
determined certain activities to pursue strict and stable monetary policy and to stabilize state’s financial system. 
Nevertheless, it would be particularly important to coordinate financial system support measures with active labour 
market policies, in order to mitigate structural long-term unemployment and to avoid social tensions. There is a possible 
development of social unrest related to the economic recesion and  the deteriorating labour market requires strategic 
actions.  
2. Legislation development on employment policy and social dialogue  
To tackle unemployment and  pursue active labour market policies, there is a need for  fundamental change and the 
further implementation of the European Union's  strategy for jobs and smart, sustainable and inclusive growth (Europe 
2020)9 and European Employment Strategy (EES). The European Employment Strategy was launched in 199710 to 
encourage the exchange of information and joint discussions by all Member States with the involvement of social 
partners, the European Parliament, European Economic and Social Committee, and the Committee of Regions in the 
social dialogue.  The EES is intended as the main instrument to provide, through the open method of coordination, 
direction and to coordinate the employment policy priorities supported by the Member States at the European level. 
Employment policy in the European Union incorporates labour law and occupational health and safety, as well as 
gender mainstreaming. It  also sets standards and objectives in these areas, as well as laying down the principles of anti-
discrimination policy.  The European Union has no powers to harmonise the numerous,and in some cases very different, 
systems of social protection and employment policies in the Member States.Rather., its role is to coordinate these 
systems in order to protect the main principles of the Common Market. The European Social Charter articulates a 
number of fundamental rights in such areas as collective bargaining, protection from unjustified dismissal, health and 
safety at work, etc.11  
When Latvia regained independence in 1991, the  legal labour relations system was based on the Labour Code adopted 
in 1972. A labour law reform was needed and it was launched in the 1990s and the new Labour Law is in force since 1 
June 2002. The major part of  this reform process was the implementation of  rules stemming from international laws, 
and in particular, EU laws.  Despite the fact that Latvian legislation does not give an explicit definition of the term 
‘employer-employee relationship', a number of international agreements on human rights, welfare, and social protection 
have been signed and to regulate labour relations. Latvia has ratified a number of the International Labour 
Organization’s Conventions.12  
For example, the Law "On Trade Unions" was addopted on 13 December 1990. The Law provides that trade unions 
may be formed on the basis of professional, branch, territorial or other principles. Employers shall also be entitled to 
form associations. The most widespread patterns in practice are the branch, undertaking and professional trade unions. 
The Law insures the right to join a union or also not joining or withdrawing from a union (so-called negative right). 
According to the Law property and financial relations between trade unions and the employer shall be governed by law, 
collective agreements and other types of agreements. In most cases the relations of a trade union and employer are  
regulated by collective agreements. 
As a result of the labour law reform a  new framework for national consultaion  was established. The status of a social 
partner and a social dialogue are regulated by the law "On Employers' Organisations and their Associations" (29 April 
1999), and the law "On Collective Labour Agreements" (26 March 1999). These legal documents are in line with EU 
principles on social dialogue and social partnerships. In addition, the trilateral consultation mechanism between 
government representatives,  the largest employers' and trade union organisations - the Latvian Employers' 
Confederation and the Free Trade Union Federation of Latvia was launched.  The National Tripartite Co-operation 
                                                 
9
  Europe 2020 (http://ec.europa.eu/europe2020/index_en.htm) 20/04/11 
10
 Community Policy in Support of Employment. Communication from the Commission. No D/98/9.  
11European Social Charter, Council of Europe Treaty, adopted in 1961, revised in 1996, 
(http://www.hrcr.org/docs/Social_Charter/soccharter.wpd) 15/04/11.  
12C 87 "Convention Concerning Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise" (4 May 1990), C 98 "The Right to 
Organise and Collective Bargaining" (4 May 1990) and C 144 "Convention Concerning Tripartite Consultations to Promote the 
Implementation of International Labour Standards" (5 July 1994). 
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Council and its institutions – the Sub-council for Vocational Education and Employment, the Sub-council for Labour 
Matters, and the Social Insurance Sub-council aimed at promoting cooperation between the social partners at national 
level. This  institutionalization of the social dialogue helps to find  a framework for agreements between all social 
partners in  solving social and economic problems. Such framework also increases responsibility of social partners in 
desision-makind process. Starting from 1996, the Free Trade Union Federation of Latvia and the Latvian Employers' 
Confederation are obliged to annually sign a bilateral social partnership agreement. The agreement allows both 
institutions to agree, for example, on the conditions related to level of the minimum salary level. Furthermore, labour   
disputes are regulated by the Labour Code of Latvia (1 January 2001), the law “On Collective Labour Agreements” (26 
March 1999), the law “On Strikes” (23 April 1998), the Civil Procedure Law (1 March 1999) and the law “On Labour 
Protection” (4 May 1993).13  
Latvia accepted and implemented in full the aquis communautare in the area of social policy and employment before its 
accession to the EU on 1 January 2003. During the process of accession negotiations, the position of Latvia on social 
protection and employment policy has been developed as the result of a mutual agreement between the government and 
the social partners – Free Trade Union Federation of Latvia and the Latvian Employers’ Confederation. 
In addition, the accession period required the design and implementation of the National Employment Plan (2004) that 
was launched in line with the Single National Economy Strategy (2004-2006). The Ministry of Welfare has issued two 
important strategy documents: the “Conception of the Development of labour protection from 2007-2010” and “The 
Programme for Development of Labour Protection from 2007-2010”. Unfortunately, this process was not always 
systematic, as it was frequently demand-driven.  
3. Identity of Trade Union movement in Latvia  
To better understand the Latvian trade union movement, its structure, policies, practices, as well as its effectiveness, - a 
historical profile of the formation and development of the trade unions movement are of prime importance.  
Trade union organisations are different in the EU Member States. The identity and performance of trade unions depend 
on the existing trends in politics, labour markets and social structures.  The following major models of trade unions  
could be considered: 
1. Welfare trade unions mostly function in France, Italy and Spain. 
2. Business trade unions, that represents employees’ interests. The best examples of that type of trade unions could 
be found in North America. 
3. Social partner unionisms, when trade unions are aimed at harmonisation of employees and social partners’ 
positions. Such unions are in Scandinavian countries as well as in the Netherlands and Germany. 
4. Trade union movement in which a state plays a decisive role in shaping the parameters of trade unions practice. 
This particular model function in most of the New Member States.  
The evolution of trade unions’ identity in Latvia is rooted in the transformation process from the socialist system to a 
market economy system and reflects responses to social and political changes that the country has undergone during its 
last 20 years of independence. As a result, trade unions in Latvia are in transition from the model in which a state plays 
a dominant role to a model of social partner unionism, which is in common in other countries that were formerly part of 
the Soviet Union’s trade union system. Decentralisation in 1991 left basic trade union organisations maintaining the 
one-workplace-one-union principle. Trade Unions in Latvia remain dominant within the trade union landscape, 
maintain the same organizing principles, namely branch unions, which adds up to a large measure of continuity. In 
contrast to unions’ structure, unions’ membership has changed dramatically. Trade union membership in Latvia 
declined dramatically since the early 1990s. Overall, only around 16% of employees are members of trade unions.  
                                                 
13
 Matters related to the social dialogue are also regulated by Article 108 of the Constitution of the Republic of Latvia (freedom of 
association and the protection of trade union rights), by the Law "On Strikes" (23 April 1998), and the Law "On Labour Protection" 
(4 May 1993).  
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During recent years the role of trade unions in many countries is becoming less important and visible. To different 
degrees all unions in the EU have seen a decline in their membership, resulting in an overall decline in union density. 
Such a trend could be explained by the following general reasons: 
1. Globalisation and capital mobility are very powerful in  influencing the negotiation process among major actors 
involved in the economic process and, thus, reducing the effectiveness of trade unions in collective negotiations. 
2. Foreign investments have a strong impact on a policy of a state, which lowers the influeince of trade unions. 
3. Trade unions’ political participation, involvement in election campaigns, and strong links with political parties  
also reduce the importance of the membership in trade unions for current and potential members. 
All of the above mentioned reasons for lowering the attractiveness of trade unions could be seen in Latvia. However, in 
addition to the explanations above, structural transforamation of the economic and political system in the country as 
well as in the organisational changes  in the  national economy strongly influenced this trend. The lack of a strong 
tradition of trade union activity following the experience of state socialism is another reason for the decline in 
membership.  
Unions and membership in them are often considered as being a part of the  socialst past, although in that period they 
were unable to perform their most imporatnt tasks, mainly providing collective representation and organising collective 
actions. At the same time the reasons for the decline in trade unions are not only the result of changes in the union 
environment, one should take into account also the strategic choices made by the unions themselves. In Latvia, for 
example, at the national level, one union confederation dominates. There is a single central trade union organisation – 
the Free Trade Union Federation of Latvia (LBAS).  
Analysis of recent statistical data shows that the Latvian Free Trade Union Federation currently unites 21 trade unions.  
The proportion of employees that are members of unions is only 16% (according to the SCB in 2009, only 143,100  
people out of an employed labour force of 953.900 were members of trade unions). Membership is higher in some areas 
of the public services – in general 33%, but in health and social work, and in education systems a membership could 
reach up to 60%, for example. 14 One of the important elements in employee-employer relations are collective 
agreements. In Latvia collective agreements cover around 20% of all employees, however, coverage is higher in the 
public services at around 55% in health and 90% in the electricity sector.15  
Collective bargaining takes place mainly at the local, company level and in the public sector. There are some sectoral 
agreements, particularly in the public sector and various civil service and public companies – for example, energy and 
water suppliers and forestry. However, higher-level collective agreements are rather policy documents, dealing with 
issues in social partnership, than collective bargaining on employment conditions. The principal level of collective 
bargaining is at the company level. The framwork for collective bargauning was set out in laws passed in 1998 and 
1999, as well as during the negotiations on the accession to the EU. The Latvian bargaining coverage is at the lower end 
of the scale At the beginning of the year 2003 there were 32 collective agreements concluded at a sectoral or branch 
level. Concluded sectoral agreements are very general and in majority of cases they just reproduce the possibilities 
offered by the law.  
The dialogue at enterprise level is more common and better developed, especially in medium and large enterprises. 
According to the available, at the beginning of the year 2003, the total number of collective agreements amounted to 
236816 The branch unions’, particularly in the transport and public sector, make more frequent use strikes to achieve 
their objectives. Therefore, in order to understand the conditions under which organisations acquire success and 
strength, it is important to consider how trade unions, their leaders and employees interact.  
                                                 
14LR CSB 
15
 European Federation of Public Service Unions (http://www.epsu.org/r/469)1/04/11     
16
 Ministry of Welfare based on the information received from Latvian Free Trade Union  
Confederation in Social dialogue and conflict resolution in Latvia. European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working 
Conditions, 2004  
(http://www.uni-mannheim.de/edz/pdf/ef/04/ef0450en.pdf) 1/04/11 
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To deal with these issues, questionnaires have been distributed to representatives of the Latvian Free Trade Union 
Federation, the Latvian Railway Workers Union (which functions in the state sector and has 16, 000 members), and to 
the Latvian Transit Workers Union (in the private sector with 1000 members). In addition to the above, the 
questionnaires cover a number of questions about employment policy in the country, strategic planning of employment 
policy at the company level, trade union policy related to potential increase of membership and on the role of trade 
unions in social dialogue (this question is particularly important in the light of the current economic recession). 
On the basis of the analytical results of questionnaires distributed among representatives from the above mentioned 
trade unions, the following major conclusions could be summarised: 
1. In general, employees in Latvia have opted for individual strategies rather than collective strategies to improve 
their economic situation. This trend weakens employees’ collective identity.  
2. Trade unions members’ collective identity and participation are proportional to their feelings of importance in 
their organisation. 
3. The interviews’ results illustrated that the interviewees considered skilled leadership fundamental to Trade 
unions’ success. And once the members of the organisation see concrete policy results by means of their 
participation, they will have more reasons to participate. 
4. Trade union leaders rose up through the union hierarchy mostly through their cultural capital and expertise.  
5. Overall the involvement of trade unions as well as the other social partners is not strong enough, despite some 
examples in which unions’ voices were heard. 
However, the position of the Latvian Free Trade Union Federation in the current economic situation has become more 
visible and stronger than in the past. Trade union leaders have criticised both tax changes and sectoral support measures 
and made their own proposals (together with other social partners), some of which have been accepted by the 
government. Trade union resistance prevented the introduction of some measures.  
A number of protests had already been organised by trade unions against government decisions about state budget 
reduction for social protection in 2007, followed by protests in 200917. Despite the substantial decline in membership, 
unions seem to have retained as strong voice on the national stage. As a result, the European Trade Union 
Confederation (ETUC) called for a new social deal across Europe that would provide an alternative to the neoliberal 
policies being proposed by governments in the NMS including Latvia, which had been hit by the crises.18  
4. Social dialogue and flexicurity approach: the role of trade unions in employment policy  
The crisis highlighted an urgent need to develop new policy responses to help provide social stability in the European 
Union and alleviate social hardship. Although labour markets deteriorated in the EU, unemployment was more 
prevalent in some countries than in others. It is important to stress that the countries with the most rigid labour market 
regulations have suffered the sharpest surge in unemployment numbers, indicating this is an important condition that 
should be considered alongside stimulus programmes. The European Commission Draft Joint Employment Report 
(JER)” 2009/2010 Report19 reaches the conclusion that socio economic inequalities have increased in Europe.  It argues 
that “a combination of factors (including economic restructuring associated with the move towards a knowledge 
economy, labor market change and redistributive policies of welfare states) account for these increases in inequality in 
the last two to three decades. 
                                                 
1710, 000 people in Latvia joined the demonstration against Latvia government policies in January, 2009 and later in March, the trade 
union of Health and Social Care Employees of Latvia (LVSADA) organised a picket in the capital, calling for an increase in salaries 
and improvement of working conditions for social workers and women working in social care and assistance. The LVSADA has 
been negotiating with Riga City Council since November 2006 and has tried to reach a solution on decent salaries in the social care 
sector from January 2007. Unfortunately all the union’s efforts of the union have been unsuccessful. A survey by the LVSADA 
revealed that 98% of employees in the social care sector in Riga are women and 49% of them are main breadwinners in their 
families. Our social workers are standing for social peace. Therefore, considering that inflation in Latvia is 7%, the LVSADA is 
calling on Riga City Council to make appropriate changes to the budget and increase the salaries of social workers by up to 20%. 
18
 EPSU/CEMR-EP Joint statement to the European Council meeting 11 February 2010 on the economic crisis 
(http://www.epsu.org/a/62121)  4/0411  
19
 European Commission (2009) Draft Report from the Commission to the Council “Draft Joint Employment Report (JER)” 
2009/2010. COM(2009)674/3. Brussels  
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One of the key issues is the development of effective employment policy at the level of the EU as well as at the level of 
nation states and to ensure internal flexibility as the core to labour market stabilization.20 A constructive social dialogue 
and decisive responses from all social partners are required to provide synergy between social and economic 
development, effective employment policy and a safety net for the future. A flexicurity approach21 was thus established 
to conciliate employers’ and workers' needs, flexibility and security, by ensuring the worker safe transitions inside the 
labour market, while maintaining and improving competitiveness of the companies and also preserving the European 
Social Model. Based on consultations with the Member States, international organisations, social partners and the 
academic community, the European Commission has suggested "pathways” and "common principles" in order to 
achieve flexicurity. 22 In the Integrated Guidelines, Member States are asked to promote flexibility combined with 
employment security — ‘flexicurity’ — and reduce labour market segmentation, having due regard to the role of social 
analysis and dialogue over choice is the foundation for the flexicurity approach and the introduction of flexicurity 
principles. The viability of these choices is largely dependent on the willingness and the ability of social partners to 
engage and define dialogue in setting up national employment policy. Flexicurity comprises activities aimed at 
promoting labour market flexibility and employment security by mutual interaction. It is necessary to ensure that labour 
legislation and agreements are sufficiently flexible and correspond to the interests of both parties – the  employers and 
the employees. In the case of necessity, active labour market policy must efficiently facilitate the transfer from one 
workplace to another or from the status of an unemployed person to employment.  The Spring European Council of 
2009 recommends that Latvia enact an integrated flexicurity approach, to intensify efforts to increase labour supply and 
productivity by reinforcing activation measures and enhancing the responsiveness of education and training systems to 
labour market needs.23  
To promote implementation of flexicurity principles in Latvia, on May 15, 2009, the Saeima adopted amendments to 
the Labour Law, which are also related to the flexibility and security in the context of employment relations.24 The need 
to put into practice the aims of the Lisbon Strategy and principles of flexicurity in Latvia requires ensuring effective 
social dialogue between the Employers’ Confederation of Latvia, the Free Trade Union Federation and the government. 
Development of such a trend still is not included in national programmes on a large scale and does not have strong 
government support. Several measures have been implemented in recent years for the improvement of the social 
dialogue, both on the national and local levels. For example, with the help of European Social Fund financing, the 
social partners involved in employment partnership, include the Employers’ Confederation of Latvia and the Free Trade 
Union Federation of Latvia, local governments and the Latvian Association of Local and Regional Governments. This 
partnership ensures social dialogue at the local and regional level and increases participation opportunities of social 
partners in the decision-making process and provision of public services. In addition, the partnership facilitates quality 
improvement of public services provided by non-governmental organisations. 25  
                                                 
20Baltic Rim Economies: Growth and Constrains 2010, Published by the DnBNORD: a number of EU countries have attempted to 
battle labour market rigidity. For example, Germany introduced work-sharing schemes, under which wages are compensated for 
shorter hours. Such schemes appear to be successful in upholding both employment and incomes in the more affluent states. It should 
be noted, however, that such programs are difficult to replicate in less prosperous countries. Among the three Baltic States, only 
Estonia has enhanced flexibility of labour market by introducing a new Employment Contracts Act, effective 1 July 2009, which 
shortened the lay-off notice and reduced severance payments. The new Act also allows distressed employers to cut salaries to the 
minimum wage for up to 3 months, and reduces bureaucratic barriers (for example, eliminating the need to gain the approval of a 
labour inspector when terminating employment con-tracts, or establishing part-time working hours).  
21
 Flexicurity is the European labour market policy aimed at compensating the ongoing flexibilization of employment relations 
(deregulation of labour markets) by means of advantages in social security (Andranik Tangian, 2010). WP 2010.06.Not for bad 
weather: macroanalysis of flexicurity with regard to the crisis, ETUI, Brussels, 2010-53 pp. 
22Flexicurity Pathways. Turning hurdles into stepping stones, June 2007, Report by the European Expert Group on  
Flexicurity. (http://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?catId=117&langId=en)1/03/11 .  
23Report on Progress in Implementation of the National Lisbon Programme of Latvia 
(http://ec.europa.eu/archives/growthandjobs_2009/pdf/nrp2009/lv_nrp_en.pdf)12/03/2011  
24
 Labour Law amended (http://wwwlikumdosana_kart_rullis.html.saeima.lv/Likumdosana_eng)/12/03/11 
25
 Report on Progress in Implementation of the National Lisbon Programme of Latvia, pp 41-42 
(http://ec.europa.eu/archives/growthandjobs_2009/pdf/nrp2009/lv_nrp_en.pdf)12/03/2011  
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A constructive social dialogue and decisive response from all social partners are required to provide synergies between 
social and economic development, effective employment policy and a safety net for the future. 26  
5. The Lisbon Treaty and the European Citizen initiative a new opportunity for trade unions 
The Lisbon Treaty give the citizens a golden opportunity to participate directly the future shaping of the EU. While in 
many countries there are various types of citizens’ initiatives (from petions to referenda) this seems to be the first time 
in contemporary history, that  such an opportunity is offered to citizens at a multinational level, that of the European 
Union. In terms of artical 11,  parahraph 4 of the Lisbon Treaty, “Not less than one million citizens who are nationals of 
a significunt number of Member States may take the initiative of inviting the European Commission, which the 
framework of its powers, to submit any appropriate proposal on matters where citizens consider that a legal act of the 
Union is required for the purpose of implementing the Treaties”.27 
The question of what is meant by a “significunt number of Member States” was debated at length. Civil society 
organisations argued that the number should be not too high because many Europan issues have a regional character. 
The European Commission opted for one-third of Memebr States. The support of the European Parliament related to 
this initiative  is shown, in particular, by the fact that European Parliament at the begining considered this initiative as 
possibly  encrouching on its  prorogative. It  set up a group of 4 raporters from all the  major political groups ( a very 
unusual procedure) to prepare the Paliament’s position on this initiative. In the end, it produced a document strongly 
supportive of this initiative, for example by reducing the number of Member States required to partivpate from one third 
as proposed by the Commision to one quater. 
There was, though, no change in the minimum number of signitures for each state (the number of MEPs by country 
multiplied by 750, the total number of MEPs). As the result of the dabates, the European Parliament and European 
Council have addopted on 16 februaty 2011 Regulation No 211/201128  to ensure practical implementation of the artical 
11 of the Lisbon Treaty.  
The Regulation requires that for an initiative to be valid a minimum of one milion  signatures from at least 7 Member 
States are needed the proportion of signitures in each of the member State being based on the number of the members of 
the European Parliamen. Concreatly this means that signitures must be collected in at least 7 Memebr States through 
appropriotely formed commitees. This is a major breakthough which trade unions should consider how to make best use 
to enhance the conditions of the workers throught  the EU.  
Trade unions exist in all Member States and still have considerable membership, and this despite the reduction of 
membership numbers. Trade unions can therefore be a driving force for requesting the European Commission to 
introduce initiatives to further improve working conditions of the workers. The trade unions should consider to 
overcome there ideological diferences in their identities to take a real  advantage of  this opportunity. This would 
increase their value and attractiveness for thir members and for the labour force in the European Union in general and 
consequently  revitalise the trade unions movement in the EU.  
Conclusion 
At a time when Latvia is facing an economic downturn, a fall in production and growing unemployment, a swift and 
decisive government response is needed. The dramatic current economic situation requires fulfilling a dual task: 
maintaining the long-term goals of Latvia's social policies and responding to economic and social challenges.  It would 
be particularly important to coordinate financial system support measures with active labour market policies in order to 
                                                 
26According to the Ministry of Economy, changes in the labour market for a timely balancing of the labour market demand and 
supply create necessity to develop a labour market forecasting system. The Ministry of Economy is responsible for coordination of 
medium and long-term labour market forecasting in the country. The ministry also works out labour market development scenarios, 
as well as medium and long-term forecasts. Under the Ministry of Economics, the Advisory Council of the Labour Market 
Forecasting is operating, which comprises representatives from the involved institutions and social partners. The task of the Council 
is to ensure inter-institutional cooperation by assessing the prepared forecasts and seeking solutions for further 
action.(http://ec.europa.eu/archives/growthandjobs_2009/pdf/nrp2009/lv_nrp_en.pdf)12/03/2011  
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 Treaty of Lisbon amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty established the European Community, signed at Lisbon 
13, December 2007, Official Journal of the European Union, C 306 Volume 50, 17 December 2007. 
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mitigate structural long-term unemployment and to avoid social tensions. There is a possible development of social 
unrest with further GDP decline: a looming social crisis. The deteriorating labour market requires immediate action. 
A number of international agreements on human rights, welfare, and social protection have been signed to regulate 
labour relations. Unfortunately however, this process was not always systematic, as it was frequently demand-driven. 
The results of this study show that the trade union movement has a relatively short history in Latvia and followed the 
legacy of transformation to a market economy as a result of regained independence.  The trade unions in Latvia are in a 
transition process from the model in which the state plays a dominant role to a model of social partner unionism.  
The involvement of trade unions as well as other social partners in social dialogue and decision-making in Latvia is not 
strong enough, despite some examples in which unions’ voices were heard. However, the position of the Latvian Free 
Trade Union Federation in the current economic situation has become more visible andgrown in strength over the 
years..  Trade union leaders have criticised both tax changes and sectoral support measures and made their own 
proposals (together with the other social partners), some of which have been accepted by the government. Trade union 
resistance prevented the introduction of some measures. 
A constructive social dialogue and decisive response from all social partners over choices in development of a 
flexicurity approach and introducing flexicurity principles is required. The viability of these choices is largely 
dependent on the willingness and the ability of social partners to engage and define dialogue in setting up a national 
employment policy.   
The decision-making process should include the government’s willingness to learn from the experiences of other 
countries that have undergone economic crises and successfully reformed their employment policies.  Improved 
governance, transparency and involvement of stakeholders in social dialogue are essential to strengthen the links 
between economic development and effective employment policies. Finally the collective engagement of trade unions 
in using the opportunity offered by the provision of the Lisbon Treaty by the “European Citizen’s Initiatives” should not 
be missed by the trade unions to both enhance their value to their membership and revitalize their image.   
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A Baltic Tiger in the Poorhouse  – A Schumpeterian View of the Baltic Crisis 
I Introduction 
After regaining independence in 1991, the Baltic States launched an economic strategy that might be called “a 
laboratory of liberalization.” “The Baltic states became poster boys of the Washington Consensus” (Kattel 2009, p. 1). 
In the case of Estonia, for example, the government put forward radical reforms to stimulate prosperity. These included 
a sound currency, a balanced budget, the cutting of subsidies to state-owned companies, property reform in connection 
with privatization, the elimination of tariff and non-tariff trade barriers, and a reform of the tax system (first simple flat 
tax in the world). Consequently, in the 2007 Index of Economic Freedom Estonia shows up as the twelfth freest 
economy in the world.  
Until the beginning of the financial crisis, the results of this experiment have been remarkable: an 8% average annual 
GDP growth since 2000, a strong decrease of poverty and inequality, and low unemployment and inflation rates. To 
sum it up, living standards improved rapidly, which might be seen as the best proof of a successful strategy. However, 
the financial crisis hit the Baltic States very hard; GDP in Estonia fell by 3.6% in 2008 and a further 14.1% in 2009. 
The unemployment rate was at 18.6% during the second quarter of 2010. Who can be blamed for this sudden growth 
breakdown? Government? Globalization? Wall Street? Or does the rise and fall of the Baltic states – seen from a long-
term perspective – reflect a natural development in terms of business cycles theory, something that occurs as a “small 
blip in an otherwise unstoppable upward” (Kattel 2009, p. 1)?  
This paper shows that the Baltic States’ rise and fall can be interpreted from a broad Schumpeterian perspective, which 
includes the role of entrepreneurs, the combination of innovation and money within a free trade doctrine, and the role of 
the state (Schumpeter 1939). In other words, we like to answer Kattel’s question (2009, p. 1) regarding whether this 
laboratory of liberalism “was based on fundamental misunderstandings and that this model was bound to create 
enormous fragility for the Balitic States, with or without a global financial meltdown.” 
II A Schumpeterian Perspective on the Crisis 
1. Economic Change, Business Cycles, and the Crisis of Capitalism 
According to Schumpeter, innovation represents the fundamental factor in the economic history of capitalism; only 
innovative change can result in economic development (Schumpeter 1939, pp. 84). The term “innovation” covers the 
following five cases: creation of a new good, introduction of a new production method, the opening up of new markets, 
the conquest of a new source of supply, and the introduction of a new form of organization (Schumpeter 1934/2002, pp. 
66). The introduction of innovation is a function of the dynamic entrepreneur, whose term and name are connected 
‘only to those who actually perfom that function’ (Schumpeter 1934/2002, pp. 75).1 Nevertheless, Schumpeter argued 
that the introduction of something “new” involves three types of problems: first, the resistance of the environment, 
second, a preference for familiar behavior, and third, general fear of the unknown (“uncertainty” in terms of Knight), 
which is why not everyone introduces something “new” and becomes an economic forerunner (Schumpeter 1939, pp. 
99). Should an entrepreneur, who is to be strictly distinguished from an inventor or investor, succeed in introducing his 
innovation onto the market (or into politics), this would disturb the existing equilibrium in economic life, triggering 
overall structural change.  
Additionally, the Schumpeterian approach contains a fruitful relationship between the innovation process and the 
financial sphere of “credit drawing bankers.” We now know that the banking system has lost some of its capabilities, 
which Schumpeter had seen in financial entrepreneurs like Crédit Mobilier or John Law, thus informal systems of 
business angels and bootstrappers are responsible for financing the bulk of entrepreneurs, thereby paving the way of 
formal financing systems (Siemon 2006). Schumpeter differentiated between innovative entrepreneurs („combining 
                                                 
1
 For more on the functionalist interpretation of entrepreneurial behavior from a newer, evolutionary perspective, see Röpke 2002. 
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given factors new“) vs. routine entrepreneurs („reproducing the same;“ „mere managers“) and claimed that basic 
innovations are needed to enter the dynamics of a Kondratieff wave (“Techno Economic Paradigms” in terms of 
Schumpeter’s followers like Perez or Freeman). The microeconomic basis for explaining innovative/entrepreneurial 
behaviour refers to an evolutionary economic approach containing the analysis of an interplay of three variables of 
action: property rights, competencies, and motivation. An entrepreneur has to be allowed, able, and willing to act 
innovative (see figure 1). 2  
Figure 1: On the connection of Input, Development, and Evolutionary Logic 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Siemon (2009, p. 22) 
Schumpeter’s theory of business cycles is an integrative part of his theory of economic development and should not be 
analyzed isolated. Schumpeter claimed that innovations trigger economic cycles whose cycle duration depends on the 
nature and significance of the innovation. Thereby originally “connecting the economic cycle directly with the 
innovations, which Schumpeter assumed appeared in discontinuous ‘waves’ or ‘clusters,’ creating the trigger for 
economic development (Oakley 1990, p. 168). The process and explanation of the economic cycle includes the 
following steps (Schumpeter 1934/2002, pp. 61; Mütze 1990, pp. 34; Ritter-Thiele 1992, pp. 83): the starting point 
presumes an equally balanced economic situation. The introduction of the new combination can be seen as the first sign 
of recovery and leads to a rise in capital investment in the investment goods industry, whereby the innovator must first 
withdraw the necessary production factors from their old applications via credit. The change of the economic 
production structure between old and new business is thus steered by means of the factor allocation, i.e. by means of 
relative prices. Economic recovery then begins when the innovations accumulate and dynamic entrepreneurs appear in 
droves (“scharenweise”). This recurring disruption of the balance primarily has three causes: a rise in the price of the 
means of producers’ goods, a collapse in consumer goods, and a subsequent credit deflation process. The slump in 
consumer goods already marks the end of the recovery; prosperity already induces to some extent the period of 
liquidation. What follows is the phase of recession, which is marked by “the economic system’s struggling towards a 
new equilibrium position, its adaption to the data as altered by the disturbance of the boom” (Schumpeter 1934/2002, p. 
231). The alternatives which remain for the ‘old’ businesses are to exit the market, to try and survive as a so-called 
marginal supplier, or to adapt by imitating the innovation. The process as a whole, however, progresses uninterrupted – 
in the sense that either revolution or absorption of the results of the revolution are always in progress; both together 
form what is known as economic cycle. 
Regarding crisis theory, these proposals need to be expanded with respect to the effects of a secondary wave. While the 
innovation induced recovery triggers a primary wave, which spreads across the system of relative prices, thereby 
influencing the entire economy, the process similarly leads to the old businesses reacting to and/or speculating on the 
                                                 
2
 Even in methodological terms, Schumpeter changed his view. For more details see Meyer 2002 and Siemon 2008. For an 
evolutionary interpretation of Schumpeter’s views, see Röpke 1977. On the contrast of input, development, and evolutionary logic 
approach, see Röpke 2002. 
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new situation. Due to a surge in demand, which goes hand in hand with the creation of purchasing power, the second 
wave is triggererd. Only because of new purchasing power goes in bulk from the hands of entrepreneurs to the owners 
of material means of production, to all producers of goods for ‘reproductive consumption’ (Spiethoff), and to the 
workers, and then oozes into every economic channel, are all existing consumption goods finally sold at ever-rising 
prices. (…) And only on this account do production and trade everywhere temporarily yield a profit, just as in a period 
of inflation’ (Schumpeter 1934/2002, p. 227). Characteristic of the secondary wave is the fact that the speculative 
anticipation of prosperity develops its own dynamics, leading to a spread in loans amongst businesses as well as 
privately. “In the atmosphere of secondary prosperity there will also develop reckless, fraudulent, or otherwise 
unseuccessful enterprise, which cannot stand the tests administered by recession” (Schumpeter 1939, p. 157). Under the 
pressure of the crash of the secondary wave, together with the related pessimistic expectations of economy’s 
individuals, the economic system can shoot beyond the ‘normal’ equilibrium so that the aforementioned innovation 
cycle expands from prosperity and recession to include the phases of depression and recovery. Recovery results from 
the freeing up of market share and sinking prices for production factors.3 
2. Social Change, Institutional Order, and the Crisis of Capitalism 
In his most recent and commercially successful book “Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy” (Schumpeter 1942/2008) 
Schumpeter, three years after the appearance of “Business Cycles,” conducted a comprehensive interdisciplinary 
analysis of the entire capitalist system. His approach reminds us of the political economy of Marx, adding political and 
sociological components to the aforementioned development and economic theories. He thereby highlighted, in 
particular, the significance of the institutional dimension of economic life; in new institutional economics terms, 
property and contract rights as well as the influence of social and political institutions play a central role for the 
development process of capitalism. Its prognosed “collapse” results, however, is not the result of pure economic 
reasons, but is the result of a changed social structure, which has grave repercussions on the economic system. To 
paraphrase one of Schumpeter’s terms, one could speak of capitalist institutions also being ‘creatively destroyed.’ The 
stability (feudal elements) of the bourgeois society is eroding: ‘With every peg from under the capitalist structure 
vanishes an impossibility of the socialist plan” (Schumpeter 1942/2008, p. 162). This process seems to be caused 
mainly by three interrelated reasons (Schumpeter 1942/2008, pp. 131). These hypotheses are analyzed below, whereby 
we will confront Schumpeter`s arguments with some opposite socioeconomic facts.  
Hypothesis 1: The obsolescence of the entrepreneurial function 
Schumpeter`s first thesis has led to a familiar controversy in economics about the relationship between competition and 
innovation (cp. Cohen/Levin 1989). The view usually associated with Schumpeter argues that monopolies might favor 
innovation; the opposite view (often associated with K. Arrow) argues that competition favors innovation. Following 
the advance of economic and social development, the social function of entrepreneurship in terms of ‘getting things 
done’ is losing significance. The resistance of the environment towards new developments has diminished substantially 
as well as the need to have a strong personality to introduce a new combination. Large businesses increasingly have the 
potential for internal financing to fulfill the investment needs of a new combination so that the function of capitalist 
(bankers) also diminishes. Overall these tendencies lead to a reduction in innovation dynamics. These two theses of 
Schumpeter subsequently led to repeated discussions on the end of entrepreneurship (see Horowitz 1962; Mansfield 
1968; Bozeman/Link 1983; Mukhopadhyay 1985). These so-called Neo-Schumpeter hypotheses claim that, first, 
company size and the innovation power of a company are positively correlated; and, second, a higher market 
concentration promotes innovation. Both hypotheses could, however, not be empirically proven (cp. Cohen/Levin 
1989).  
 
                                                 
3
 The Russian economist Kondratieff also assumed that the dynamics of economic life in a capitalist society were not 
ordinary/common and linear but ‘complex and cyclical in character’ (Kondratieff 1926, p. 573; our translation). Schumpeter refers in 
his “Business Cycles” explicitly to Kondratieff’s empirical works and named the waves of the 50s and 60s triggered by basis 
innovation after the ‘Kondratieff Waves’. 
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Hypothesis 2: The destruction of the protective strata 
In the course of advancing capitalist development, innovative progress increasingly becomes a routine task conducted 
by large scale enterprises; in the words of Schumpeter, innovation becomes a mere issue of ‘cost calculations.’ Just as 
capitalism destroyed the structures of feudal society, increasing economic concentration is now destroying the ‘old’ 
capitalist economic and social structure. From this viewpoint, small and medium sized enterprises are being 
increasingly ousted from the market; oligopoly and monopoly structures characterize most economic branches and 
sectors. The fall of central capitalist institutions is also related to the rise of large-scale enterprises and public limited 
companies: private property as well as freedom of contract are increasingly infringed within the course of these 
developments. In contrast to the classic entrepreneur, managers of modern public companies behave like bureaucrats.4 
The reduced entrepreneurial potential of society also leads to the fall of the bourgeoisie, who partly let themselves be 
supported by the success of the entrepreneurs, yet also ensure sociopolitical protection and defend the political interests 
of the entrepreneurs.5  
However, if one supports the thesis that the evolution of the economic system goes beyond the purely economic area, 
this need not inevitably lead to the dissolution of the entrepreneur function and its protective layers. The economic 
historian Hartmut Berghoff discovered that the ‘new middle class(es) […] (will be) less middle class and not to the 
same extent as its classic predecessor(s) as milieu creating. They are unable to retain staff long-term and to produce 
social stability by means of long-term company goals’ (Berghoff 2005, p. 15; our translation). Nonetheless, this has not 
resulted in a fallback in economic strength or innovation. Moreover, one could also present a counter thesis, namely, 
that the growing individualization of society in connection with a new allocation of social roles has brought about a 
different motivation towards self-employment. No longer can the ‘will to found a private kingdom’ – Schumpeter’s 
forerunner of McClelland’s Achievement Motivation Theory – be considered the motivational determinant of 
innovative behavior, but (in light of the lack of available jobs) the motivation born out of the necessity to ensure one’s 
existence. This also serves to explain, for example, the development of the so-called ‘Creative Economy’: ‘low rents 
and a widespread creative scene […] which [make] self-employment possible, the absence of jobs for life often making 
it even necessary’ (Lembke 2006, p. 15; our translation). Of course, the level and modes of entrepreneurial activity are 
highly affected by the surrounding culture and by legal rules. However, there is no one-way direction in the 
development of society that leads inevitably to a destruction of the protecting strata.  
Hypothesis 3: Growing intellectual hostility 
Let us now consider the third thesis, a growing hostility towards capitalism that strikes at the very foundations of the 
moral authority of many institutions. In addition to the loss of the entrepreneur function and the erosion of the 
protective institutional layers, a general atmosphere that is critical of capitalism is developing in our sociopolitical 
environment, which is primarily promoted by intellectual forces. In other words, the legislative, administrative, and 
judicative practice is destroying the motivation and incentives of entrepreneurship, thereby permanently blocking the 
evolution function of dynamic entrepreneurialism.6 Here one could surely make a connection to Mancur Olson Jr.’s 
theory, which identified the core cause of the rise and fall of nations as ‘institutional sclerosis’ and their related 
coalitions: ‘The growth of coalitions, which are driven by the desire to secure a larger piece of the pie of national 
income, the rise in regulatory complexity and state activity, encouraging lobby activity as well as rising lack of 
transparency/clarity of the negotiations of these cartels, modify the incentives and the direction of evolution in society’ 
(Olson 1982, p. 72).  
                                                 
4
 Schumpeter already referred to the company constitutional law problem areas, which Berle and Means addressed in the 1930s and 
much later highlighted within the context of New Institutional Economics under the name of Principal Agent Theory (cp. 
Berle/Means 1932; Erlei/Leschke/Sauerland 2007, pp. 103). 
5
 Schumpeter’s theory on the fall of the bourgeoisie can be nicely combined with a paper by the sociologist Christoph Deutschmann 
(2008), who states a ‘collective Buddenbrooks Effect’ for Germany. Within the framework of a multi-level analysis, he investigated 
how structural upward social mobility leads to a growing imbalance on the asset markets, which in the end has an effect on the 
overproportional growth of investment-seeking financial assets on the one hand, and a shrinking number of potential solvent debtors, 
on the other. 
6
 For more on the difference between the innovation and evolution function, see Röpke 2002. 
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However, one could certainly disagree with this hypothesis, objecting to such a development. For instance, one could 
highlight the growing decentralization of the state apparatus and the institutional precautionary measures that act against 
one-sided political intervention. The United States Supreme Court Justice Louis Brandeis hence very appropriately 
described decentral federalized structures as “laboratories of democracy” (New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 
262, 311 [1932]). Furthermore, independent institutions have been established across the world to protect competition, 
which at least in theory aim to prevent rising monopolization of the economic system. Moreover, one could highlight 
that there can also be a change in thinking within economic and innovation policy, such as the discussion about so-
called “supply-side economics” has shown (cp. Seidl 1984, pp. 139). Schumpeter’s picture of the entrepreneur as an 
actor of social and economic change implies that entrepreneurs are particularly sensitive to the social embedding. 
Nevertheless, one might argue that entrepreneurs yet may partially resolve institutional deficiencies by innovative 
behavior or reliance on social networks. 
3. The Recent Economic Crisis from Schumpeter’s Perspective 
Even though Schumpeter’s more sociological thesis on the ‘self destruction of capitalism’ has at least not yet been fully 
proven, one could see the current economic crisis as empirical evidence (or as ‘purely economic reason’) for the fall of 
capitalism.7 In terms of Schumpeter’s Economic Theory, a move into a depression is dependent on “the mentality and 
temper of the business community and the public, the prevalence of get-rich-quick moral, the way […] in which credit 
is handeled in prosperity, the ability of the public to form an opinion about the merits of propositions, the degree to 
which it is given to belief phrases about prosperity plateaus and the wonders of monetary management and so on” 
(Schumpeter 1939, p. 150). Additionally, it is not possible to create ‘theoretical expectations’ about the beginning of 
depressions or their extent. According to Schumpeter, however, it is decisive to distinguish between two factors when 
dealing with the analysis of crises or depressions: first, the effects that are theoretically inherent in the capitalist system, 
in other words, ‘normal’ waves based on economic development dynamics; and, second, the social and political 
environmental factors, which are different in every crisis (Schumpeter 1934/1951, pp. 110). 
Because of its effects, the current financial and economic crisis has often been compared with the Great Depression of 
1929. Schumpeter explains this historical depression as follows: “coincidence of depression phases of all three cycles” 
(Schumpeter 1939, p. 907). Based on Schumpeter’s Economic Theory and the “useful art grip” of the Three Cycle 
Scheme8, the current global economic crisis could be interpreted as a collapse of the depression phases of two or 
possible three cycles. Eight years have passed since the last major crisis following the bursting of the New Economy 
Bubble in 2001, a period which corresponds exactly with a Juglar Cycle. Moreover, the 5th Kondratieff Cycle is now 
clearly in decline.9 The automotive industry (4th Kondratieff Cycle) is to be seen as the ‘grandfather’ of Kondratieff 
Cycles, which can explain its current downfall – temporarily stalled with the aid of state funds (as basis technology; no 
growth, no new jobs). Irrespective of these developments, “there are no purely economic reasons why capitalism should 
not have another successful run which is all I wished to establish” (Schumpeter 1942/2008, p. 163, Fn. 7). As we have 
seen with the economic theory, fluctuations are theoretically normal in the development process; yet not necessarily 
crises such as the current type, which cannot simply be explained by market fundamentalism. Alongside the stagnation 
effects, which result from a diminishing Kondratieff effect, one must also consider those rejections that stem from 
politically motivated interventions within a complex economic system.  
One can identify many surprising similarities between the depression of 1929 and today’s situation, Schumpeter saw the 
fundamental difference between the Great Depression and earlier economic crises in that non-economic factors played a 
                                                 
7
 Schumpeter’s image of the “March into Socialism” is to be seen as more of a hypothetical construct as he did not mark it with any 
time frame – but with institutional organization/construction possibilities. 
8
 Schumpeter always emphasized that no hypothesis should be made with the Three Cycle Scheme. This scheme proved far more 
useful for the ordering of facts and is, hence, only to be seen as a “useful descriptive or illustrative device” (Schumpeter 1939, pp. 
906). 
9
 The exact time frame of the long Kondratieff cycles is difficult to determine. If one were to simply count forwards schematically, 
the fifth Kondratieff Cycle would now be at the beginning of a long-term decline. Schumpeter himself, however, assumed that the 
cycles would be reduced in the course of capitalistic development. Consequently, one often talks about the fifth Kondratieff Cycle as 
being in its end stages, while the sixth long wave of economic development is only in its early stage (cp. Nefiodow 1999; Siemon 
2008). 
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dominant role: ‘other things made a catastrophe out of that which would have otherwise been a mere depression […] 
political pressure on interest rates, organized resistance toward necessary adaptations, etc.’ (Schumpeter 1934/1951, p. 
114). With respect to social and political factors, the current situation the real estate bubble in the USA can essentially 
be seen to be responsible for the financial crisis. Two political interventions are largely responsible: monetary and 
interest rate policy of the American Federal Reserve Bank and poor institutional credit rating regulations for American 
mortgaging and banking (cp. Liebowitz 2008; Shiller 2008).10 Schumpeter wrote that “[g]iven the way in which both 
firms and households had run into debt during the twenties, it is clear that the accumulated load – in many cases, though 
not in all, very sensitive to a fall in price level – was instrumental in precipitating depression” (Schumpeter 1939, p. 
909). 
Interestingly, economists like Kregl, Burlamarqui and Kattel have connected the Schumpeterian approach to Minsky’s 
Theory of financial stability, thereby stressing Schumpeter’s position that the role of money for an economic system is 
rather a problem of quality (e.g. financing innovations) than a problem of quantity (financing secondary wave’s by-
products: entrepreneurship of speculation, non-innovative and/or consumptive fields, areas of “reckless” and 
“fraudulent” enterprises). According to Minsky (1982, 2008), in a free market system, there are three different ways for 
business units to meet their financial commitments: hedge, speculative, and Ponzi finance. While a hedge position is 
characterized by “hedged” outstanding debts or financial commitments due to sufficient cash flows from operating 
activities (e.g. in case of promising business plans of innovators, combining given factors new in order to generate 
revenues to hedge their balance sheet and income statement), speculative positions do not cover all commitments. Thus, 
in the latter case the business unit needs to sell some of the assets, to cut the costs, or to borrow fresh money in order to 
meet financial commitments. In a Ponzi situation, the business unit is not able to to meet all commitments, which are 
larger than assets and debt potentials; in other words “financing costs are greater than income” (Minsky 2008, p. 231). 
Kregel has shown that this approach can be used for analyzing country positions in international economics (Kregel 
1998, p. 5). In addition, Kregel and Burlamarqui (2006) have created a toolbox for the understanding of the way in 
which innovation (coupled with competition – both in industry and financial sector) can create something like Minsky’s 
financing positions. For example, failed product development can lead to speculative or Ponzi positions (same results 
for the victims of creative destruction).  
By trying to hedge the balance sheet or income statement, companies/entrepreneurs rely on a setting of capabilities 
(learning skills, expert knowlege and routines), motivation (in the sense of McClelland and Atkinsion) and property 
rights (cultural norms, laws etc.). These variables of action (see figure 1; framework by Röpke 1977 and 2002) develop 
and evolve in the wider context of the national system of innovation, which can further be characterized by 
“environmental turbulence” due to changes in the legal system, different structures of corporate governance, or special 
features of the education system. By being involved into a macroeconomic environment of exchange and inflation rates, 
social items – from an Schumpeterian standpoint – must be analyzed I order to show how entrepreneurs “move from 
short-term speculative positions to long-term hedged-positions (or not)” (Kattel 2009, p. 4). From this point of view, the 
Baltic States’ path of development has been endangered from the beginning to be hit from a Schumpeterian crisis (in 
this case: a triple crisis of a Kichin, Juglar and Kondratieff downswing) due to the particular circumstanes: a strong free 
trade doctrine hindering the rise of dynamic comparative advantages in order to establish long-term competiveness 
within the process of catching up11 and a lack of entrepreneurial history, hindering a process of entrepreneurial learning 
in order to deal with Schumpeterian downswings (learning from failure, learning to build and follow a high-value added 
path of vision).12 The free market doctrine as a “stable environment created highly fertile grounds for short-term asset 
booms” (Kattel 2009, p. 10). The secondary wave’s effects occured and “in the context of lowered risk-perception, 
abolished trade restriction, aggressive lending activity by foreign banks, and extensive use of easy credit drove 
                                                 
10
 In this context, an investment banker said to the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung: ‘Washington wanted more people to be able to 
afford a house and started to push interest rates. As a consequence, house prices rose, home buyers took more and more risks, making 
astronomical profits for the finance houses, which offered loans in complex non-transparent packages.’ (Mejias 2008, p. 42; our 
translation). 
11
 See therefore our second contribution in this volume referring to the case of Estonia. 
12
 For an evolutionary perspective on entrepreneurial learning see Röpke (2002, Siemon 2006). 
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economic expansion by financing consumption as well as a real estate bubble. This resulted in skyrocketing asset prices 
that have enabled debt-led growth” (European Cooperation in Science and Technology 2011, p. 3). Hence, the easy 
credit boom of the early 2000s in the Baltic States “only covered up deeper structural problems created through 
industrial restructuring in 1990s” (Kattel 2010, p. 9).13 
III Conclusion 
This article showed Schumpeter’s view on diagnosis and change in the capitalist system. First and foremost, innovation 
within an economy can be seen as fundamental for such change in an economic system, which has proven to be the 
“main trigger” in the development of capitalism caused by strong entrepreneurial efforts. Schumpeter regards change as 
development, seen as qualitative change of capitalist means of production. Such change is, however, not constant and 
continuous, but takes place in disruptive spurts, which vary in form and size. From this Schumpeterian standpoint, the 
Baltic crisis can be characterized as a problem of simultaneous downswings occurred by the fall of the 5th Kondratieff. 
Because the Baltic states are still within a process of catching up since the early 1990s, the ability to cope with this 
Schumpeterian depression became quite difficult due to a lack of entrepreneurial experience, specifically concerning 
how to act within a phase of depression. Foreign capital has been spent for non-innovative investments, thereby over-
leveraging due to secondary waves effects. Furthermore, the established free market doctrine has hindered the 
channeling of foreign capital into innovative fields. Hence, the Baltic states are endangered of falling behind due to its 
liberal institutional reforms; they became highly vulnerable to “financial fragility” (in terms of Minsky). 
How can a policy approach provide a process of Minskian hedging in order to stabilize a Schumpeterian process of 
economic development? Is Estonia (or the Baltic states in general) threatened to be stuck in this crisis due to a lack of 
“hedge positions,” i.e. a “strategy of innovation” (Röpke 1977) or is there something like a natural path of an 
unstoppable upward for the Baltic states due to the liberal market environment? 
Our conclusion is that it is necessary to integrate Schumpeter’s pillars of economic development (innovation and 
finance) into the logic of comparative advantages (in the sense of Ricardo) in order to help the Baltic states rise like 
phoenix. Seen from a Schumpeterian perspective, the role of dynamic comparative advantage is responsible for the bulk 
of international trade fluxes, for the competiveness of innovative entrepreneurs in general, and for a state of financial 
stability. Hence, a strong upswing, triggering participation in the next Kondratieff wave (as well as Juglar and Kitchin 
waves), is necessary to enter a dynamic sphere of innovation. 
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The concentration and competition in the banking sectors of the Baltic States in 
the context of a crisis 
Introduction 
The subject of the article is the banking sector of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. The Baltic States (BS) followed similar 
paths of transformation. Despite many common features, however, each had a unique development, differing in the 
number of credit institutions, the share of foreign capital in the financial market, and macroeconomic conditions. The 
banking sector plays a significant role in shaping the economic conditions. In the context of global financial crisis, there 
comes a question about the impact and role of large concentrations of foreign capital in the banking sector. The aim of 
the article is to present the changes of the concentration levels and competition in the banking sector of Estonia, 
Lithuania, and Latvia. The article also shows that a highly concentrated banking sector is not more endangered by a 
crisis under certain conditions. 
The changes of the banking sector structure in the context of EBRD transition indicators  
The New Member States (NMS) went through three phases of transformation. The first phase was connected to the 
establishment of a centrally planned monobank system.1 The second phase started in 1989, when a market economy was 
introduced after the communist system collapsed. The third phase of transformation was associated with the process of 
accession of these countries to the European Union. During the third phase, the Baltic states began very quickly to 
integrate with the international financial markets. Some authors suggest that the second and third phases are examples 
of a dual transformation, an adaptation both to a market economy and to the requirements of the EU. These changes 
resulted from political and international developments, including the growth of international trade, liberalization of 
capital flows, and improvement of the technological infrastructure. While assessing the transformation, the European 
Bank of Reconstruction and Development constructed transition indicators, which included banking reform and 
interest rate liberalisation. In the scale from 1 to 4+, the situation of NMS countries was similar only at the beginning. 
Thereafter, the level of transformation was graded higher in Estonia than Latvia and Lithuania (Graph 1). Since 2004, 
the EBRD estimated Estonia at the level of 4.0 due to the competitiveness and stability of the banking sector, efficient 
supervisory and flexibility of long-term financing for corporates, and the high share of foreign capital in banks. Latvia 
reached the level of 4.0 in 2007- 2008, but EBRD grades did not include public finance state of Latvia, where the 
banking sector lacked trust in the financial system. In 2009, the banking indicator for Latvia fell to 3.67 due to the 
nationalization of banking groups the year before. Lithuania was constantly graded at 3.67 in 2006-2010 thanks to the 
solid base of supervisory regulations, which defended this country from turbulences derived from a financial crisis. 
Graph 1. Transition indicators. Banking reform and interest rate liberalization indexes in the Baltic States 
 
Source: Structural Change Indicators, EBRD, www.ebrd.com, January 2011  
                                                          
1
 C. Stirbu, Financial Market Integration in a Wider European Union, HWWA Discussion Paper nr 297, Hamburg Institute of 
International Economics 2004, p. 11-12. 
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According to J. E. Stiglitz, the transition countries as a whole achieved the success less than statistics may suggest 
because of a very fast speed of privatization and price liberalization (called “shock therapy”) advised by international 
organizations, but having done so before the introduction of adequate legal regulations. In the end, however, the NMS 
came out positively through this transformation. 
For and against the inflow of foreign capital into the banking sector of the Baltic States 
The high share of foreign capital in the banking system in the Baltic countries has many effects on a wide range of 
issues. Undeniable advantages of the present capital structure include: de-politicization of the banking system, and 
therefore independence from government and the Treasury, improvement of the range and quality of banking services, 
implementation of new financial products and services, transfer of knowledge, technology and innovation (e.g. financial 
advisory, investment and electronic banking). ATM networks and the handling of credit cards require large amounts of 
money at the time of their initial implementation. Foreign banks have also been gradually introducing advanced 
professional services such as factoring, leasing, and derivatives. The benefits also include the implementation of 
accounting and reporting standards and higher standards for staff training. Extensive international relationships 
involved an increase of foreign currency payment transactions. At the beginning of the transformation, major banks 
with high market share functioned effectively due to a great margin gap between their mother countries and NMS. For a 
short period of time, all the necessary factors – capital, know-how, and technology – were  available only as a result of 
foreign capital inflow.2 The entry of foreign banks has resulted in increased competition in the financial services 
market, which proved to be beneficial for customers.3 The inflow of foreign investments gives evidence to the 
economic and political stability of the country, and thus offers a chance to favorable pricing of country risk, lower 
margins, and commissions in dealing with foreign countries. The presence of global financial institutions in the country 
increases the entry of FDI, and vice versa; banks follow their customers. 
On the other hand, the dominance of foreign capital in the banking system raises a long list of concerns. These include: 
loss of national identity of the domestic financial market, the possibility of discrimination against domestic companies 
when granting loans by foreign banks, acquiring strategic information about local businesses, the promotion of exports 
from mother countries, the use of transfer pricing and income shifting between markets (leading to the possibility of tax 
avoidance in the country of investment by foreign institutions), the transfer abroad of domestic savings, and focus on 
the wealthiest customers. This latter phenomenon associated with customer segmentation is described as "cherry 
picking." One characteristic is the development of personalized services to the wealthiest customers known as private 
banking. Banks with foreign capital were focused primarily on providing support to major domestic enterprises, 
especially foreign traders, foreigners living in the NMS, and the wealthiest citizens. Another argument is the failure of 
the transmission channel of monetary impulses from the central bank to the financial market through commercial banks 
with foreign capital. 
Foreign ownership also has several downsides. These include the selection of areas in which foreign banks intend to 
operate, putting more restrictions on lending to SMEs, and lack of interest in financing low-income projects that are 
important from the standpoint of the economy. In addition, greater competition may motivate some of the weaker 
domestic banks to take excessive risks, which may lead to their bankruptcy. Less efficient banks can lose customers and 
go bankrupt. A threat to national banks' financial situation may cause destabilization of the entire banking sector. If 
foreign banks reduce their involvement in the country or depositors move their savings to a foreign bank, the crisis may 
deepen. The collapse or liquidation of the bank implies huge costs. However, limiting access to the banking sector for 
foreign capital would hamper the privatization. Global business of foreign banks may not necessarily coincide with the 
objectives of national banks. Nevertheless, in European transition countries it was not possible to finance the 
development of domestic investment by savings, so the share of foreign financial institutions seems inevitable. Foreign 
                                                          
2
 N. Borak, Western Rules for Eastern Banking, “Post-Communist Economies” 2000, Vol. 12, Nr 3, p. 293-295. 
3
 C. Buch, Opening up for Foreign Banks: How Central and Eastern Europe Can Benefit, „Economics of Transition” 1997, nr 5, p. 
339-366. 
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capital can also reduce the likelihood of speculative attacks on the currency of the country.4 This happens for two 
reasons: the involvement of global institutions, whose interests are represented in this country and strengthen the 
economy as a whole, including the introduction of a currency board system in conjunction with the euro (as the Baltic 
States did). On the other hand, banks with high foreign ownership of assets may show greater sensitivity to shocks 
caused by the home countries or other countries where these banks are present, and a currency board system is not an 
effective means to prevent currency exchange rate crisis. In addition to the opportunity to accelerate economic growth, 
financial sector development, and increase international competitiveness, we need to pay attention to the limitations of 
sovereignty management and greater vulnerability to external financial crises, including the phenomenon of 
generalization of the valuation of assets of the region and a domino effect. Recent history provides many examples in 
this perspective, so it is important to find a balance between the need of development and its implementation.  
A clear assessment of the impact of foreign capital is very difficult.5 Proponents of foreign capital emphasize the 
qualitative development of the sector, the introduction of new financial products and services, and easiness to follow 
global technological trends. Critiques of foreign capital show a negative effect on the banking sector through such 
parameters as the number of bank branches, employment, or loans to businesses. The largest banks with domestic 
capital usually operate equally well as banks with a majority of foreign capital. An important result of the presence of 
foreign capital in the Baltics is the increase of banks’ efficiency and less threat of insolvency due to a stronger capital 
base. It is estimated that in Europe more than 40 banking groups are operating in a cross-border way, via branches and 
subsidiaries in 17 EU Member States.6 For banks in the regions (directly or indirectly) bordering the Baltic countries 
the expansion was a natural extension of the domestic markets. These banks were SEB, Swedbank, DnB NORD Bank, 
Nordea group, and Danske Bank. 
Table 1. The ownership structure of the banking system in the Baltic countries in the period 1997-2008 
 Total number of banks 
 
Total number of foreign 
banks 
Share of foreign banks in 
banking sector assets (%) 
 1997 2003 2006 2008 1997 2003 2006 2008 1997 2003 2006 2008 
Estonia 12 7 14 17 4 4 12 15 28,8 97,5 99,1 98,2 
Lithuania 12 13 11 17 4 7 6 12 40,6 95,6 91,8 92,1 
Latvia 32 23 24 27 16 10 12 16 70,6 53 62,9 65,7 
Source: Banking Structures in the New EU Member States, European Central Bank, 2005, p. 17 and Structural          
Change Indicators, EBRD, www.ebrd.com, 31.12.2010. 
Already a few years before EU enlargement, some Western banks took a key role in the Baltic States by purchasing the 
control packages in local banks (table 1). For large banking groups, those investments were part of the strategy at 
European or global levels. The selection of such a strategy by several banks in the region is a kind of necessity, due to 
their incomparable assets in a smaller ratio of the largest banks in the EU-15. 
Competition and concentration in the banking sector  
The way banks function significantly affects the nature of competition in this sector, as well as a bank's competitive 
position. Competition is a key element of market processes and mechanisms governing the functioning of the markets. 
Referring to the classic theory of perfect competition, it is based on the rivalry concept, building conflict or competition. 
The trend of cooperation underlines the importance of the relationship between market participants who do not serve to 
defeat the competition and increase customer loyalty. An American Nobel Prize winner, G. J. Stigler defines 
competition as rivalry between individuals, groups, or states.7 It should be emphasized that competition is a dynamic 
process. Actions taken to achieve better results and profits from the competitors include a number of methods and 
strategies to strengthen its market position as a result of price wars and collusion, aggressive advertising, and mergers 
and acquisitions.  
                                                          
4
 D. Gros, Who Needs Foreign Banks?, Centre for European Policy Studies, CEPS Working Document, Nr 185, September 2002, p. 
1-10. 
5
 S. D. Cohen, Multinational Corporations and Foreign Direct Investment, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2007, p. 179-200. 
6
 J. M. González-Páramo, Cross-border Banking in the EU: Development and Emerging Policy, Speech by Member of the Executive 
Board of the ECB, Hong Kong 2006, http://www.ecb.int/. 
7 G. J. Stigler, Perfect Competition, Historically Contemplated, “Journal of Political Economy” 1957, Nr 65, p. 262. 
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An oligopolistic competition model characterized the structure of the banking sector in the 1970s and 1980s. After the 
development of the financial services market, a result of deregulation and liberalization of the financial sector, there was 
a shift in the direction of monopolistic competition. The banking industry generally is not homogeneous and consists of 
a group of large banks, which determine the price level in the market, and many small banks, which follow a prescribed 
level. Market structure of banking services may be based on the construction of monopolistic competition, perfect 
competition, and pure or differentiated oligopoly. Pure oligopoly is the functioning of a number of banks offering an 
almost identical product. Differentiated oligopoly is based on the market of several banks, when diversity characterizes 
products and services. Monopolistic competition occurs when there is a market for many banks, which are identified by 
customers due to the many opportunities. Given the declining number of banking entities in the sector due to mergers 
and acquisitions, it is worth bearing in mind that the small number of banks determines the behavior of market players 
and their efficiency and productivity.  
Two approaches to the evaluation of competition appear in the literature: the classic model of SCP (structure - conduct - 
performance hypothesis) described by J. S. Bain8 and the ESH model (efficient structure hypothesis),9 based on the 
assumption that a positive relationship between profitability and market concentration is not conditioned by the degree 
of market power, but higher efficiency of operators is consistent with higher market share. 
The structure of the banking sector is largely dependent on regulation, which defines its shape. Much of the regulation 
tilts toward oligopolistic competition, even with a moderate degree of concentration. A high degree of regulation of the 
banks is necessary because of their role as institutions of public trust and financial intermediaries, as well as the need to 
ensure stability and security of the financial system. Intense competition can eliminate weaker players, which in the 
case of the banking sector may destabilize the entire financial system. However, an excessive regulatory framework 
makes it difficult to achieve the efficiency and lowers the yield, which weakens the competitiveness of banks. 
Moreover, over-regulation implies a reduction in banks' responsibility for the results of their operations, and therefore 
weakens the impact of market self-discipline mechanisms. Protectionist measures are similar. They do not encourage 
flexible adaptation in a changing market environment. On the other hand, these are the same factors that affect the 
successful completion of mergers and acquisitions carried out in the banking sector. Similar to barriers to entry, there 
are also barriers to exit, even in the proper selection of the buyer entity and the sensitivity of banks as financial 
institutions to changes in securities prices.  
In terms of the single financial market, there is a pressure to make inter-connections, resulting in the increase of 
concentration in the sector. Competition in the banking sector implies a decline in prices of banking products and 
services, while supporting innovation and forcing banks to take action which results in higher efficiency. Research of 10 
European banks in the years 1996-2002 conducted by S. C. Valverde, D. B. Humphrey, and R. L. del Paso revealed that 
large banks have comparable abilities to establish competitive strategies due to a similarities in business environment, 
costs, and productivity when creating conditions for local leaders is supported by governments in order to make 
expanding market share possible. 10 
High market concentration, however, may create conditions for oligopolistic competition, including the ability to 
impose higher prices and achieve higher revenues and profits. A study by H. Degryse, L. Laeven, and S. Ongena 
checked how organizational structure affects the competitiveness of banks.11 The study's authors concluded that the 
bank’s geographic coverage, market share, and pricing strategy for loans is determined by the organizational structure 
of the bank and its competitors. Thebank’s potential was lower when competitors had a larger market, a hierarchically 
organized structure, excellent communication technologies with customers and within the organization, a greater 
organizational focus, and strict relationships with the head office credit departments. Striving to increase the 
competitiveness of the bank, therefore, may include a desire to increase or maintain market share, gaining or 
                                                          
8
 J. S. Bain, Relations of Profit Rate to Industry Concentration, „Quaterly Journal of Economics” 1951, No. 65, p. 293-324. 
9
 H. Demsetz, Information and Efficiency: Another Viewpoint, „Journal of Law and Economics” 1973, No. 10, p. 1-22. 
10
 S. C. Valverde, D. B. Humphrey, R. L. del Paso, Do Cross-Country Differences in Bank Efficiency Support a Policy of “National 
Champions”?, “Journal of Banking and Finance” 2007, nr 31, p. 2137. 
11
 H. Degryse, L. Laeven. S. Ongena, The Impact of Organizational Structure and Lending Technology on Banking Competition, 
“Review of Finance” 2009, nr 13, p. 225-259. 
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maintaining a leadership position, and the pursuit of profit. Identification of the factors of competitive advantage covers 
the market value of the bank, which affects the behavior of shareholders and other stakeholders in the environment of 
the bank. The source of a competitive advantage is also the bank's value added, which exceeds the value of the bank's 
capital. The study of competition and concentration are based on different methods, often giving similar results. If, 
however, a parameter deviates from the homogeneous results, it is often the source of the specificities of the country. 
The most commonly used measure of concentration and competition is based on the NEIO canon (New Empirical 
Industrial Organization). Literature falling within the scope of the canon promotes the use of Lerner's index, Herfindahl-
Hirschman index, the CR rate and a study of parameters such as net interest margin, ROE (return on equity) and ROA 
(return on asset).12 
Measures of concentration and dominance in the banking sectors of the Baltic States 
Assessment of the degree of concentration and dominance in the banking sector in the Baltic States will be made using 
the ratio dominance Concentration Ratio for the number of banks adequate for the size of the banking sector and the 
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI), which is a measure of industry concentration. Undoubtedly, the economic 
dimension of concentration and deconcentration processes is becoming increasingly important in times of growth of 
transnational linkages and increased requirements in terms of competitiveness. HH indicator value is the sum of squares 
of the shares of all participants in a given market . 
HH = 
∑
=
n
i 1 S
2
i
 
S i -   hare of funds, assets and liabilities respectively in the bank funds, assets, and liabilities of the entire banking 
 sector, expressed in percentage points, 
n -  number of banks. 
Because shares are raised to the square, the higher the HH index value, the more unequal the distribution of the market 
between the different entities. Moreover, when the other factors are constant, the rate will be lower when more entities 
are operating in the market.13 HH indicator value ranges from 0 for a perfectly competitive market to 10 000 for a pure 
monopoly. It is understood that if the ratio exceeds HH 1800, the market is characterized by high concentration. Table 2 
and Figure 2 present HH index values for the analyzed countries. The highest degree of concentration, at the level of 
3000-4000, is the Estonian banking sector and this case is closer to the model of oligopolistic competition. This, 
however, must be proved by the degree of dominance in the banking sector. The banking sector of Lithuania suggests a 
moderately high degree of concentration of less than 2000. The banking sector of Latvia during the analyzed period was 
characterized by a low degree of market concentration, characteristic for monopolistic competition. It should be noted 
that the HH index value in Estonia and Lithuania decreased gradually, which can be explained by the entry of new 
foreign companies into the banking sectors, especially in the way of greenfield investments and mergers and 
acquisitions. 
Table 2. The value of Herfindahl-Hirschman index in the banking sector of Estonia, Lithuania and Latvia in 2003-2009  
COUNTRY HERFINDAHL-HIRSCHMAN INDEX  
 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Estonia 3943 3887 4039 3593 3410 3120 3090 
Lithuania 2071 1854 1838 1913 1827 1714 1693 
Latvia 1054 1021 1176 1271 1158 1205 1181 
Source: EU Banking Structures, European Central Bank, October 2008 and September 2010 
                                                          
12
 S. Carbo, D. Humphrey, J. Maudos, P. Molyneux, Cross-country Comparisons of Competition and Pricing Power in European 
Banking, “Journal of Money and Finance” 2009, nr 28, p. 116. 
13
 HH index is the most popular tool for measuring market structure and it has the advantage over the rate of N-firms (Concentration 
Ratio N) due to the analysis of the participation of all participants on the market, not just the N-largest. Furthermore, it is a measure 
used to assess mergers in the U.S. and European antitrust law, which requires the consolidation of control in the event of a significant 
threat to competition. 
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Figure 2. The value comparison of Herfindahl-Hirschman index in the banking sector of the                                    
Baltic States in 2003-2009 
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Source: EU Banking Structures, European Central Bank, October 2008 and September 2010 
Concentration Ratios N (CR N) also measure dominance in the banking sector. These indicate the share of funds, assets, 
and liabilities of the N country's largest banks, respectively, in relation to the total amount of funds, assets, and 
liabilities of the entire banking sector of the country.  
CR N = 
∑
=
N
i 1 S i  
S i -    share of funds, assets, liabilities respectively N of the country's largest banks in relation to the total amount of 
 funds, assets and liabilities of the entire banking sector of the country in the percentage points, 
n -  number of banks. 
In this measure the most commonly used parameter values are the values of N = 3,4,5,10 and 15. The higher the 
concentration in the percentage points, the stronger the market is dominated by N entities. The amount of CR can be 
used to describe the market structure, so the value of CR1> 90% will mean the existence of a monopoly. The market is 
effectively competitive, meanwhile, when CR4 <40%, which means that the four largest market participants have 
market shares of at most 10% and other smaller players operate in the market. Monopolistic competition may be defined 
in a market where the value of the CR4 ratio ranges from 40 to 60%. Finally, a CR4> 60% indicates oligopolistic 
structure.  
Below, CR will be assessed on the participation of the five largest banks’ assets in the entire banking sector’s assets of 
the country. Then, a process of assessing the type of competition on the basis of HH, CR4 (to explore the structure of 
competition in the banking market in the traditional model approach) and CR5 will be carried out. Table 3 and Graph 3 
illustrate that CR5 concentration ratio in individual countries fluctuated slightly during the period. The highest degree of 
concentration CR5 was observed in the banking sector in Estonia, in which the lowest rate at 93,4% was recorded in 
2009, and the highest levels, in the years of 2002 and 2003, were rated respectively 99,55% and 99,20%. Therefore, the 
assets of the five largest Estonian banks accounted for almost 100% of the assets of the entire banking sector. 
Table 3. CR5 value of the assets in the banking sector in Baltic States in 1997-2009 
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Estonia 96,73 98,68 98,69 97,51 98,69 99,55 99,2 98,6 98,1 97,1 95,7 94,8 93,4 
Lithuania  91,37 93,84 87,41 86,53 87,6 83,94 81,0 78,9 80,6 82,5 80,9 81,3 80,5 
Latvia 49,98 55,74 55,98 55,9 63,41 65,34 63,1 62,4 67,3 69,2 67,2 70,2 69,3 
Source: EU Banking Structures, European Central Bank, October 2008 and September 2010 
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Graph 3. CR5 value of the assets in the banking sector in the Baltic States in 2003-2009 
 
Source: EU Banking Structures, European Central Bank, October 2008 and September 2010 
A high degree of domination can be also observed in the banking sector of Lithuania, where CR5 changed periodically. 
At the end of 2009, 80% of the Lithuanian banking system’s entire assets were under control of banks with 
Scandinavian capital, while two of the biggest investors in the Lithuanian banking system, SEB and Swedbank, had 
29% and 22%, respectively. Moreover, SEB and Swedbank held the biggest share in leasing, life insurance and pension 
funds markets. The development strategy of the Swedish parent bank groups will have real influence on the further 
development of Estonia’s and Lithuania’s banks and its financial system. The country with the lowest degree of 
dominance was Latvia, but in this country the banking sector was increasingly dominated by major banking institutions 
(CR5 ratio increased between 1997-2009 from less than 50% to 69,3%). The average value of the CR5 in the banking 
sectors of the Baltic States in the period of 1997-2009 increased by 2%, which leads to the conclusion that the 
consolidation processes and foreign capital inflow in the region of the Baltics did not materially affect the degree of 
dominance of the largest banks in the banking sectors of the analyzed countries. It is worth noting that these results 
differ from results obtained for the other NMS that accessed the EU in 2004 and 2007. The average value of CR5 in the 
banking sectors of these countries during the period 1997-2007 decreased by 14%. Even in 2000, the NMS had two 
characteristics: too few assets and deposits (the region was determined in this respect as the underbanked) and an 
excessive number of banks (overbanked). In both cases, consolidation and FDI seemed to be approaching a solution to 
banking sector stability.  
Table 4. Summary of concentration ratios in the Baltic States in 2009 
COUNTRY 
 
HERFINDAHL-
HIRSCHMAN 
INDEX * 
CONCENTRATION 
RATIO 4 (%) 
CONCENTRATION 
RATIO 5 (%) COMPETITION 
Estonia Very high 95,4 93,4 Monopoly/Differentiated 
oligopoly 
Lithuania High 75,4 80,5 Differentiated oligopoly 
Latvia Low 62,1 69,3 Monopolistic 
competition 
* HH 0-1000 very low, 1000-1800 low, above1800 high, above 3000 very high                                 
Source: Author’s calculations. 
On the basis of the HH and CR4 indicators, we can determine what kind of competition characterizes the banking sector 
in the countries studied. Table 4 summarizes the levels of HHI, CR5, and CR4, obtained through calculations based on 
the statistics published by central banks. One can conclude that the competition in Estonia is close to a monopoly, 
associated with the dominance of the largest bank, which is Swedbank Tallinn, with a share of 78,5% in Estonian 
banking sector assets. The Lithuanian sector is also highly concentrated, but the largest bank in Lithuania, which is also 
Swedbank, has "only" 29% share of the assets of the banking sector. High concentration in these countries is confirmed 
by Herfindahl-Hirschman index. Latvia has a 62,1% level of CR4; the index of HH at a level of 1181 documents a low 
degree of concentration, which is confirmed by the value of CR5 (69,3%). 
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Is high concentration unsafe? 
The research on concentration and domination in a banking sector is important in the context of the crisis when the 
banking sector remained the most essential guarantee for the stability of the financial system. For example, despite the 
fact that assets of the Lithuanian banking system declined by 6,1% in 2009, the asset share of the banks increased and 
accounted for slightly more than 80% of the total financial system assets.14 The three largest Scandinavian banks (SEB, 
Swedbank and DnB NORD) not only controlled the largest share of the Baltic States’ banking system assets, but they 
also played an important role in the country’s non-banking sector – leasing and life assurance markets. Therefore, the 
financial situation of these banks is of the most importance to the development and stability of the Baltic States’ 
banking system. At the end of 2009, Scandinavian bank groups together controlled around 75% of the total Baltic 
countries banking system’s assets. In Latvia, their share was slightly lower due to a significant market share of the local 
banks, while in Estonia, nearly all of the banking system was under the control of these bank groups. Swedbank and 
SEB groups are the biggest investors into the banking system in the Baltic States; they control around 50% of the Baltic 
countries banking system‘s assets. Subsidiaries of these Swedish bank groups follow intensive activities in all three 
Baltic countries, a home market for the groups. Other important investors into the Baltic countries’ banking system are 
Nordea and Danske Bank groups, which have affiliates in all three Baltic countries, and a Norwegian DnB NOR Bank 
group. 
Studies on competition and concentration are usually based on the assumption that bank competition is positive from a 
social point of view. Generally, higher concentration is accompanied by less favorable pricing terms offered to 
customers of banks, higher profitability and profits, as well as poorer access to credit, which in theory should determine 
the lower competition. However, these relationships may not always be so strict and unchanging. In countries with more 
liberal regulations and a higher concentration of foreign ownership, the impact is much weaker on the occurrence of 
these phenomena. An example would be Finland's banking sector, which was highly concentrated. The three largest 
banks (OP Bank Group, Nordea, and Sampo) in 2003-2006 had a 70% market share in loans and deposits. However, as 
demonstrated by research conducted by J. Molnar, retail credit sector could be regarded as competitive and margins 
were rather low for the bank.15 Banks receive the income largely from activities other than loans, for example asset 
management. This situation is similar to the functioning of the Estonian banking sector.  
On the other hand, O. de Jonghe and R. V. Vennet demonstrated in their research on potential agents of European 
banks’ operations that banks having an efficient management system and advanced technologies in the long term gain 
competitive advantage.16 In addition, it turned out that the concentration of the banking sector does not affect equally 
the operators acting on it. Only banks that have a large share in a concentrated market generate non-price benefits. 
Macroeconomic conditions and specific individual markets have an important impact on the functioning of banks: while 
the variables specific to the banks explained 11.7% of banks volatility, the variables specific to the country explained 
more than 30% of the variation. The above arguments confirm the supposition that quantitative tests are not sufficient to 
fully assess the situation in the sector. 
Margins and the structure of banking in the Baltic States in the context of a crisis 
The banking sectors of NMS were attractive for foreign investors who expected to achieve income from operations in 
emerging markets. Net interest margin (NIM) is the difference between coupon income and expenditure related to 
interest (i.e. interest paid to depositors). NIM is one of the major indicators of cost in banks and can show the current 
degree of competitive condition in a market, but can also reflect other factors, such as market power and risk appetite. 
NIM covers the costs of banking services. When it exceeds the costs of the bank, it may be a source of profit. The 
existence of profits is an incentive for the entry of new banks, which increases competition in the market and produces a 
downward pressure on interest margins. Therefore, with a larger number of competing banks interest falls mainly on 
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loans, and the intensifying competition contributes to offering the customers higher interest on deposits. Both these 
effects lead to a reduction in interest margins. 
In Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, net interest margin reflected a significantly higher level than the average in the 
European Union. In 2008, the margins were at the respective levels of 2.55%, 2.82% and 2.38%, while the EU average 
was 1.87%.17 Faced with insolvency risk and other balance sheet problems, many EU governments decided to offer 
financial support to credit institutions, including partial or full state involvement in the restructuring process. The 
government stakes in banks have raised some concerns on cross-border competition and the existence of a true level 
playing field in the Internal Market. However, basic indicators of competition, such as NIM, did not show significant 
changes during the crisis in the EU.  
The study of determinants of interest margins in NMS was carried out by M. S. Schwaiger and D. Lebieg.18 They 
found that in the banking sectors of transition countries higher net interest margins were achieved than in countries with 
a "mature economy." The major causes included credit risk, and, to a lesser extent, interest rate risk. NIM is 
significantly affected by higher efficiency, lower operating costs, a higher proportion of non-interest income, lower risk 
aversion, a higher level of competition, and lower implicit interest payments. The presence of foreign capital through 
direct investment, in the light of these studies, brings a positive impact on margins, due to possible refinancing of the 
banks and possibility of moving the capital and its guarantee within the banking group. 
These theoretical assumptions were confirmed by K. Drakos in his studies on the effectiveness of the banking sectors of 
transition countries. He stated that the margins decreased significantly, largely due to the expansion of foreign entities, 
which in turn implies the success of the reform of the banking sectors. At the same time, he pointed out that the margins 
were different in public and private entities, which also indicated dependence of bank margins on the ownership of 
banks.19  
The study by C. Valverde and F. R. Fernandez concerning NIM values in conjunction with market power and 
specialization of the bank determined that the bank's market power increases when revenues are derived from a 
diversified portfolio of banking products and services.20 Net interest margins resulting from non-interest income. in 
2004-2006 were the highest in the euro area and slightly lower in the EU-15. Since 2004, however, average non-interest 
margins in Latvia and Estonia were higher than those in the EU. The level of non-interest margins affects the practice of 
tying banking services, such as mortgage lending, with current accounts and signing of contracts for life insurance, as 
well as linking them to the current account of consumer loans, or loans to small and medium enterprises. Most of such 
relationship occurred in the banking sector in Latvia21.  
In 2000-2006, most countries in transition experienced a significant increase in lending to the private sector, especially 
in Estonia and Latvia. The problem of excessive lending by the banks of the NMS has been widely studied. By 2005, 
however, a greater weight of lending in national currency than foreign was observed. This was partly explained by the 
decline in interest rates, rising incomes, generating economic growth, and increase in property prices. It changed 
afterwards to the foreign currency lending. As stated by G. Kiss, M. Nagy, and B. Vonnák, a contributing factor to the 
tendency of lending revenue decline was a reduction in banks' interest margins. Banks tried to compensate this fact by 
increased lending.22 In the Baltic States, an increasing trend for private sector loans and a downward one for loans to 
firms was observed.  
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A worsening of financial standing of the borrowers and declining collateral value, together with a very conservative 
approach to the credit risk for enterprises, were the main reasons behind credit losses in the Baltic countries in the time 
of financial crisis since 2007.23 Scandinavian parent banks reported the biggest losses. In 2009, Swedbank and SEB 
groups accounted their euro loan portfolio impairment losses for respectively 2.4 bln EUR and 1.2 bln EUR, of which 
61% and 78% derived from the Baltic countries. Lower cost of financing accompanied by higher interest rate margins 
led to an increase in the NIM, while floating securities turnover and rising stock prices contributed to the growth of 
intermediation and investment management charges. All these factors made possible to achieve operational profit used 
to cover the part of losses in the banks of analyzed countries (table 5). Nordea and Danske Bank parent bank groups 
reported that only a small portion of their income came from the operations in the Baltic countries, therefore economic 
situation in Lithuania and other Baltic countries has insignificant effect on the operational results of these bank groups. 
Table 5. Profitability of Scandinavian bank groups measured by ROE (return on equity) in 2006-2009 
Bank group 2006 2007 2008 2009 
SEB group 20,8 19,3 13,1 1,2 
Swedbank group 19,3 18,9 15,2 –12,5 
DnB NOR Bank 19,5 22 12,4 10,6 
Nordea group 22,9 19,7 15,3 11,3 
Danske Bank group 17,5 15,1 1,0 1,7 
Source: Financial Stability Review 2010, Lietuvos Banka, January 2011 
Concluding the net interest margin concern, the banking sector of the Baltic States have already developed enough to be 
able to function efficiently, even at the time of the global crisis. Efficiency of banks at the microeconomic level is 
generally associated with improved management and obtaining economies of scale and scope. Leading banks invest the 
most in the development of information technology and quality to achieve higher efficiency. Efficiency on a 
macroeconomic level requires better risk diversification, lower transaction costs and skillful allocation of resources into 
financial revenue generating projects.24 A well-functioning banking sector can work even at lower interest margins and 
interest rates, higher deposits, developing and stimulating business investment, and household consumption. 
The effects of a financial crisis on concentrated banking sectors in the Baltic States 
Many authors (Group of Ten, A. N. Berger and R. S. Demsetz)25 reported in their study that the effectiveness of the 
bank increases only to a certain amount of assets, over which big players may feel diseconomies of scale. This 
correlation may exist due to the complexity associated with managing the larger banks. It should be noted that the 
natural economic factor, limiting the growth of the banks, thus impeding cross-border integration and building large-
scale pan-European banks, is the tendency to move liquidity crises.  
F. Fecht and H. P. Grüner demonstrated in their study that a compromise may be found between the benefits of 
diversification and the costs of crisis contagion phenomena, if the banks merge from two different regions with different 
risk and it is the preferred option from the viewpoint of the bank's operational risk.26 In the model built by Fecht and 
Grüner, liquidity deficit in one region may then be discounted by surplus liquidity in another region. If the bank 
expands into the third region, liquidity risk increases, when the volume of liquidity deficit is escalating. The greater the 
number of regions, the greater may be the risk of liquidity shock. The authors put forward the thesis that the size of the 
bank engaged in mergers and acquisitions is less important for the safety of its balance sheet than the number of 
countries in which it makes an expansion of the consolidation. The conclusion is that the advancement of integration in 
the European banking sector characterized by cross-border mergers would be higher if the EU took place a greater 
differentiation of risk of banking in various countries. The described model explains the high degree of interest in 
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acquisitions of banks in the region of the Baltic States by Scandinavian banks. It is still unclear, however, what the 
optimum size of the consolidated banking group is. 
It is worth emphasizing that despite the high share of foreign capital in the region, no bank has fallen. However, credit 
expansion in earlier years has generated substantial debt charged to the financial performance of banks. The most 
serious case was of Parex bank, which was subjected to the method for the bank takeover and restructuring, called P&A 
(purchase and assumption).27 This technique is widely applied by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation in USA 
and will be useful for the resolution related to a further management of Parex Banka, taken over by the state of 
Latvia.28 In 2008, Latvian Parex bank encountered liquidity problems due to imbalances of short-term liabilities and 
long-term loans (only those related to real estate projects accounted for 44 %). Compared to 2007, deposits in Parex 
bank declined by 36% during the crisis. The highest quality assets and liabilities of the bank will be likely separated and 
sold to a private investor. 
To sum up the considerations taken in the work, the Baltic banking systems have successfully adapted to the changing 
macroeconomic environment. Despite record high losses, banks also have accumulated a significant amount of liquid 
assets and maintain positive levels of capital adequacy ratios.29 However, many banks recorded significant impairment 
of their loan portfolios in 2007-2009. A high concentration level and immense share of foreign capital were not the 
main destabilizing factors for the region. Improving macroeconomic situation should help to the banking system. The 
share of loans that recorded obliteration should decline leading to a general enhancement in the loan portfolio quality. 
The recovery of the domestic economy will lead to an improvement both in crediting and bank revenues. Further 
impairment could be possible only in case the difficult economic development scenario materializes in the world. 
References 
Bain J. S., Relations of Profit Rate to Industry Concentration, „Quarterly Journal of Economics” 1951, No. 65. 
Banking Structures in the New EU Member States, European Central Bank, 2005.  
Berger A. N., Demsetz R. S., Strahan P. E., The Consolidation of the Financial Services Industry: Causes, 
Consequences and Implications for the Future, “Journal of Banking and Finance”, February 1999, Vol. 23. 
Borak N., Western Rules for Eastern Banking, “Post-Communist Economies” 2000, Vol. 12, Nr 3. 
Buch C., Opening up for Foreign Banks: How Central and Eastern Europe Can Benefit, „Economics of Transition” 
1997, nr 5. 
Carbo S., Humphrey D., Maudos J., Molyneux P., Cross-country Comparisons of Competition and Pricing Power in 
European Banking, “Journal of Money and Finance” 2009, nr 28. 
Cetorelli N., Competitive Analysis in Banking: Appraisal of the Methodologies, “Economic Perspectives” Nr 1, Federal 
Reserve Bank, Chicago 1999. 
Cohen S. D., Multinational Corporations and Foreign Direct Investment, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2007. 
De Jonghe O., Vennet R. V., Competition versus Efficiency: What drives Franchise Values in European Banking ?, 
“Journal of Banking and Finance” 2008, nr 32. 
Degryse H., Laeven L., Ongena S., The Impact of Organizational Structure and Lending Technology on Banking 
Competition, “Review of Finance” 2009, nr 13. 
Demsetz H., Information and Efficiency: Another Viewpoint, „Journal of Law and Economics” 1973, No. 10. 
Drakos K., Assessing the Success of Reform in Transition Banking 10 years later: an Interest Margins Analysis, 
“Journal of Policy Modeling” 2003, Volume 25, Nr 3. 
                                                          
27
 The main P&A advantage is that this method allows customers to further use bank services uninterruptedly. With proper advance 
preparations, it is possible to restructure a problematic bank, to decompose the bank assets into two parts, and transfer insured 
deposits into another bank, in a very short period of time – usually one weekend. A purchase and assumption of a problem bank 
weakens a possibility of the break out of depositors’ panic (run on banks) and failure of the financial sector operation. Compared to 
announcing the bank bankruptcy, this method allows the reduction of expenses of the deposit insurance institution by transferring a 
part of the bank assets and liabilities to a private entity. This is also beneficial for the bank taking over, provided with an opportunity 
to develop the business of a bankrupt bank in a certain geographical region and customer segment. 
28
 By the end of 2009, the government had deposited with the bank an amount equal to 622 mln LVL, as a liquidity support, while 
the capital injection by the government exceeded 195 mln LVL. 
29
 Financial Stability Review 2010, Lietuvos Banka, January 2011, p. 58. 
The concentration and competition in the banking sectors of the Baltic States in the context of a crisis 
 
 86
Eller M., Hass P., Steiner K., Foreign Direct Investment in the Financial Sector and Economic Growth in Central and 
Eastern Europe: The Crucial Role of the Efficiency Channel, “Emerging Market Review” 2006, nr 7. 
European Financial Integration Report 2009, Commission Staff Working Document, European Commission, Brussels, 
11.12.2009 
EU Banking Structures, European Central Bank, October 2008 and September 2010 
Fecht F., Grüner H. P., Limits to International Banking Consolidation, “Open Economies Review” 2008, Volume 19, 
Nr 5, p. 651. 
Financial Stability Review 2010, Lietuvos Banka, Vilnius, January 2011. 
González-Páramo J. M., Cross-border Banking in the EU: Development and Emerging Policy, Speech by Member of 
the Executive Board of the ECB, Hong Kong 2006, http://www.ecb.int/. 
Gros D., Who Needs Foreign Banks?, Centre for European Policy Studies, CEPS Working Document, Nr 185, 
September 2002. 
Kiss G., Nagy M., Vonnák B., Credit Growth in Central and Eastern Europe: Convergence or Boom?, Magyar 
Nemzeti Bank, MNB Working Papers 2006, No. 10. 
Molnar J., Market Power and Merger Simulation in Retail Banking, Discussion Papers 2008, nr 4, Bank of Finland, 
Helsinki 2008. 
Report on Consolidation in the Financial Sector, Summary Report, Group of Ten, Bank for International Settlements, 
January 2001, chapter VI. 
Schwaiger M. S., Liebeg D., Determinants of Bank Interest Margins in Central and Eastern Europe, Financial Stability 
Report 14, Oesterreichische Nationalbank, Vienna 2008. 
Stigler G. J., Perfect Competition, Historically Contemplated, “Journal of Political Economy” 1957, Nr 65.  
Stirbu C., Financial Market Integration in a Wider European Union, HWWA Discussion Paper nr 297, Hamburg 
Institute of International Economics 2004. 
Structural Change Indicators, EBRD, www.ebrd.com 
Valverde C., Fernandez F. R., The Determinants of Bank Margins in European Banking, „Journal of Banking and 
Finance” 2007, nr 31. 
Valverde S. C., Humphrey D. B., del Paso R. L., Do Cross-Country Differences in Bank Efficiency Support a Policy of 
“National Champions”?, “Journal of Banking and Finance” 2007, nr 31. 
Renata Orlowska / Krystyna Zoladkiewicz 
 87
Renata Orlowska / Krystyna Zoladkiewicz    University of Gdansk 
Constraints of economic development of East European economies in the context 
of the unpredictability of Russian economic policy measures 
Introduction 
International trade plays a significant part in the world economy. Trade, in fact, drives general economic growth. 
Although the relevance of the domestic demand – consumption and investment – to economic growth should not be 
underestimated, exports generally drive growth without leading to a deficit in the balance of payments and support both 
economic activity and growth. It is therefore understandable that foreign economic policy has recently gained in 
significance. One of the most challenging consequences of the global economic crisis, moreover, is the increasing level 
of trade protectionism.  
Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania gained independence from the Soviet Union in 1991. In 2004, Poland and the three Baltic 
States, former COMECON countries, joined the European Union. Independence from the Soviet Union created new 
trading relations and changed their focus towards the west. However, the Russian Federation continues to be an 
important trade partner for all parties involved.  
It is necessary for Poland and the Baltic States to accelerate their economic growth in light of the global economic 
crisis, when countries all over the world are subject to the pressure of protecting their economies, which usually 
accompanies an economic slowdown. In this context, the role of trade with neighbouring countries, especially those 
with big and unsaturated domestic markets, gains in importance. 
The Russian market thus seems to be a particularly attractive choice from the viewpoint of both Poland and the tree 
Baltic States. Russia is one of the most promising export destinations with an extremely large number of consumers. 
Trade with Russia is profitable for all four countries for a number of reasons: 
− geographical proximity, which reduces transport and distribution costs; 
− similar cultures and related awareness of consumer preferences and habits, which facilitates trade negotiations; 
− a long tradition of trade cooperation; both countries used to be the major trade partners for each other for many 
 years; 
− the attractiveness of the Russian market to all the EU member states, which is an additional advantage for Poland 
 and the Baltic States. 
Russia, being their large eastern neighbour, still exerts significant influence in a range of areas. It is therefore crucial for 
the three Baltic States and Poland that significant levels of Russian trade protection is eliminated, especially considering 
that all four are interested in deepening trade and investment relationship in its immediate vicinity. In this context, 
moreover, Russian membership in the WTO may play a special role as a catalyst for its unilateral trade policy decisions 
and actions. It may be regarded as an appropriate framework for exercising Russian influence in the trade area, as it will 
lay the foundations for comprehensive reforms in trade regimes.  
On the other hand, the Russian market is highly competitive and facing it is a difficult task. As a result, entering this 
market and becoming established there is a real challenge to foreign enterprises, the more so because the preferences 
and expectations of Russian consumers are increasingly demanding. At the same time, the Russian market is not 
regulated by precise norms within the trade or competition policy, and a number of international trade norms and 
standards are not respected. This is a result of the fact that Russia is not a member of the World Trade Organisation. As 
a consequence, there is no institution which would supervise the rules of access to the Russian market, assert one’s own 
rights or settle litigation. It implies that Russia may take independent decisions related to the trade policy without 
consideration for the trade partners involved.  
Russia is the EU’s third biggest trading partner, with Russian supplies of oil and gas making up a large percentage of 
Russia’s exports to Europe. Trade between the two economies had shown steep growth rates until mid 2008, accounting 
for 52.3% of its overall trade turnover in 2008. This trend was interrupted by the economic crisis and the unilateral 
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measures adopted by Russia, which have affected this bilateral trade. In 2009, EU exports of goods to Russia achieved 
EUR 65.6 billion and imports of goods from Russia were EUR 115 billion. Imports from Russia are mainly energy and 
mineral fuels products (77.3%), some manufactured goods chemicals and raw materials. EU exports to Russia are 
diversified, covering nearly all categories of machinery and transport equipment (42.9%), manufactured goods, food, 
and live animals1. 
The EU is by far Russia's main trading partner. It is also Russia’s most important investor. Up to 75% of FDI stocks in 
Russia come from the EU member states2. At the centre of EU-Russia relations at present are ongoing WTO accession 
negotiations. In this context, Poland and the Baltic states, because of their geography and cultural ties, could have 
served as a bridge to Russia, which is an important partner for all members of the EU. However, there are many 
disputed points that require negotiation on both the national and European levels. Estonia, for instance, is becoming 
more dependent on Russia for natural gas imports. Of the three Baltic states, Lithuania has the highest share of trade 
with Russia today, but it is trying to reduce dependence on Russian energy. In January 2011, the Lithuanian Energy 
Ministry lodged a complaint with the European Commission regarding Gazprom's alleged abuse of its dominant 
position. The ministry requested the Russian gas concern to apply a transparent, fair, and non-discriminatory policy on 
natural gas. In another case, in 2009, Russia attempted to raise export tariffs for raw wood from EUR 15 per cubic 
metre to EUR 50 per cubic metre. This posed a threat of bankruptcy to many Finnish enterprises dealing with wood 
processing. It was not until Finland intervened in the European Union, however, that Russia’s prime minister, V. Putin, 
introduced a moratorium on this decision. 
It seems, therefore, that considering the structure of trade with Russia, the barriers for some industries are extremely 
restrictive. Thus will undoubtedly remain so, as the research shows, since there is a strong lobby in Russia who wants to 
limit the access to the market for competition. This fact emphasises even more the need for Russia’s membership in the 
WTO.  
The role of the WTO in the global trade 
The World Trade Organisation is one of the most important pillars of the global economic order. It is an integrated 
system of rules applying to individual spheres of trade (goods and services, foreign investment, intellectual property 
rights), including dispute settlement procedures. The philosophy of the WTO is based on the view that open markets, 
lack of discrimination, and global competition support the welfare of individual countries. As a result, the WTO makes 
a variety of efforts to increase the transparency of trade policies adopted by its members. It is important that those 
national standards are not allowed to deviate from the common rules. It follows that in order to reduce the scale of 
protectionism, it is essential that all countries in the world become members of the WTO, especially those which exert a 
particularly high impact on the situation in global markets. 
Nonetheless, the “great absent ones” among the WTO members still include Russia. It is the biggest economy and the 
only G-20 country which does not belong to the WTO even though it submitted its application for membership in 1993. 
Although major reforms have already been made in the Russian economy, the major dispute areas which require further 
accession negotiations include the level of allowed agricultural subsidies, the Russian export tariffs for wood, and the 
rules regulating the operation of state-owned enterprises in Russia.  
In general, however, foreign companies still face a number of tariff and non-tariff trade barriers when exporting to 
Russia. One of the major complaints is Russia’s complex system of standardization. It stems from the lack of clarity and 
transparency, and overall redundancy. Foreign providers of non-financial services experience discrimination not as the 
result of federal Russian law, but the result from violation practices from local authorities (fees to be paid to obtain 
licenses, while domestic firms allegedly omit it by bribes). 
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Key decisions the Russian Federation had to make included binding tariffs, defined levels of subsidies in agriculture, 
and commitments on services. By now, Russia has successfully negotiated all relevant bilateral accession agreements 
with all members except Cambodia, Vietnam (both new members) and Georgia. Conflict with Georgia is still delaying 
the accession process. As a matter of fact, Russia has already agreed to reduce its bound MFN tariffs to about 8 per cent 
on average. Liberalization covered important services sectors, but in some sectors commitments have not been agreed. 
Among others in the insurance sector, foreign insurance companies are subject to a 49% equity restriction. Foreign full 
participation in the insurance sector will be allowed only five years after the date of accession. Only the EU insurance 
companies enjoy more generous treatment as they can offer life and mandatory forms of insurance in Russia directly, 
without the requirement to work through a majority Russian-owned partner3. The other issue is that Russian federal law 
permits foreign banks to establish subsidiaries in Russia but does not allow them to establish branches. After accession 
to the WTO, Russia will allow foreign ownership to account for 70% of the country’s total banking sector equity with 
some restrictions concerning bank employees4.  
Tight government regulations also restrict other important sectors for FDI such as the telecommunications and 
aerospace industries. Purchase of agricultural land and land close to federal borders (or in areas determined as critical to 
national security) by foreigners is still prohibited. In May 2008, a list of 42 restricted sectors was introduced in which 
purchases of “controlling interests” by foreign investors must be pre-approved by the Russian government. The list of 
strategic sectors includes not only sectors involved in military production but also production and sales of natural 
resources and their extraction, newspapers with a circulation of more than one million, etc. It leads to non-transparent 
and burdensome process of approval. It is expected that Russian commitment to reduce aircraft tariffs as part of its 
WTO accession will help them purchase the modern, fuel-efficient aircraft they need to remain competitive with foreign 
airlines.  
Considering that Russia and over 40 other countries do not belong to the WTO, the Organisation’s regulations do not 
have a universal character. The WTO’s legal regime aims to guarantee access to export markets. Those regulations ban 
raising tariffs over the accepted level, discriminating exporters from different countries, offering them different terms 
and conditions of access to the domestic market, and applying unjustifiable sanitary or phytosanitary requirements or 
standards concerning product safety. The regulations also detail the principles of applying market protection measures 
aimed to ensure that each WTO member freely exports its products to the markets of other members according to the 
equal treatment principle. It implies that as soon as Russia joins the WTO, the introduction of numerous barriers to 
imports from other member states will be much more difficult. Although the Russian authorities may deliberately 
breach those regulations, they will be threatened with litigation before the WTO Dispute Settlement Body (DBS). And 
even though such trials are long and it is sometimes difficult to enforce lifting inconsistent regulations, the members 
have an opportunity to seek justice and impose sanctions on the countries that breach common regulations. If a country 
remains beyond the WTO structures, however, there is no institution that could award damages, which often leads to 
deliberate wrongdoing that cannot be punished. 
Russia’s accession to the World Trade Organisation will generate for this country medium-term and long-term benefits 
estimated on an annual basis at USD 53 billion and USD 177 billion, respectively, mostly owing to the liabilities in the 
trade in services. 
The characteristics of protection measures applied against Pomeranian enterprises in the Russian market 
Russia’s obedience to the WTO regulations is crucial to Poland’s exporters. According to the results of a questionnaire 
survey of Pomeranian enterprises, exporters are aware that the WTO may have a significant impact on their 
competitiveness in foreign markets. It may also play an important part as a mechanism securing their trade interests in 
this market. 
                                                 
3
 However, until Russia’s accession, EU firms are to act in accordance to Russian law, which requires that chief executives and chief 
accountants of foreign insurers operating in Russia be Russian citizens. 
4 At least 75% of the bank's employees and 50% of the bank's management board must be of Russian nationality if the chairman is 
not a Russian citizen. Heads of foreign banks' Russian offices are required to be proficient in the Russian language.  
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The characteristics of the trade barriers existing in the Russian market are based on a questionnaire survey among 308 
enterprises from the Pomeranian Voivodship. 211 (i.e. 68.5%) respondents confirm their cooperation with Russia. 
Further analysis is based on this group of exporters. 
The highest share (78.7%) of the analysed enterprises claims that customs procedures cause most of the problems in 
their export to the Russian market. Bureaucracy is the next most common source of problems (70.1%), and nearly half 
of the exporters (47.9%) point to corruption as a significant obstacle. High trade tariffs, technical standards, and 
phytosanitary barriers are also mentioned as sources of problems (see: Fig. 1). 
Figure 1. Barriers used against firms in 2010 (survey by DGT)  
 
Source: Orłowska,R.,  Żołądkiewicz,K., Bariery w handlu z Rosja bnapotykane przez firmy województwa pomorskiego, 
in: Eksport oraz bezpośrednie inwestycje zagraniczne firm województwa pomorskiego, ed. S. Umiński, PBS DGA, 
Gdańsk 2010, p.103. 
The average figures provide evidence supporting those findings. The enterprises suggest the barriers preventing 
expansion of exports to Russia is related to the fact that Russia is not a member of the WTO.  
Tariffs and customs procedures 
World trade has recently witnessed the lifting of MFN ad valorem duty rates below 4% on average and tariff binding. 
The principles of estimating the customs’ value of a good are also important; the procedure ought to be neutral and 
should not increase the duty following the good’s incorrect classification. Moreover, the customs procedure should not 
limit the trade as a result of unnecessary, complicated, and time-consuming requirements concerning the import 
documentation (bureaucracy). 
Nonetheless, customs procedures may become non-tariff barriers to trade if the customs authorities misclassify a good 
or overestimate its value. Thus, in order to reduce the area of subjective customs’ procedures, the WTO provides 
regulations for customs valuation and classification of goods. Customs classification is particularly favourable to 
trading partners (much more so than the valuation) since it involves application of an international classification system. 
It reduces the uncertainty concerning the qualification of goods by customs authorities, which is particularly important 
in the case of close substitutes that may be subject to different rates of duty. As a result, the use of a coding system, 
which strictly defines the requirements concerning the production process and packaging, reduces the expected duty. 
Naturally, even the agreement concerning the customs valuation or pre-shipping control is not a panacea for corruption, 
using incorrect basis for customs valuation of a given imported good, invoicing fraud, or increasing freedom in applying 
regulations to own customs procedures. Nonetheless, the implementation of a customs valuation system consistent with 
the WTO agreement requires automatisation of customs administration, improvement of infrastructure, staff training, 
etc. 
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Figure 2. Customs procedures as a barrier indicated by 166 firms according to production sectors 
 
Source: as in Figure 1, p. 105. 
Customs procedures in Russia are perceived as the most significant barrier limiting access to this market. When 
analysing the evidence by industry (see: Fig. 2), it turns out that customs procedures, indicated by 166 respondents, are 
considered the heaviest burden for the manufacturers of machines and equipment (30%), jewellery (13%), building 
materials (9%), furniture (8%), ships and boats (5%), clothing and footwear (5%), and fish products (4%). 
Membership in the WTO seems to be a remedy for those practices. This is especially true because the average levels of 
MFN tariffs in Russia are higher than in medium-developed countries and much higher than in OECD countries. The 
structure of Russian tariffs is rather diversified. The average level of MFN tariffs in 2008 was estimated at 10.8%, 
whereas the average weighted with the volume of trade (in 2006) amounted to 11.4%, with the tariff on agricultural 
produce at a level of 14.2% (22.8% as a weighted average), and on the non-agricultural goods – at 10.2% (9.3% as a 
weighted average). The tariffs for agricultural produce are significantly higher than those for manufactured goods. From 
the perspective of an exporter’s competitive position, it is thus essential to apply an appropriate customs classification. 
Among the MFN tariffs for imported agricultural produce, the most frequently used ad valorem tariffs (applied to 37% 
of imported goods) were below 5%, and the less frequently used ad valorem tariffs included: 5-10% rates applied to 
11% of imports, 10-15% rates applied to 30% of imports, 25-50% rates for 5% of imports, and the highest 50% rates 
were used for 3.5% of imports. In the case of non-agricultural goods, the MFN rates were used as follows: below 5% ad 
valorem rate for 35% of imports, 5-10% rates for 15% of imports, 10-15% rates for 20% of imports, 15-25% rates for 
16% of imports, and the 50% ad valorem rate for only 0.3% of imports. The average MFN tariffs and maximum rates of 
duty for individual groups of commodities are presented in table 1. 
Table 1. Average and max MFN Russian tariffs of different product groups in 2008r. 
Product group  Average MFN applied duties  Max applied duties  
Animal products  21,5  134  
Dairy products  5,5  25  
Fruits, vegetables, plants  12,0  45  
Coffee, tea  10,4  41  
Cereals and preparations  14,6  116  
Oilseeds, fats and oils  8,1  37  
Sugar and confectionary  19,0  85  
Beverages and tobacco  44,4  456  
Cotton  0,0  0  
Other agricultural products  6,7  31  
Constraints of economic development of East European economies in the context of the unpredictability of Russian 
economic policy measures  
 
 92
Fish and fish products  13,5  175  
Minerals and metals  10,1  29  
Petroleum  4,5  5  
Chemicals  7,0  29  
Wood, paper, etc.  15,5  87  
Textiles  12,0  56  
Clothing  20,2  59  
Leather, footwear, etc.  11,0  91  
Non-electrical machinery  4,2  27  
Electrical machinery  8,8  45  
Transport equipment  10,4  25  
Manufacturers, n.e.s.  13,5  218  
Source: Tariff Profiles WTO 2009, WTO Secretariat, Geneva 2010.   
Among Russia’s problems, two are of particular significance to the analysis: “tariff chimneys” and the fact that many 
tariffs are “specific” tariffs, defined as fixed amounts expressed in euro per quantity of the product, for instance 1 
EUR/kg. For this reason each appreciation of the euro increases the ad valorem equivalent of the specific duty. 
Moreover, approx. 10-15% of tariffs have a form of compound tariffs. In this case the tariff is expressed as a 
combination of an ad valorem duty and a specific duty; in practice, the higher of the two is applied to imports, e.g. the 
ad valorem rate for soft cheese is 15% but not less than 0.5 EUR/kg. In general, the highest tariffs are applied to food 
and light industry products. 
In the group of the analysed enterprises from the Pomeranian Voivodship, 80 point to the problem of high tariffs, of 
which 24% are manufacturers of machines and equipment, 18% manufacture jewellery, 18% manufacture furniture, and 
6% each manufacture building materials, clothing and footwear, and ships and boats (see: Fig. 3). 
Figure 3. High tariff rates as a barrier indicated by 80 firms according to production sectors 
 
Source: as in Figure 1, p. 107. 
As a result of the negotiations concerning accession to the WTO, Russia made a commitment to reduce its MFN tariffs 
to an average level of 8%, which implies an approximate 50% reduction in existing tariffs. In the case of many 
products, such as those delivered by the civil aviation industry, the reduction would range from 20% to 7.5%. For 
building and agricultural machinery as well as R&D and medical equipment, the reductions would amount to up to 5%. 
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In June 2009, however, the Russian government announced the increase of many tariffs to be expected in the years 
2010-2012. Russia – discouraged by the lengthy (nearly twenty years) procedure of applying for membership in the 
WTO – is now delaying the process itself, which provides the country an opportunity to manoeuvre using trade policy 
measures, including customs policy. It involves growths in tariffs for many imported goods in 2010. The tariffs for raw 
materials and semi-finished goods, meanwhile, will be reduced. In the years 2011-2012, in turn, tariff reductions are to 
be applied to imports of hi-tech goods. The aim is to simplify and accelerate the importing and exporting of innovative 
goods and introduce tax exemptions for the Russian export of goods developed by innovative enterprises, which remain 
unprofitable under the existing system. The action is directly related to the implementation of the “Innovative Russia” 
package of bills. The changes refer also to the export tariffs for many Russian products. For instance, the middle of 
2010 saw an increase in the tariffs for exporting mineral oils and painted or preserved raw wood (from 15% to 25% ad 
valorem but not less than 15 EUR per cubic metre). 
Significant increases in import tariffs, on the other hand, were reported mostly for pig livestock, since in early 2010 the 
Russian government raised the tariffs from 5% to 40% ad valorem to protect domestic farmers. This growth was 
partially balanced with incidence (price reductions made by exporters, including those from Poland), and partially with 
the devaluation of the euro in relation to the ruble and the US dollar. In Poland, however, those operations resulted in a 
dramatic fall in exports of livestock – from 4.9 million in the first quarter of 2009 (USD 28 billion on an annual basis 
and the 4th position after Lithuania, Germany, and Estonia) to 147 thousand in the first quarter of 2010. Other exporters 
to this market reported less significant declines in their shares (or even increased their shares considerably, which was 
the case for Latvia). It is estimated that Russia’s protectionist policy regarding pork led to a 33% reduction in imports of 
livestock, mostly at the expense of Polish exporters, but this result still does not satisfy the expectations of Russian 
producers. 
Other problems related to trade with Russia may be traced to an event that took place on the 1st of January 2010 when a 
Customs Union agreement was signed between Russia, Belarus, and Kazakhstan, thus establishing the Eurasian 
Economic Community (EurAsEC). The countries share unified customs tariffs, a unified system of customs regulations, 
identical requirements concerning licences and concessions in foreign trade, and a Customs Code that came into force 
on 1 July 2010. The mechanisms regulating the activity of the customs union are to be introduced by the end of 2010 
although the process of adjusting the regulations to those in force in the member states will be a difficult task. 
Nevertheless, there are still doubts as to the final effects of establishment of this union since the attempts to integrate 
Russia and Belarus, as well as Russia and Kazakhstan, had already been made in the past and the final results left a lot 
to desire. 
Quotas, phytosanitary norms, technical standards, etc. 
A general problem in the trade with Russia may be perceived in its new decree on the Food Security Doctrine, which 
came into force on 30 January 2010. This decree aims at the development of the domestic production of good-quality, 
safe, and cheap food while reducing the dependence on imports. The share of domestic production to be achieved in 4-5 
years is estimated in relation to the total annual consumption for individual agricultural markets (95% for grain and 
potatoes, 90% for milk and dairy products, 85% for meat and salt, and 80% for fish products, sugar, and vegetable oil). 
For instance, as early as in 2009 imports accounted for only 25% of the total annual consumption of poultry. At the 
same time, numerous barriers were introduced to reduce the competitiveness of imports and support the domestic 
production of food instead. Since 2007, a system of two parallel kinds of quotas has been in force: import quotas (e.g. in 
2010 the quota for poultry was set at 780,000 tons, for pork at 500,000 tons, and for beef at 560,000 tons), and tariff-
rate quotas for meat (e.g. within the quota, the tariff on poultry amounts to 25% but not less than 0.2 EUR/kg, and 
above it – 80% but not less than 0.7 EUR/kg; the figures for pork amount to 15% but not less than 0.25 EUR/kg and 
75% but not less than 1.5 EUR/kg, within and above the quota respectively, whereas for beef: 15% but not less than 0.2 
EUR/kg and 50% but not less than 1 EUR/kg, respectively). What is important, the level of quotas in the cases of 
poultry and pork was reduced in relation to the preceding year whereas the quota for beef was increased following the 
problems in this market. The application of quotas distorts the picture of competitive advantage, which becomes less 
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transparent and more susceptible to administrative wrongdoing and corruption. Moreover, the WTO generally bans their 
use; the major objective of the member states is to prevent their implementation. However, many countries still apply 
them, especially in relation to agriculture. 
Sanitary, phytosanitary, and veterinary regulations are another form of intervention. The government imposes these 
measures in order to protect the health of people, animals, and the natural environment. They cannot, however, be used 
as trade restrictions, especially in the form of strict and expensive sanitary, phytosanitary, and veterinary criteria. The 
WTO agreement aims to limit any wrongdoing related to the implementation of those criteria, and particularly the 
inspection of the imported goods, which may be used as an excuse for rejecting certain goods that satisfy the safety 
criteria yet are politically sensitive. The sanitary and phytosanitary criteria set by the WTO significantly reduce the 
scale of protectionist overuse of health and safety of food. 
Nevertheless, the Russian Federation, which remains beyond the WTO structures, applies independent solutions to this 
problem. Since 1 June 2009, it has been obligatory to attach safety certificates to exported apples and Chinese cabbage. 
Since 1 October 2009, those certificates have been also required for tomatoes, strawberries, and cherries, and since 1 
March 2010, finally, the certificates are also required for pears. Furthermore, a list has been made of approved exporters 
of meat products, diary products, poultry, eggs, pig and bovine livestock, etc., who satisfy the requirements of the 
Russian veterinary control and are allowed to export their products to Russia. However, even the presentation of a 
relevant certificate does not imply the right to apply time limits for those enterprises listed among approved exporters in 
the case of products that are subject to veterinary supervision. As a result, even the exports of poultry from the United 
States were banned at the beginning of 2010, and it was not until the US president Obama intervened to Russia’s 
president Medvedev that the ban was lifted. Considering the fact that Russia is the strongest partner in the new Customs 
Union (Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan), even EurAsEC’s coming into force will not eliminate the possibility of 
Russia’s temporary interventions protecting its domestic market for agricultural produce and food, especially 
considering the doctrine provides a list of 53 groups of sensitive products. 
As a consequence, it is difficult to evaluate what impact the food security doctrine might exert on the growth in exports 
of Pomeranian enterprises to the Russian market. It will without doubt be a result of the domestic production self-
sufficiency indicators achieved by Russia and changes in the size of the Russian domestic market on the one hand, and 
the competitiveness of foreign producers and efficient promotion of Polish products, including those from Pomerania, 
on the other. It would be also important to appeal to the WTO regulations, which allow questioning of a decision made 
by customs, sanitary, veterinary, or agricultural authorities as those regulations set certain standards yet leave to the 
members a certain freedom to modify them on the condition that other members are notified of any such deviations and 
appropriate justification is presented. 
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Figure 4. Sanitary and phytosanitary barriers indicated by 24 firms according to production sectors 
 
Source: as in Figure 1, p. 110. 
 
Figure 5. Technical standards as barriers indicated by 35 firms according to production sectors  
 
Source: as in Figure 1, p. 110. 
The research shows that the phytosanitary norms and technical standards are particularly painful for certain industries 
represented by the analysed enterprises. The phytosanitary barriers thus seem to be the most important obstacle for the 
producers of wrapping foil (34%), whereas the producers of machines and equipment (52%) argue that it is technical 
standards that make the trade so difficult (see: Fig. 4 and 5). 
Product standards, technical norms, and certification systems play extremely important roles in the proper functioning 
of individual economies. They include widely accepted regulations, standard procedures, or legally binding technical 
norms and certificates, which prove they are met. The objective of introducing those technical standards and norms is to 
ensure the compatibility of goods and their quality. The standardisation is beneficial to all the parties involved, but the 
norms may become a barrier to trade, particularly if enterprises or the whole industries implement more strict 
requirements for meeting a standard, and especially if they are meant to reduce the competitiveness of imports. 
Governments often succumb to domestic lobbyists when they set technical norms. The aim of the WTO “Agreement on 
technical barriers to trade” is to ensure that the standards, technical norms, and certification systems in member 
countries are not applied in a manner that would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between 
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countries or a restriction on international trade. Those requirements should ensure transparency (publication of 
regulations) and prevention of possible wrongdoing, and ought to be based on appropriate international standards. And 
again the procedures concerning the certification norms and requirements of the Russian Federation may and do 
significantly differ from the regulations obliging WTO members, leaving a lot of freedom in those matters. 
State-owned trade enterprises (common in Russia) pose another threat to the WTO system since they may evade the 
principles of the Most Favoured Nation clause and apply measures discriminating their trade partners while making 
decisions concerning their purchases or sales. They may exert a similar impact to the introduction of taxes (tariffs) or 
subsidies. Each enterprise with a dominant position in the market and favoured by the central administration may 
reduce the competition. In this way the trade is distorted and its efficiency falls. Usually the WTO members, i.e. market 
economies, require from the new member a significant progress in the privatisation of enterprises and development of a 
market-oriented legal environment.  
The Russian Federation is still careful about opening its market to foreign competition. The liberalisation of trade as a 
result of joining the WTO raises resistance among the groups that have thus far been protected by the domestic trade 
policy. The major opponents may be classified into four basic groups. The first group includes Oleg Deripaska – the 
tycoon in the aluminium industry, and production of vehicles and aircrafts – who is in favour of the existing infant 
industry trade policy. Similarly, the Russian Chamber of Trade emphasises that exports of Russian primary 
commodities, whose demand is rising, remains unthreatened so the liberalisation of the trade policy is useless. The 
Chamber strives for applying the infant industry policy to the food-processing, pharmaceutical, chemical, and electronic 
industries. Strong opposition is also observed in the agricultural sector, although Russia has been so far subsidising its 
agriculture to a limited extent only. The renaissance of agricultural production – in the opinion of agrarian societies – 
requires a focused support; the sector is expecting higher subsidies, which may translate into a growth in agricultural 
produce and its exports. For this reason, the accession to the WTO, which will reduce the subsidies for agriculture to a 
minimum, causes resistance. Another issue is also the specific sanitary requirements applied by veterinary services to 
imported goods, which leads to reductions in the imports of: poultry, pork and beef from the EU, including Poland, 
Ukraine and the US; fish from Latvia and Norway; diary products from Lithuania and Ukraine; and wine and fruit from 
Georgia and Moldova. Those measures should be considered as highly protective (although they are also applied by 
many other countries). The last group of opponents who are against the liberalisation of trade within the WTO includes 
the representatives of the Russian services sector, especially those concerning intellectual property rights (internet 
piracy), retail, telecommunication, banking and insurance. 
The relevance of Russia’s membership in the WTO to Pomeranian enterprises 
The evaluation of Pomeranian exporters’ operations was designed to learn about their plans concerning their future 
operations and expansion as well as their preferences related to the Russian market. 
The problem of Russia’s membership in the WTO is more complex than a mere discussion on the barriers applied by 
the country. In the questionnaire, all 308 enterprises answered the question “Would Russia’s accession to the WTO, 
imposing an obligation to respect trade agreements and liberalisation on all its members, facilitate trade with Russia?” 
This implies that the Russian market is in the centre of attention of all exporters from Pomerania. 
So taken all the above difficulties in this important market into consideration, the efforts aimed at Russia’s accession to 
the WTO should be supported. It will force the Russian government to desist from interventions in their trade policy in 
favour of a more open and market-oriented approach. 
There is no doubt that the situation of Polish exporters would significantly improve if Russia joined the WTO 
structures. On the other hand, Russia’s membership in the Organisation may not meet all the expectations. Experts 
emphasise that the sanctions imposed on Russia’s exports (if Russia becomes a member of the WTO; and according to 
the Organisation’s regulations) in “revenge” for its strict import regulations may turn out to be inefficient. It results 
directly from the commodity structure of Russian exports, which is based mostly on oil and natural gas, steel, iron ore, 
coal, metals, and chemical products. As a consequence, during the Polish-Russian “meat war” several opinions could be 
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heard: optimists claimed that Russia’s accession to the WTO might improve the situation; pessimists expressed doubts 
as to this improvement. Several arguments supported the pessimistic opinions. First, if the EU filed a case concerning 
such an embargo with the WTO, the trial would be lengthy. Second, even if the EU won the case and Russia failed to 
obey the ruling, the Union would be unable to impose any sanctions on Russia since it exports neither processed goods 
nor agricultural produce to the EU. And who would be willing to place restrictions on exports of the Russian oil and 
natural gas? 
The guarantees perceived by Poland and other members in relation to Russia’s accession to the WTO will therefore 
depend on the degree to which the Organisation will be able to force its new member to obey the common regulations. 
Figure 6. Importance of Russian membership in the WTO for Pomeranian firms 
 
Source: as in Figure 1, p. 113. 
There are many studies undertaken by institutions and think tanks that demonstrate the broader economic consequences 
of having Russia outside the WTO.  
This research carried out among Pomeranian entrepreneurs reveals that they face numerous barriers in the Russian 
market and the majority of respondents postulate that Russia should join the world trade system (see: Fig. 6). From the 
perspective of Pomeranian enterprises, Russia’s aspirations to join the WTO should be welcomed, the more so because 
it will be followed by a gradual implementation of major reforms in the country’s trade policy. 
Similar research results were obtained by the authors in their questionnaire survey carried out among the members of 
the Gdansk Business Club in March and April 2009. The same regularity was also found in another questionnaire 
survey conducted by the authors together with MBA students of the University of Gdansk in April and May 2010 
among 139 enterprises from all over Poland. 
The conclusions seem, therefore, to be unanimous. From the perspective of Pomeranian entrepreneurs the government 
should be lobbied to support the membership of the Russian Federation in the WTO since it will benefit Pomeranian 
exporters through more access to this market and transparency of operations. 
In general, the most important results of analysis is that countries from the region should establish a coalition to support 
Russian accession to the WTO. It may be a way to reduce trade barriers and benefit businesses of all parties. It should 
be perceived as a necessary element of normalcy in a mutual relationship since key decisions Russia had to make 
included determining the level at which to liberalize tariffs and non-tariff barriers. It will also comprise the elimination 
of significant levels of protection due to Russia’s complex system of standardization to serve more transparency and 
clarity in their trade policy.  
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in Estonia 
 “If I see a company coming out of Estonia I am reasonably assured that it will be executed well. That is because there 
is a lot of Skype alumni in Estonia. For its size, Estonia is generating more high quality startups than you would 
expect”  
(Naval Ravikant, founder of AngelList) 
I Introduction 
Liberalization as the main concept of the last two decades guaranteed a fertile culture for Estonia’s catching up. Seen 
from an entrepreneurial perspective, this might have been the best choice in order to empower all kinds of 
entrepreneurial forces (mainly in the sphere of non-innovative behaviour) that have been blocked for decades. But 
improving the direction of development by political influence would now require abandoning the powerful free trade 
doctrine in order to prepare the soil for innovative entrepreneurship that will be needed for a forthcoming upswing 
period. This thesis can be directly related to the way innovation occurs at the company level in Estonia (innovation as 
outsourcing, cost-cutting machinery acquisitions, etc.): “financial fragility in effect locks these small economies into 
specific innovations that target low value-added sectors and activities” (Kattel 2009, p. 15). Some efforts have already 
been made to establish a more innovation-oriented policy approach since 2000 by targeting public and private R&D 
activities, strengthening the instituitional bases, and break-out from a free market innovation approach. There is now a 
pressing need to take account of Estonia’s traditional sectors “with major sources of employment such as wood 
processing, furniture, textiles, clothing, and radio, TV and communication equipment all losing competiveness rapidly” 
(Reid/Walendowski 2006, p. 31).  
Considering this background, we want to analyze the current status of innovation policy in Estonia. Our main research 
questions will be: how can a policy approach provide a process of Minskian hedging in order to stabilize a 
Schumpeterian process of economic development? Is Estonia (or the Baltic states in general) threatened to stick in this 
crisis due to a lack of “hedge positions,” i.e. a “strategy of innovation” (Röpke 1977), or is there something like a 
natural path of an unstoppable upward for Estonia due to the liberal market environment? 
II Innovation Policy and Economic Development in Estonia 
In 1939, Estonia and Finland had very similar standards of living. In 1987, however, Finland’s GDP per capita was 
about $14,370, compared to Estonia’s GDP per capita of about $2,000. This “welfare effect” that happened under the 
Soviet Union’s socialism is well known and can be explained, of course, by the decades-long lack of capitalist 
dynamics. But what has happened in Estonia after the institutional restructuring of Eastern Europe in 1990? 
Interestingly, after regaining independence, inflation was rampant in Estonia; real wages fell below $2,000 per capita 
and almost 90% of the country’s international trade depended on Russia (Laar 2007, p. 2). Since then, Estonia became 
something like an economic lab of liberalization. Estonia established radical reforms, allowing Adam Smith’s “invisible 
hand” to bring prosperity by establishing an entrepreneurial culture, a sound currency, and a balanced budget. 
Furthermore, subsidies to state-owned companies were cut, property reform and privatization opened the economy, 
tariff and non-tariff trade barriers were eliminated, and the tax system was reformed to a simple flat tax (the first in the 
world1) on January 1, 1994 (Lumiste, Pefferly and Purju 2008, pp. 3).2  
 
                                                 
1
 For a detailed discussion of the theoretical, historical, and political background for implementing Estonia’s flat tax, see Laar (2007, 
pp. 9).  
2
 Despite of the fact that regional disparities occurred already at the very beginning of the transition process and the new government, 
the few regional policy measures (regional tax reductions etc.) were cut off, because they no longer fit the laissez-faire ideology 
(Kuura 2006, p. 467). 
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II.1 A Lab of Liberalization: The Rise and Fall of Estonia’s Economy 
Estonia became “off the cuff” one of the freest economies in the world3 and in 1993-1994 the forgotten spot in the 
world became a “mekka” for FDIs. Privatization (completed by 2000-2001) and liberalization opened the door for the 
inflow of foreign investments. Beside this financial influx, FDIs also became a source for a new business culture, 
marketing skills, and technical knowledge (Lumiste, Pefferly and Purju 2008, p. 33). Consequently, this development 
was accompanied by new working places and the reconstruction of old factories (Laar 2007, p. 6).4 The openness of the 
Estonian Economy – measured by the ratio of exports to GDP – was between 40-50% in the 1990s and peaked at 58.5% 
in 2006 (Lumiste, Pefferly and Purju 2008, p. 24). “Estonian enterprises had to substantially change the character of 
their products. Many enterprises changed from being manufacturers of final or semi-final products to being 
subcontractors of Western firms [especially in Finland and Sweden]. Raw materials (unprocessed wood, scrap metals, 
textiles, and agriculture) formed a very large share of Estonian exports” (ibid, pp. 24). In 1999, Estonia became a 
member of the WTO and the supply of finance available to enterprises and consumers from banks increased 
considerably with changes in bank ownership, falling interest rates, and a widening range of financial products 
(Smallbone/Venesaar 2003, p. 77). The most attractive area for foreign investments during the period of 1995-2006 
have been real estate, renting, and business activities with 29,8%, financial intermediation 28,1%, and manufacturing 
17,5% (Lumiste, Pefferly and Purju 2008, p. 13), resulting in short-term boom effects, but hindering the rise of a long-
term innovation strategy (see below). 
However, the results of this experiment have astonished the world: An 8% average annual GDP growth since 2000 
(until the financial crisis), a strong decrease in poverty and inequality, low unemployment, low inflation, and rapidly 
improved living standards can be seen as a proof of a successful “catching-up” strategy. The government’s budget was 
not only balanced, but it ran a strong surplus, and many new, export-oriented factories were established. This boosted 
competition and led to modernization. The free market doctrine reigned (and still reigns), and Estonia liberalized its 
capital movements even further than required by EU accession (Lumiste/Pefferly/Purju 2008, p. 19). Furthermore, due 
to the Free Trade Agreements with Finland and Sweden, replaced later by the Free Trade Agreement and Association 
Agreement with the EU, the trade with Western Europe made up two-thirds of trade in the 2000s and Estonia received 
EU membership. 
But the crisis hit Baltic States hard. As we have shown, the crisis can be interpreted as a Schumpeterian problem of 
simultanous downswings, which occurred by the fall of the 5th Kondratieff (Otter/Siemon 2012, in this volume). The 
stable ground of a free market strategy allowing an enourmous influx of FDIs “created highly fertile grounds for short-
term asset booms and so particulary during the early 2000s, large amounts of foreign investment and private lending 
went into financing of consumption and real estate booms” (Kattel 2009, p. 10). Kattel illustrates that the Baltic states 
have moved into a situation of speculative (maybe widening to Ponzi) financing: “The small open [Baltic] economies 
were flushed with foreign capital, became quickly overleveraged and are now paying the price” (ibid, p. 1). From an 
evoutionary standpoint, Estonia’s catching-up process was led by learning processes, imitation effects, and input-led 
growth as a by-product of more or less non-innovative activity. We suppose that the catching-up process will be further 
blocked if no self-created entrepreneurial activity can be achieved. This kind of “learning“ will be particularly important 
in order to cope with intrinsic problems of secondary wave effects that follow a Schumpeterian downswing. The GDP 
in Estonia fell by 3.6% in 2008 and a further 14.1% in 2009. Unemployment is currently at 18.6% (second quarter 
2010). Despite these hardships, however, the Estonian government kept budget deficits low, and Estonia joined the euro 
zone on January 1, 2011. 
Seen from a Schumpeterian standpoint, liberalization guaranteed, of course, a certain culture of seed for catching-up 
during the last two decades. This kind of “big-bang-transformation” after the collapse of the Soviet Union, might have 
                                                 
3
 In the Index of Economic Freedom, Estonia in 2007 was, despite certain constraints from EU, still the twelfth freest economy in the 
world. In 2002 it ranked fourth! 
4
 In this context the Department of Foreign Trade of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs played an important role in the harmonization of 
legal acts related to international trade. Furthermore, it acted as a coordinator of measures to integrate Estonia into the EU and the 
WTO and to build relationships with, for example, the European Free Trade Association (EFTA). Lumiste, Pefferly and Purju (2008, 
P. 18) state that the “Department has been the most liberal of all the institutions that influenced the regulations of foreign trade.”  
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been the best choice, thereby causing an increase in productivity in fields once belonged to the low-productivity legacy 
of the Soviet period (Tiits et al. 2003, p. 16).5 Those entrepreneurial forces lay fallow, and have been released to typical 
learning processes within a process of catching up (see Abramowitz 1986). Hence, the lab of liberalization generally has 
helped to establish a vital atmosphere of entrepreneurial activities.6 This way of development seems to be typical for 
transition countries in general, as MacMillan/Woodruff (2002, p. 168) state: “The entrepreneurs in the transition 
countries exemplify Smith’s dictum [of the invisible hand]. By creating jobs, supplying consumer goods, constraining 
the market power of the state firms and building reform momentum, they have produced real welfare gains.” The region 
is still one of the easiest places in the world to start up a business, requiring only 6.2 procedures on average to register a 
new company. Furthermore, the Baltic Sea region generally grants its employers great flexibility in hiring and firing 
their workforce (Varblane/Mets/Andrijevskaja 2010, p. 8). The economy still benefits from a strong electronic and 
telecommunication sector (“E-stonia”). But successful firms like Skype, Playtech Ltd., Rate.ee or Helmes Ltd. are 
influenced strongly by the involvement of foreign partners. None of these projects have been started as a spin-off 
project by academic entrepreneurship “Made in Estonia” (Lumiste/Pefferly/Parju 2008, p. 36).  
However, this entrepreneurial activity was more or less short-term and less innovation orientated due to the lack of a 
targeted Schumpeterian policy approach intended to establish long-term comparative advatages (see below). 
Schumpeterian effects of a secondary wave have occured in Estonia expounding that the growth processes were led by 
mainly non-innovative input impulses: “Thus, in the context of lowered risk-perception, abolished trade restriction, and 
aggressive lending activity by foreign banks, extensive use of easy credit drove economic expansion by financing 
consumption as well as real estate bubble, and resulted in skyrocketing asset prices that have enabled debt-led growth” 
(COSTAction 2011, p. 3). Furthermore, the Estonian economy became stuck in specializing in short-term comparative 
advantages due to FDI calculations: cheap labor intensive (textile) and resource intensive (timber) industries with only 
low innovative potential. Hence, from the very beginning of this catch-up process, the influx of FDIs created “highly 
fertile grounds for short-term asset booms” and led to “financial fragility,” which “locks these small economies into 
specific innovations that target low value-added sectors and activities” (Kattel 2009, p. 15).7 Although all political 
forces declared their support to business, sometimes even to SMEs, and private ownership became dominant, the 
influence of entrepreneurship policy has been rather modest (Smallbone/Venesaar 2003). Moreover, the entrepreneurial 
spirit in Estonia remained at a low level, as has been shown by international comparisons (Varblane/Mets/Andrijevskaja 
2010, pp. 11)8. 
Despite the fact that the supply of finance available to enterprises from banks has increased considerably since 1994, 
access to capital by commercial banks in Estonia – like in every other country – was (and still is) very limited, due to 
                                                 
5
 An interesting case study shows how the Estonian company Tarmeko has been forced to change its entrepreneurial direction in the 
woodworking and furniture industry by immediate diversification and rapid restructuring. Upstream, the supply of wood and other 
inputs (paint, glue, rubber, etc.) from Soviet sources was almost completely cut and had to be replaced with hard currency purchases. 
Downstream, the whole distribution system collapsed. In a couple of months, the demand for the chipboard desks shrank from 500 a 
day to a couple dozen. Tarmenko rapidly traced a path of developing new products that international distributors were demanding, 
from very simple products (e.g. wooden chairs) to more sophisticated products (e.g. leather sofas). In 1993 Tarmeko sold 88 % of its 
products mainly to Western Europe, while in 1991 96 % still had been shipped to the Soviet Union. This process of change 
management was accompanied by a management buy-out in 1994 initiated by the Estonian Privatization Enterprise (von 
Hirschhausen/Hui 1995, pp. 435). Tarmeko still exists - www.tarmeko.ee! 
6
 In 2004, for example, the number of active enterprises was 40,627 and the number of active sole traders was 50,260 amongst the 1.4 
million inhabitants in Estonia. Tallinn, the capital of Estonia, and its surrounding Harju county dominate the economic life of 
Estonia; more than half of Estonian businesses are registered there (Varblane/Mets/Andrijevskaja 2010, p. 13). 
7
 See Kattel (2004, p. 402), who has already alluded to several statistical analyses that traditonal Estonian sectors have become more 
efficient since the early 1990s. From a dynamic perspective, however, the long-term innovation orientation has diminished: “While 
technological complexity has increased, the relative share of value added in the output of Estonian companies was greater in the year 
1994 than in the year 2001.” Furthermore, he has confirmed that “a substantial part of revenues and, correspondingly, of the higer 
wages and improved living standard generated by these effective agricultural and other resource-intensive Estonian producers, does 
not remain in Estonia or create any additional specialization in Estonia, but is transferred back from where the relevant technologies 
originated” (ibid, p. 405). 
8
 See Varblane/Mets/Andrijevskaja (2010, p. 11), who refer to the Global Entrepreneurship Monitor’s concept (“Total 
Entrepreneurial Activity Index”) and state that this index in Estonia is very low. The level of subsistence entrepreneurship, however, 
“is low as well and reflects the advancements also in the level of income in Estonia. The position of Estonia is rather typical for a 
country with the upper middle income level”. Furthermore, they refer to other surveys illustrating that Estonia’s population in general 
is not highly interested in becoming an entrepreneur, thereby giving Estonia the position at the very end of a long list of countries. 
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insufficient collateral and a lack of a track record (Smallbone/Vanesaar 2003, p. 77). The Estonian system of formal 
venture capital industry has developed significant problems during the last two decades.9 There is not a sufficient 
number of competent seed and start-up investors in the formal and informal financing sector. This is mainly due to the 
fact that the history of the venture capital market providing seed and start-up capital for innovative firms is quite short. 
Most investments are channeled into growing companies and seldom into start-ups. Venture capital firms as well as 
business angels are reluctant to support local RTDI business projects due to the high risks (Nedeva/Georghiou 2003) 
due to a lack of fruitful entrepreneurial compencies in the financial sphere. These types of investment are not only 
important for providing capital, but for their evolutionary effects by acting as a sounding board and giving feedback to 
entrepreneurs (Siemon 2006). The well-known successs story of VC investing in Estonian knowledge-based economy is 
Skype, which was financed by foreign investors and sold to eBay for 4.1 billion US dollars in 2005. Skype’s technology 
is based on software created by four Estonians and commercialized by a Scandinavian team. Interestingly, still no 
scientific survey about the amount and quality of a vital business angels market in Estonia exist at all. This is probably 
due to the fact that Estonia has failed to establish the necessary culture of financial entrepreneurship by recycling the 
capital and entrepreneurial experience from entrepreneurs who have been successful during the 1990s.10  
However, the structure of the VC industry has become more organized.  In 2009, the Estonian Venture Capital 
Association (EstVCA) has been established (nudged by the Estonian Development Fund) as an umbrella organisation 
for Estonian VC firms and business angels. Generally, however, the Estonian formal and informal Venture Capital has 
not been analyzed thouroughly.11 
Well known theoretical aspects were adducted in order to provide financial support for innovative entrepreneurs due to 
their role as job- and growth-creating machines (“gazelles” in terms of Kirchhoff). Hence, an institutional framework 
for innovation policy has been established in the late 1990s in order to organize the responsibilities between the 
different political institutions regarding planning innovation oriented programmes (see figure 1).12 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
9
 According to a study of EVCA, the private equity investments amounted in 2005 just to 0.004 percent of GDP in 2004, whereas the 
average percentage in Europe was at 0.32%. In 2008 (0.088%), the picture remains nearly the same (2007 the Estonia Development 
Fund was established, thereby the data amounted 0.332%). Estonia is at the bottom of private equity investments in Central and 
Eastern Europe, just leaving Slovakia, Slovenia, Serbia and Bosnia&Herzogowina behind. This might be one hint for an 
underdeveloped venture capital industry (accompanied with a strong need and desire for foreign direct investments). From a 
Schumpeterian standpoint, however, the role of financing innovations is not just a matter of quantity, but of quality (cp. Siemon 
2006). 
10
 See Varblane, Mets and Adrijevskaja (2010, p. 28): “The basis for private venture funding raised as the result of sale of own 
successful companies by entrepreneurs established businesses (...). Mainly these entrepreneurs have invested afterward their money 
into new businesses of the same sector they were experienced. That means, although, 15 years after starting private business there is 
not the big number of grown in Estonia investors having competency in knowledge-based entrepreneurship”  
11
 A study of Köomägi and Sander (2006), based on detailled theoretical background, has shown that, for example, the small VC 
market in Estonia does not offer the opportunity to use syndication. Furthermore, traditional concepts of staged and convertable 
investments are used rarely and complicated financing structures in the stages are used seldom. 
12
 The figure contains older denotations in terms of “Ministry of Education” (now: “Education and Research”) and “Ministry of 
Economic Affairs (now: “Economic Affairs and Communication”) 
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Figure 1: Institutional Framework of Estonian Innovation Policy 
 
Source:  Varblane/Mets/Adrijevskaja (2010, p. 23; based on Reid 2003) 
Estonia’s process of catching up has shown some successful aspects since implementing this more innovation-
orientated approach. Of course, it is difficult to measure the innovativeness of a state due to certain methodological, 
statistical and paradigmatical problems (neoclassical input-logic vs. Schumpeterian development-logic approach etc.). 
Due to the innovation approach of the Lisbon strategy, the European Innovation Scoreboard (EIS) has been published 
annually since 2001 to track and benchmark the relative innovation performance of EU states.13 For Estonia, the 
innovation performance in 2008 was just below the EU 27 average but the rate of improvement is above. Estonia’s 
relative strength are in finance and support, firm investments, linkages & entrepreneurship, and innovators, while 
relative weaknesses are stated in scientific throughputs (patents, trademarks, designs, etc.).14 However, some problems 
of implementing the so-called “knowledge triangle” (education, research, innovation) still remain (Kirch 2010, p. 276). 
The period from 2000 to 2007 saw a rapid increase in GDP while it dropped in 2008. Estonian GDP was 45% of the EU 
average in 2000 and increased to 68% by 2008. The accumulation of human capital might be one important (input-logic 
orientated) aspect for developing countries to catch up to the EU average level, as Kirch (2010, p. 274) states. However, 
accumulation of human capital as an input-factor as well as entrepreneruship itself cannot be a lasting cornerstone of 
economic development if some kind of innovation (combining given factor endowments, e.g. R&D, natural resoruces in 
a new way) and evolution (learning skills how to innovate or being any other kind of entrepreneur) are lacking (see 
chapter below).  
II.2 The Estonian Turnaround: From “No-Policy Policy” to Innovation Policy 
Regarding innovation policy, Estonia has followed a policy of non-intervention during the 1990s: “Estonia has been an 
interesting case of the country, which has since regaining its independence moved ahead without having defined its 
innovation policy and one could define Estonian innovation policy as ‘no-policy policy’ (term proposed by Kalvet et al., 
2002)” (Varblane/Mets/Adrijevskaja 2010, p. 20). The first watershed from the free market doctrine to an innovation 
policy approach, thereby covering different forms of financial and institutional interventions, can be registered in the 
late 1990s.  
                                                 
13
 The methodology hass been revised recently since the number of dimensions increased to seven (human resources and 
finance/support in the first group, “Enablers,” firm investments, linkages/entrepreneurship and throughtputs within the second group, 
“Firm Activities” and innovators, economic effects within the group of “Outputs” (see e.g. EIS 2009, Kirch 2010). 
14
 In EIS-report 2009, Estonia is called a moderate innovator ranking considerably in front of Latvia and Lithuania, their Baltic 
counterparts, ranking in the weakest group of innovation (“catching up countries”) (EIS 2009, p. 8). 
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The entrepreneurship and innovation policy since 1990 can be characterized by the following milestones (cp. Kuura 
2006; Smallbone/Venesaar 2003, Varblane/Mets/Adrijevskaja 2010, pp. 19; Karo 2010; Kirch 2010; Reid/Walendowski 
2006; Kristapsons/Martinson/Dagyte 2003, pp. 139):  
 From 1992 to 1998, the Swedish Organization NUTEK implemented a project called: „Support to Regional 
Development in Estonia through Business Development.“ The main aim of the project was to support the 
establishment of three regional business centres (Vóru, Viljandi und Jóvi) in order to stimulate private small 
business in economically depressed regions; 
 In 1993, the EU PHARE programme started to support the Business Advisory Service (BAS) centres; four 
centres were established in major Estonian cities (Tallinn, Tartu, Narva and Pärnu). At the same time, the 
programme “Estonian Jobs and Society” (J&S) was started with Finish support and based on a concept that 
larger business would promote the establishment of smaller enterprises; thus four business centres were 
implemented in Tallinn, Harjumaar, Hiiumaa and Saaremaa; 
 In 1994, the “State Support of Enterprise Act” was passed; it did not mention SMEs explicitly, but set out 
certain criterias that have been used since then, e.g. the number of 80 employees. The EU funded project 
“Technical Assistance for SMEs in Estonia” was implemented as well; 
 The “Rural Development Foundation,” under the Ministry of Agriculture, was founded in 1993 in order to 
support economic development in rural areas by long-term loans, granting of leases, and specific support 
services; 
 In 1997, the Estonian Regional Development Agency (ERDA) was established as an „umbrella“ organization. 
Its main tasks have been to implement the government’s regional programmes as well as the programme 
“Business Support Networks (BSN)” as independent but closely related and co-operating institutions; 
 In 2000, “Enterprise Estonia”15 (Budget 2005: 98 mill Euro) was introduced as a new “umbrella”16 agency and 
the Estonian Credit and Export Guarantee Fund (KredEx) was founded as an institution to support SMEs’ 
financing situations and to decrease export-related credit risks; 
 In 1998, the R&D Council initiated the work towards an “Estonian R&D strategy” collaboratively prepared by 
the Ministry of Education (now Education and Research), the Ministry of Economic Affairs (now Economic 
Affairs and Communications), and the Estonian Academy of Science. In 1999, the Estonian Science 
Foundation and the Estonian Academy of Sciences were accepted as members of the European Science 
Foundation (ESF), a pan-European body for promoting management and regulation of solid scientific practice 
in the European Research Area. In 2003, Estonia participated in five ESF research programmes 
(Kristapsons/Martinson/Dagyte 2003, p. 150); 
 The major improvement of policy-level thinking started since late 1990s due to the aforementioned 
developments. Two documents about the Estonian innovation policy were prepared by the R&D Council, the 
ministries, and the Estonian Academies of Sciences in order to promote a set of general policy priorities (e.g. 
the improvement of quality of product and services, development of innovative products based on local R&D, 
creation of innovation networks): The Estonian State Innovation Programme (approved in June 1998) and the 
National Development Plan for the years 2000-2002 (1999). Unfortunately, neither of these were actually 
                                                 
15
 “Enterprise Estonia” (EE) was established due to some problems that arose by the policy path traced before. A PHARE report 
states that the plurality of private and public institutions (Chamber of Commerce and Industry, Estonian Small Business Association, 
Investment Agency, Trade Promotion Agency, Tourism Board) – additionally to BSN – involved in the process of supporting 
entrepreneurship were accompanied with problems of coordination and responsibilities. EE was started as a foundation subordinated 
to the Ministry of Economic Affairs and encompasses all aforementioned agencies, i.e. integrating ERDA in 2001. In 2003, the 
functional organized subunits of EE were reorganized into three divisions: the Business Start up Division, the Business Development 
Division and the Busines and Living Environment Division (Kuura 2006, pp. 469; Varblane/Mets/Adrijevskaja 2010, p. 23). 
16
 Programmes like NUTEK or PHARE were relatively well financed, while others (e.g. J&S) were plagued by limited resources. 
Thus, the need to consolidate was felt in Estonia. (Kuura 2006, p. 468). 
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implemented due to the lack of resources (Varblane/Mets/Adrijevskaja 2010, p. 20; 
Kristapsons/Martinson/Dagyte 2003, p. 150); 
 In 2000, the White Paper on the strategy of R&D in Estonia for 2001-2006 “Knowledge Based Estonia” was 
accepted by the government. Referring to this, R&D activities – partly financed by EU structural funds – were 
supported in order to establish a research, technology development, and innovation (RTDI) policy. The 
government prepared two related programmes (the inno-awareness and the spin-off programme). Thereby it 
became a commitment to Lisbon Strategy’s requirements in order to preserve the European welfare model (cp. 
Rodrigues, 2003).17 The Estonian Technology Agency (ESTAG) was founded in 2000 in order to implement 
this innovation policy. The Estonian strategy set out two main objectives: (1) Updating the pool of knowledge 
by raising the quality and level of scientific research and (2) increasing the competitiveness of enterprises. The 
implementation was done by four key lines of action (Reid/Walendowski 2006, p. 9): 
o Financing research and development, such as the increase in total expenditures on R&D from 0.9% in 
2003 to 1.5% of GDP by 2008; 
o Development of human capital by reinforcing and complementing the national educational system 
strategy (“Learning Estonia”); 
o Increasing the effectiveness of R&D and innovation systems by raising awareness, bridging structures 
between industry and research, supporting spin-offs, etc.; 
o International co-operation by strengthening Estonian participation in international R&D networks. 
 The “SPINNO programe” was introduced 2001 for the enhancement of the commercialization capacities and 
activities of public research institutions. More specifically, it had the following objectives: (a) to increase the 
exploitation rate of the results of research carried out in Estonian universities and R&D instituitions, (b) to 
develop an evironment favourable to entrepreneurial activities in Estonian Universities and R&D institutions, 
(c) to develop co-operation between Estonian universities and R&D institutions in supporting knowledge-
intensive entrepreneurial activity (SQW 2003, p. 1). EE and the Ministry of Economic Affairs and 
Communications (MEAC) provide grants in form of co-financing for public research institutes for the creation 
of spin-off organizations and capacities.18 After the period 2001-2006, the programme has been continued for 
the period 2007-2013 (Brighton/Kells 2007); 
 The R&D Financing Programme was established in 2001 (budget for the first period 2001-2003: 15.3 mill. 
euro) in order to support R&D activities in industry as well as research institutes. The programme contains 
three sub-instruments: (1) support for feasibility studies, (2) applied research support for R&D institutions, and 
(3) applied research and/or product development support and loans for companies (for an overview of the main 
conditions of granting support see Kalvert/Jürgensson (2009, pp. 3).19 The objective of the renewed 
“Knowledge-based Estonia” strategy 2007-2013 is to increase Estonia’s R&D investments by 2014 to 3% of 
the GDP; 
                                                 
17
 This was a result of reorganization of “The Innovation Foundation,” the first, but hardly noteworthy, organization supporting R&D 
established 1991. The understanding of innovation policy was extended during 1990s from project-base activity to a more systematic 
understanding of innovation. In 2004, a strategy document “Estonian Success 2014” was passed containing the aim to double 
Estonian GDP by 2014, increase productivity by 80%, and increase employment rate up to 70% of labour age poulation. 
18
 During the period 2001-2003, three projects have been provided at Tallinn University of Technology (TUT), Tartu University 
(together with Estonian Agricultural University and Tartu Science Park), and for BioSpinno as a sector wide project (including, for 
example, the Estonian BioCentre, Instititute of Chemical and Biological Physics, Tartu Biotechnology Park, and the Estonian Gene 
Centre); this was subsequently extended to seven projects during the second round of funding awarded in 2004. 
19
 “The goal is to apply the developed technologies and innovations in business, thus increasing the effectiveness and improving the 
performance figures of the company implementing the project and the Estonian business sector on the whole” (EAS 2001, cited in: 
Kalvet/Jürgenson 2009, p. 3). Kalvet and Jürgenson have shown that input and output additionality of this programme turned out to 
be generally low without claiming to cut off R&D granting schemes, because of changes in enterprises’ behaviour and 
entrepreneurial attitude. (ibid, p. 17).  
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 The Competence Centres Programme (launched in 2002) has become one of the main innovation policy 
measures in order to bridge the science and technology spheres of the innovation system. The need for a 
qualitative shift of core capabilities was established by eight centres including about 100 enterprises (mostly 
SMEs) and covering different fields of biotechnology (food, medicine), nanotechnology, ICT (hardware and 
software solutions), and machine technologies. The public budget for the 2007-2013 period is approximately 
58 million EUR (Karo 2010, p. 189). Due to this, also some programmes of entrepreneurship education at 
universities, e.g. at Tallin University of Technology and Tartu University have been implemented during the 
last decade; 
 The “Estonian Development Fund” started in 2007 as a think tank in order to lead Estonian economic 
restructuring and is based on the Estonian Development Fund Act (2006). Recently, it triggered the ambitious 
programme “Growth Vision 2018.”20 
In , the National Technology Programme started in order to concentrate the R&D support measures into areas in which 
Estonia has the potential to thrive in international competition. For this purpose, the Ministry of Economic Affairs and 
Communications, together with the Ministry of Education and Research, planned to launch state-level technology 
programmes in areas of national priority. The first state programme to be started was the national Energy Technology 
Programme (ETP).21 In addition to the ETP, programmes in the fields of biotechnology and information technology 
have been or are about to be launched. 
II.3 A Schumpeterian Evaluation: Short- vs. Long-Term Competiveness in Estonia 
Especially the “Knowledge Based Estonia” strategy can be regarded as a milestone in Estonian RTDI policy: “It 
contributed to shifting attention of policy-makers from a ‘laissez-faire’ (free market) approach to economic policy 
towards the need to invest significantly greater public and private resources in boosting higher valued added activities” 
(Reid/Walendowski 2006, p. 12). Based on a firm’s life cycle approach, the following (figure 2) illustrates how 
different kinds of innovation and entrepreneurship policies are targeted to the different tiers of a firm’s innovation 
process. Thereby, the problems of financing innovations (and entrepreneurship in general) by public efforts can be 
viewed closer from a Schumpeterian standpoint.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
20
 The public fund aims to do 6-8 investments a year and is targeted to early stage Estonian companies with an ambitous international 
expansion plan, a sustainable, unique competitive advantage, a strong team, scalable technology/business model, and a clear exit 
path. Furthermore, investments into foreign companies are possible, provided their headquarters are established in Estonia and if they 
bring R&D activity to Estonia. The fund is a full member of the European Private Equity & Venture Capital Association (EVCA) and 
was basically endowed with 36.8 mil. € (“Arengufond”). Therefore, the state-owned shares in AS Eesti Telecom, equivalent to at 
least 3 percent participation, were transferred to the fund from its start as the backbone of its investment capital. Investments are 
alway made jointly with co-investors in order to avoid crowding out effects. The fund contains a team of 15 experts, a supervisory 
council (9 members) and an international expert commitee (7 experts). Furthermore, the first attempts to establish a formal network 
of business angels was supported in 2009 (see www.arengufond.ee) 
21
 This programme was launched in order to concentrate the R&D and innovation priorities of the Estonian energy sector, to 
determine the directions of Estonian energy education available, to improve the efficiency and transparency of financial resources, 
which already have been allocated in the field of energy, to improve inter-ministry cooperation in the field of energy, and to improve 
cooperation between the state and the energy sector, and within the energy sector. 
Cord Siemon / Nils Otter 
 
 107
Figure 2: Innovation Policy in Estonia 
 
Source: Survey “Financing of Estonian innovation system” (Zernike Group 2004, p. 82)  
In sum, it can be concluded that Estonia has made considerable effort in order to establish a framework of innovation 
policy. What we would like to do in this paragraph is to assess these initiatives critically from a Schumpeterian 
standpoint of evolutionary economics. As the literature overview has shown, the aforementioned innovation policies 
were only marginally successful. Recently established programmes might be an exception due to some learning effects, 
but taken as a whole there have been no satisfactory results.22 However, it has to be stressed that Estonia has had until 
the present the status of a moderate innovator (see above23), and it seems not to be fair to evaluate an innovation policy 
after ten years when it generally could take a long period (maybe decades in case of Kondratieff dynamics) to recognize 
the unfolding long-term impact of innovation programmes. Nevertheless, we are going to judge the Estonian activity by 
some reflections with regard to Schumpeterian theories and policy practices. Hence, the following section is not 
dedicated to trivialize the aforementioned Estonian efforts, but to provide a more detailed evaluation by differentiating 
four interrelated aspects: 
1. Inappropriate techniques and the addressing of innovation programmes; 
2. Strong relationship to an “input-logic” driven growth theory; 
3. Programmes are strongly involved within a free trade paradigm allowing an influx of FDIs in low value-added 
industries and thereby hindering the raise of dynamic comparative advantages; 
4. Programmes can be seen as a camouflage, hiding a lack of entrepreneurial culture within the institutional 
sphere of political administration. 
Ad 1) One can state that some of the Estonian initiatives have been viewed critically because of technical aspects 
(Zernike Group, 2004): Payments are mainly spent retrospectively, thus entrepreneurs still need to raise money for early 
stage investments to take part in subsidy programmes. In case of applied research grants and feasibility study grants, 
they are used in tier 3 instead of tier 1 and 2. Thus, an entrepreneur needs to have 50% of the capital by himself. 
Furthermore, the applied research grants and KredEx guaranteed loans are usually paid in cooperation with banks As 
Smallbone and Venesaar (2003) have shown, only a very small number of firms benefit from or are even aware of these 
                                                 
22
 As mentioned above, the Total Entrepreneurial Activity Index is still low. Within the Estonian economy, medium and high-tech 
innovations play only a minor role within the entrepreneurial scenery. Using comparative data from the Eurostat database, Varblane, 
Mets and Adrijevskaja (2010, p. 14) state: “The share of firms from the high or medium-high technology branches of industry 
composed 13% of all firms in Estonia. (...) Only two other Baltic countries – Latvia and Lithuania had also very low level of this type 
of firms.” 
23
 Schumpeter gave a broad concept of innovation containing five cases (see article above). Christensen (2000) gives theoretically 
based insights that incremental innovations can lead into a situation of an Innovator’s Dilemma. In the case of Estonia, Kattel (2009) 
has shown illustratively that statistics on Estonia’s rise during the 2000s are input- and growth related, while innovation-based 
development effects are hidden. 
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programmes. From the beginning, the reform of the Estonian research and innovation system have been carried out 
seperately by different ministries. Hence, the system was split into two independent parts (academic science and applied 
science), while the links and interactions between research and industry remained underdeveloped (Kristapsons, 
Martinson and Dagyte 2003, p. 153). Varblane, Mets and Andrijevskaja (2010, p. 41) clearly pointed out that these 
programmes have not been aimed thouroughly for Estonian economy’s needs: 
“Among other Enterprise Estonia instruments it is possible also for high-tech companies to 
apply for a 45-75% refund of company’s R&D expenditures or applied research costs. 
Unfortunately up to now the support of growing knowledge intensive firms in the fields of 
biotechnology [6th Kondratieff?] or information technology [5th Kondratieff!] is very low on 
the stage of applied research and product development”. 
Furthermore, the evaluation of aforementioned activities have shown that persons involved in funding procedures “often 
do not have the necessary expertise, and there is a lack of clarity of assessment criteria, institutions involved are highly 
fragmented and conduct overlapping projects. Overall amounts of RTDI financing in Estonia is not sufficient to develop 
a knowledge-based economy” (Varblane/Mets/Adrijevskaja 2010, p. 27).24 Moreover, Reid and Walendowski (2006, 
pp. 12) have figured out that the Knowledge Based Estonian strategy contained a number of weak points and missing 
links: 
1. Despite identification of key areas, mechanisms for the selection of R&D institutions were not clearly 
identified and the responsibilty for pushing forward analysis on the key technology fields was too ambigous; 
2. While the strategy clearly argued for the need to ensure support to the new and additional demands for R&D 
and innovations not only in high technology sectors but also in traditional manufacturing sectors, the measures 
tend to focus on a small group of higher technology companies and there were no explicit sectoral actions 
foreseen; 
3. The principle focus of most human capital and R&D measures was the investment in infrastructure or specific 
projects. The underlying assumption has been that this infrastructure will attract young people to become 
scientists and favour returns of scientists who have emigrated. Other factors such as national and international 
labour market dynamics for skilled scientists and engineers should also have been addressed. 
Furthermore, the innovation programmes SPINNO, R&D Financing and Competence Centres have been criticized 
several times regarding outcomes and direct innovation effects. However, we have to relativize these technical aspects 
from a Schumpeterian standpoint, since by moving from ‘no-policy policy’ to a ‘technical unconvinceable policy’ 
something “entrepreneurially” has happened. Albeit there has not been much success in terms of “ideal” outcomes 
(rates of patenting, returns of licensing, amount of spin-offs created), some “intermediate” outcomes have been 
observed, i.e. increasing the knowledge about commercialisation and technology transfer in research institutes, creation 
of basic legislation, procedures and technology transfer organisations (Karo 2010, p. 188; Kalvert/Jürgensson 2009, p. 
17; Brighton/Kells 2007, p. 9). Furthermore, the fact that the Parliament discussed and passed the strategy was “itself a 
significant step forward towards recognition of the role of R&D and innovation for economic and social development of 
the country” (Kristapsons, Martinson and Dagyte 2003, p. 153). 
Ad 2) Generally, Estonia’s expenditure to higher education is too low (about 60% of the average level of the EU). 
Hence, the present situation in training of highly qualified specialists is not sufficient; backwardness in training 
specialists with doctoral degree is one of the main problems (Kirch 2010, pp. 277). This is, of course, an important 
problem of pure input logic. From a Schumpeterian viewpoint, the question has to be raised “whether a knowledge 
investment target [= input logic] has a real economic significance if the local economy fails to appropriate this 
knowledge (...). It requires capacities within industry to integrate and exploit it, not to mention local finance for the 
                                                 
24
 In this context, Kattel (2004, p. 413) refers to studies that give proof that “in principle, one and the same or similar projects receive 
financing from several different sources”. These technical aspects have been also figured out by an earlier study of Nedeva and 
Georghiou (2003). 
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product development phase [development and evolutionary logic]” (Reid/Walendowski 2006, p. 14). In other words, the 
overall objective of increasing R&D expenditures to 1.5% by 2006 (and 3% by 2013) has some intrinsic weaknesses 
(ibid, pp. 13):  
In this context, it can be stated that the Estonian research funding systems have a tendency for a historical lock-in of 
funding favouring existing rather than emerging research poles. The implicit assumption of a rapid raise of private 
expenditures on R&D by enterprises (both in relative share of total R&D expenditure and in absolute terms) is doubtful, 
since this project increase does not take sufficient account of Estonia’s industry structure and its general market 
orientation. “Firms aren’t interested in increasing R&D expenditures just for the sake of it but because they expect that 
the new or improved production processes, technology concepts, or new products responding to market needs emerging 
from these activities, will improve their efficiency and hence their long term competiveness” (Reid/Walendowski 2006, 
p. 13).25 
Moreover, the strong orientation at the Finish R&D policy system is neglecting the fact that once Finland established its 
policy and their successful development decisions on so-called weak signals for Schumpeterian processes. An imitation 
of this modus operandi under different circumstances is endangered with a misleading policy approach and a waste of 
resources. Kattel (2004, pp. 414-415) has argued in this context that two essential mistakes were made in the policy 
transfer.  
“For one thing, Finland has implemented very aggressive R&D policies since the 1960s, 
where the public sector played an important role, which created essential preconditions for 
the genesis of relatively strong R&D which are aware of the needs of the economy. 
Secondly, Finland's current innovation policy programmes are based on social and 
economic signals, which refer to the existence of a firmly organised civil society, science 
and industry. Neither Estonia's science, society nor economy meets these preconditions 
today. It would be unreasonable to add more measures stimulating competition to the 
underfinanced and fragmented R&D system, while competition is basically missing and the 
interests of entrepreneurship lie elsewhere” (References and footnotes left out) 
However, while reading Estonian innovation programmes one sometimes get the impression that Schumpeter’s 
innovation perspective has been seen from an input logic perspective, like the way in that New Growth Theory has 
interpreted Schumpeter’s approach.26 The policy is more focused on the role of production factors of an innovation-
related production function than on entrepreneurial aspects causing the raise of inputs. Thereby, a linear automatism is 
presumed, which is contradictory to the evolutionary interpretation of Schumpeter’s framework (development and 
evolutionary logic).27 “Unfortunately learning is not an automatic process, but certain motivation to enter the learning 
cycle must exist” (Varblane/Mets/Adrijevskaja 2010, p. 22). An input logic approach neglects the process of 
entrepreneurial learning to reflect and applicate R&D knowledge, normally appearing as tacit knowledge. 
“Consequently the success of Estonian economy depends heavily on the capability and willingness of firms to adapt and 
utilise knowledge produced outside Estonia. We need to have skills – to understand the knowledge, be able to use it and 
to adapt it for creating new knowledge” (ibid). A main task will be to improve the human capital base and to skill it 
                                                 
25
 See also the comments of Varblane, Mets and Andrijevskaja (2010, p. 40): “Recent innovation surveys indicated that only a small 
fraction of Estonian firms innovate and most of those do so by importing capital equipment rather than by conducting basic research 
themselves or purchasing research services from Estonian or foreign research institutions. It reflects that Estonian firms are often not 
on the current technology frontier and the growth of their productivity and competiveness does not require the implementation of 
cutting edge R&D.” In the same way, Kattel claimed in 2004 (p. 414) that “to entrepreneurs almost no measures have been 
channelled in Estonia that would motivate them to invest in R&D projects.” 
26
 Some of these growth models are more or less innovation-oriented (Romer Aghion and Howitt are well known authors in this 
realm) in order to overcome Solow’s well known black-box “residual.” Nevertheless, the common ground of these models is the 
analysis of an input-stimulated growth path under specific production-technological circumstances (cp. Röpke 2006). For the 
theoretical reference to Schumpeterian Theory see above, figure 1. 
27
 In a similar way, Reid and Walendowski (2006, p. 14) argue: “This aspect of the innovation systems remains relatively ignored by 
a strategy that remains essentially linear in approach (the hypothesis that increasing research funding in Estonia will automatically 
lead to increased growth and competiveness in the countries).” 
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entrepreneurially in order to remain benefits from human capital’s and R&D’s spillover effects in Estonia. However, the 
followed path of strengthening academic entrepreneurship within the acdemic scenery still seems to be ineffective.28  
Ad 3) Estonia still follows a free trade approach in order to attract further foreign capital. One can assume that FDIs by 
themselves are not directly connected with strong backward and forward linkages (in terms of Hirschman). This might 
lead to a process of fostering short-term asset booms and triggering “Ponzi schemes waiting to happen” (Kattel 2010, p. 
3). “As foreign capital has tended to finance consumption instead of productive investments and has not generated 
positive returns or export surplus, Estonia faces problems in servicing debt and interest payments” (COST Action 2011, 
p. 5). Thus, the easy credit boom in the 2000s only “covered up deeper structural problems created through industrial 
restructuring in 1990s” (ibid, p.9).29 Varblane, Mets, and Andrijevskaja (2010, p. 8) state that “the inflow of foreign 
capital is currently still oriented toward reaping benefits from the relatively low labour costs.” Taking Ricardo’s 
theorem of comparative advantages into consideration, it can be claimed that Estonia is following a path of 
specialization on low value added activities by free trade.30 Consequently, it gets more difficult to emancipate from such 
a market-driven specialization pressure, and one has to rely on static comparative advantages and to trace a short-term 
strategy. In terms of modern evolutionary economics, only lower forms of entrepreneurial functions like routine or 
arbitrage entrepreneurship (see Röpke 2002) have to be curtailed in order to prepare the soil for Schumpeterian 
entrepreneurship. Varblane, Mets, and Andrijevskaja refer to Havas’ analysis of Hungary in order to explain the 
Estonian situation:  
“economic development can be maintained, or even accelerated, without indigenous R&D 
and innovation efforts in the short run thanks to foreign direct investment. Country opting 
for this ‘development’ path becomes not only overly dependent on foreign technologies, but 
would most likely to lose its attractiveness, too: at best becoming the ‘dumping site’ of 
outdated technologies, or even abandoned by foreign manufacturing firms altogether” (cited 
in Varblane/Mets/Andrijevskaja 2010, p. 8).  
We already described this situation by differentiating between a process of economic growth (“input logic”) and a 
process of economic development (“development logic”).31 Furthermore, if one takes into account some evolutionary 
variables of action (property rights, competencies and motivation), the dilemma of entrepreneurship in Estonia gets 
more visible. The central question thus is whether entrepreneurial competencies and motivation within the academic 
and economic sphere in Estonia can be generated under the actual circumstances (blocked learning process of catching 
up, free trade paradigm). From this perspective, the role of property rights in terms of tariff and non-tariff barriers have 
to be reconsidered, at least if one wants to create an atmosphere where dynamic comparative advantages can be 
achieved. McClelland’s “achievement theory” and its implications – task difficulty perceived as too high for 
Schumpeterian entrepreneurs thereby blocking the rise of entrepreneurial competencies necessary for innovative areas – 
                                                 
28
 Varblane, Mets, and Adrijevskaja (2010, p. 27) have noted: “Even though the two mentioned universities [Tartu University and 
Tallinn University of Technology] are relatively strong in basic research their commercialization competencies are not yet fully 
developed, and their training for entrepreneurship is insufficiently integrated in study curriculum”. 
29
 By 2008, 15 out of 17 banks were foreign-owned with an asset share of 98.2%. Hence, “the Estonian economy was turned into a 
bubble economy, where foreign capital was directed into services, financial intermediation, real estate, and other businesses that by 
targeting domestic markets with non-tradable goods do not generate foreign currency earnings, but induce inflationary speculative-
led growth” (COST Action 2011, p. 2). 
30
 See Reid and Walendowski (2006, p. 32): “[T]he economy remains dominated by labour intensive sectors of production, which are 
already losing competiveness (textile, furniture). Low value added intermediate products dominate Estonian exports unlikely to 
create sustained longer term growth due to the relatively low importance of medium and high-technology sectors (both 
manufacturing and services), this is evident in terms of employment figures.” 
31
 Statistics generally are not able to detect the development logic effects (and problems) behind input-related growth processes (see 
above, figure 1). In case of Estonia, Kattel clearly states: ”The underlying cause why so many policy analysts and economists missed 
what is going on in these activities [FDIs] is hidden in the very nature of modularity in production. What are statistically captured as 
high technology products may in reality be very different in nature: it can be touchscreens for iPhones or it can be assembled mobile 
phones for any brand mobile producer. Both show up as high technology statistics, yet the former is a product at the beginning of its 
life cycle and the latter has clearly reached maturity. (...) Thus, even if high technology exports have been growing in developing 
countries, this does not mean that we deal with similarly dynamic sectors with significant increasing returns and forward and 
backward linkages. Not realizing this changing technological nature of production became one of the key fallacies for the Baltic 
States and their chosen economic policy model” (Kattel 2009, pp. 8-9). 
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can be mentioned regarding the establishment of an innovation system under free market circumstances; “many 
knowledge-based small enterprises and spin-offs are unable to achieve a critical mass because of an unfavourable 
environment; they have a short lifetime and weak business plans, they create little know-how and even fewer products, 
thus having very little impact on both the development of global technology and innovation in the local economic 
environment” (Tiits et al 2002, p.45). 
In his interesting analysis, Marek Tiits states that “the introduction of proactive foreign investment strategy is one of the 
most effective means in a small country to rapidly increase the knowledge intensity of the economy. However, the 
Estonian innovation policy (...) has underestimated the power and role of such proactive strategies.” According to this, 
Tiits claims for “much better focusing of the activities of foreign investment agencies and closer co-ordination of FDI 
strategies with education, research, employment and other policies” (Tiits 2007, p. 324). Hence, an important issue for a 
country in and after a catching up process like Estonia is determining “which unique competitive advantages are 
available and how new ones could be created – in other words, what could be the future international specialization of 
the given economy” (ibis, p. 333). By implementing a free market policy, it is evident that due to the absence of capital 
restrictions the main tools that are available for policy makers include traditional macroeconomics or FDI policies. 
Following an innovation policy by controlling and directing useful and less useful FDIs by tariff and non-tariff barriers 
resp. techniques32 requires political and economical “development decisions, and thereby decisions about possible 
future specialization of an economy depend largely on the existence of a comprehensive shared vision of a country’s 
future. Even though it is clear from economic theory [containing a dynamic perspective] that it is more beneficial to 
specialize in rapidly growing high productivity industries (...)” (Tiits 2007, p. 333). 
In this context, the sophisticated and important analysis „Made by Estonia“ by Tiits, Kattel and Kalvet (2006) has 
shown that after the first phase of catching up by liberalization and start up boom the industry is threatened to get stuck 
in low-added activity by focusing on static comparative advantages. A long-term innovation strategy has to take this 
into consideration:  
„(...) Estonian innovation policy does not currently provide any effective mechanisms to 
influence the factors that hinder productivity growth in wood processing or electronic 
industry [= static comparative advantage], which have greatest impact on our economic 
growth and exports. Neither are there any schemes that would specifically support the 
emergence of new high technology economic sectors [= dynamic comparative advantage]“ 
(Tiits, Kattel and Kalvet 2006, p. 92). 
Development theory and policy therefore examine the conditions under which decisions can be made, either through 
pacing devices or inducement mechanisms (Hirschman 1958, p. 26). To integrate those elements we have to break out 
of the dominant neoclassical paradigm (factor endowment and input logic) in order to focus on the entrepreneurial 
process of combining input factors. An increase in export per se is not enough to induce economic growth (or 
development), since exporting low priced products only contributes enough to secure minimal wages (Tiits et al. 2003, 
p. 6). Furthermore, economic history reveals several problems related to relying on natural resources under free market 
pressure (Dutch Disease, Efficient Poverty etc.; see Siemon 2010).  
Ad 4) The political response to R&D policy has varied from time to time, depending on the ideological attitude of the 
government. During the early 1990s, first official statements with regard to the importance of scientific R&D activity 
remained on paper – ‘Big science’ could wait (Kristapsons, Martinson and Dagyte 2003, p. 139). Consequently, 
Estonian expenditures on R&D have hovered around 0.5-0.6% (in terms of GDP). The policy system in general could 
be characterized by a lack of scientific and entrepreneurial attitude. Hence, in combination with a free market stance 
and the reluctance of resources, there was no drivetrain to engage in these fields actively. Rather, the scientific 
community failed to establish contacts and promote a dialogue with policy-makers (ibid, pp. 140-142).  
                                                 
32
 Examples include quantitative restrictions on the allocation of bank portfolios in certain areas and the use of foreign borrowings, 
ceilings on short-term influxes, limits on loan-to-colleteral value ratios on mortgage lending, adjustable capital adequacy ratios and 
risk weights, and so on (COST Action 2011, p. 2 and the references given there).  
A Baltic Tiger in a Gilded Cage – A Schumpeterian View on Innovation Policy in Estonia 
 112
During the first years, the Department of Foreign Trade played a central role in the harmonization of various legal acts 
and acted as a coordinator of measures to integrate Estonia into the EU and the WTO (Lumiste, Pefferly and Purja 
2007, p.17). At this time, there was a so-called ‘window of opportunity:’ “Soviet Estonia had no Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs and hence no political history. (...) In the early 1990s the department employed many young people who did not 
have the burden of associations with the old system.” At first glance, this could have been an ideal situation for the 
implementation of a Schumpeterian innovation policy. As has been shown by historical examples, some states did 
successfully create novel know-how and innovation (Reinert 2008). Tiits et. al (2003, p. 46) even go further when they 
postulate that the government is obliged  
“to change, reform and readjust institutions and environment (legislation, the educational system, etc.) and to 
demonstrate innovation in policy making.” The well-meant strategy “Knowledge-based Estonia,” however, was just a 
framework; the real implementation needs an entrepreneurial attitude within the political sphere. Kattel (2004) has 
argued impressively that Estonia’s R&D system has been based too much on market-orientated competition and 
partnerships as a core policy aim, but has lacked the tools to create sustainable state capacity to support technological 
development. In regard to this, Tiits, Kattel and Kalvet (2006, p. 21) identify a strong misjudgement of policy makers 
due to the strong input logic interpretation of the innovation process: “Even if Estonia did manage to rapidly increase its 
investments to the level of 3-4 per cent of GDP, we would still remain but a very modest contestant on the international 
scale. Yet Estonia’s existing research and innovation policy has undertaken to follow the assumption that Estonia is just 
as big a player as the US or the European Union are.” And with regard to FDIs, they claim that ‘the right kind’ of policy 
decisions are more effective and cheaper than an input logic approach: “Implementing this strategy, however, requires 
exceptionally professional and determined public policy development; including enforcement of convergence between 
the policy of attracting high technology focused foreign direct investments and the existing structure of economy, and a 
proactive technology transfer policy to ensure that the know-how accompanying the foreign direct investment actually 
gets passed on to domestic enterprises” (ibid).  
Likewise, Drechsler (2004, p. 393) states: “The key economic and development issues of today, sustainability, dynamic 
markets, innovation and technology, actually foster the role of the state for economic growth (…). The Schumpeterian, 
innovation-based world cannot be imagined without a capable state actor (…)” (ibid). Therefore, the bearer of 
development decision within the institutional landscape of innovation policy has to be endowed with entrepreneurial 
capabilities and motivation, but also provide traditional public goods. According to this, Drechsler pleads for a 
Weberian-based and Schumpeter-orientated re-interpretation of the New Public Management Approach, a management 
philosophy used by governments since the 1980s to modernise the public sector33: 
“The key to succesful PA [Public Administration] reform, vital as it is not only, but also, for 
economic growth, as well as, if you will, for good governance, is to strengthen 
administrative capacity and competence of a responsive and responsible state. The optimal 
solution for this is a genuine post-post-NPM [New Public Management] system, Weberian-
based but with the lessons from NPM learned, which – and this is not less right for being a 
cliché – puts the human person into the center of administrative decision-making. And this 
is a Neo-Weberian State, with attention to the specific local reality, and with the final goal, 
as always, of the Good Life in the Good State” (Drechsler 2005) 
Moreover, Karo (2010, p. 174) states that “the emulation of institutions may be a bigger challenge in the catching-up 
context than the emulation of technologies.”34 According to his institutional thinking, the governance of public science 
                                                 
33
 See www.wikipedia.de: “New public management is a broad and very complex term used to describe the wave of public sector 
reforms throughout the world since the 1980s. The main hypothesis in the NPM-reform wave is that more market orientation in the 
public sector will lead to greater cost-efficiency for governments, without having negative side effects on other objectives and 
considerations.” 
34
 In this context he refers to political-economic problems of an innovation policy regarding the cyclicity and the self-centred 
attitudes of politicians in order to be re-elected: “The process of emulation of governance of science and innovations systems is 
further complicated by the technological cyclicality of economic development (...) and changing cumulative understandings about 
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has gradually moved from a purely “public good” based rationale to a more “network” based rationale. The relative low 
success of Estonian innovation policy can then be interpreted “as a general weakness of the science and innovation 
system to provide basic capabilities and supporting governance structure and capacities for innovation-based economic 
restructuring” (Karo 2010, p. 185). He argues that the adoption of seemingly “successful blueprints” like the US Bay-
Dole Patent and Trademark Act of 1980, granting institutions of public science and also individual scientists the right to 
claim property rights (patent, copyrights, trademarks) of the scientific knowledge created through public funding, may 
not be successful without a perspective that contains a more systemic approach providing a historical institutional 
perspective. “The lessons from the US science and innovations system should not be learned in terms of what policies 
or what kind of reforms have been carried out, but in terms of what was the combined structural and institutional effect 
on different aspects of the governance system” (Karo 2010, p. 181). We have already stated that entrepreneurs and 
scientists complained about a lack of expertise within the sphere of public administration after they applied to attend 
innovation programmes (see above). Furthermore he states: “Although Estonia has adopted a joint Research and 
Development and Innovation Strategy, Knowledge-based Estonia, it should be only seen as a formal change in policy 
rhetoric towards a more coordinated policy arena – direct policy measures to coordinate both the design and the 
implementation of R&D&I logic like National Technology Programmes (which are merely tools of coordination) have 
not been fully implemented (first two programmes starting in 2009)” (Karo 2010, p. 187, fn. 11).35 
III. Conclusion: The Free Market Doctrine on Trial  
A country that is going to continue its catching-up or leapfrogging development process must have innovative 
entrepreneurs paving the way for all other kinds of entrepreneurs.36 These innovators have to be allowed, able, and 
willing to adapt and transform their resources (‘input’: knowledge, capital, natural resources, etc.) within their domestic 
markets in order to induce positive linkages to all sectors of industry.37 The specific characteristics of the catching-up 
process of small countries are on the one hand limited resources and growing complexity of developing basic 
technologies hindering the establishment of a cost-intensive infrastructure. On the other hand, global market for low and 
medium technology products are increasingly dominated by the scale and cost-advantaged and rapidly industrializing 
countries, e.g. South East Asia, India, and China (Tiits, Kattel and Kalvert 2006, p. 20). Hence, the main challenge for 
catching-up economies like Estonia lies in “their capability to be innovative while learning to use and develop the latest 
imported technologies, simultanously with establishing domestic industry that is competitive on international markets” 
(ibid, p. 19).  
In order to build dynamic comparative advantages by entering a new techno-economic paradigm (based on weak 
signals: holistic health; bio-/nanotechnology), an effective industrial policy (picking the winners) by investments in 
BCG-Matrix’ „question marks“ is needed by overcoming Hayek’s information problem (“arrogance of knowledge”).38 
                                                                                                                                                                  
proper institutional underpinnings of these developments (from a linear to a more systemic understanding of technological change)” 
(Karo 2010, p. 175). 
35
 During recent years a significant shift in the overall financing of and emphasis in the science and innovation policy can be 
observed. The MEAC was relatively under-represented in funding innovations until the introduction of the EU Structural Funds in 
Estonia. It funded about 14% of the total state budget for R&D in 2002, while it increased to approximately 40% by 2006. The rest 
has come through MER (with other ministries playing a minor role funding up to 1.2% of the R&D budget (Karo 2010, p. 187). In 
this context, the evolution of innovation programmes can be explained: “it is almost easier to initiate new policies than to change 
structural characteristics or old policies of a particular system. Therefore, it is not surprising that new policy initiatives, such as 
National Technology Programmes are initiated in Estonia in another attempt to create a horizontal coordinating mechanism into a 
structurally fragmented system that is not likely to produce the desired solutions” (Karo 2010, p. 194). 
36
 For leapfrogging in general, see Brezis, Krugman and Tsiddan (1991). In context with the catching up process in the case of China, 
see Zhu, Lynch and Jin (2011). 
37
 The important role of innovations is neglected in the conventional theory of international trade, since the role of entrepreneurs’ 
efforts “combining given factors in a new way” is ignored theoretically. It reflects an entrepreneurial behaviour Schumpeter 
described as the actions of a ‘mere manager” (or ‘routine entrepreneurship’ in terms of Jochen Röpke). The endowment of given 
production factors (labour, capital, knowledge, etc.) is the basis for a production function-oriented explanation for the bulk of 
international trade fluxes. Heckscher-Ohlin’s theorem (and its followers) reigns. Schumpeter’s cornerstones of economic 
development (innovation, entrepreneurship, finance) are difficult to integrate in standards economics – but the other way around 
might be more fruitful (see Siemon 2010). 
38
 The statement of a high innovation policy official –  “How should the government know which sector ought to be supported, and 
why and when” – would be a strong rapprochement to the “drastic market ideology” which has been characteristic of Estonia’s policy 
approach throughout the period after regaining independence in the 1990s (Kattel 2004, p. 414). Hence, Tiits (2007, p. 336) claims 
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Finnish economic development in the 1970-1980s and the policies implemented to catch up with Sweden are valuable 
recent examples (Tiits, Kattel and Kalvet 2006, p. 60). Tiits, Kattel and Kalvet (2006, p. 9) state that “without this 
policy and with the continuation of current specializing trends, Estonia is unlikely to ever catch up with the level of 
economic development in the European Union, the US, or the ‘Asian Tigers.’” 
Estonia’s export sector products are based on natural resources (wood processing activities) and low value adding 
functions of Scandinavian information technologies and electronic clusters (endowing cheap/low-skilled labour) being 
engaged primarily at the end of the product life cycles. Therefore a shift towards new comparative advantages is 
necessary to vitalize older industry segments and to establish new industry cycles.39 “Increasing wealth (wages and 
profits) and employment in Estonia is only possible in the long-term with the sale of innovative products and services to 
foreign markets. To achieve this, Estona must break out of the stereotypes associated with transitional countries and 
make itself known in the world as an innovative country” (Reid/Walendowski 2006, p. 32). The Schumpeterian 
orientated literature on Kondratieff dynamics has shown that for basic innovations in Kondratieff cycles 5 and 6 the role 
of academic knowledge and entrepreneurship has grown tremendously (Perez, 2002; Reinert, 2008; Röpke, 2006). 
Therefore, a strategy to break out of the free trade paradigm temporarily has to be accompanied with establishing a 
culture of academic entrepreneurship by coaching them to strengthen their capabilities and motivation. This culture is – 
despite certain efforts – still lacking. As long as the Estonian innovation policy will only be directed to producers with 
cost advantages and low scientific input, there will be no real economic development in the Schumpeterian sense. Thus, 
the framework of innovation policy in Estonia is like a gilded cage, supporting enterprises, but capturing 
entrepreneurship. 
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